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This thesis explores the trade related aspects of environmental standards. It assesses the potential 
for trade related conflict between Developed and Developing countries arising out of Unilateral 
Environmental Action (UEA). Furthermore it analyses the concept of Mutual Recognition (MR) and 
Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) to understand how the inherent characteristics may 
potentially be utilized to reduce friction in international trade while implementing standards. The 
thesis also looks at the WTO compatibility of environmental standards, UEAs and MRAs. It uses a 
“Black Letter” methodology of doctrinal analysis, concentrating on doctrinal principles associated 
with the transnational governance of environmental standards and  includes the analysis of statutes 
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The consequences of globalisation affect a number of public interest topics, such as human rights, 
sanitary and phytosanitary issues, and issues dealing with sovereignty. One such public interest topic 
allowing academic analysis is the relationship between globalized free trade and the environment1. 
An important discussion emanating from this intersection of trade and the environment is on the 
effects of environmental standards on trade.  
This thesis explores the trade related aspects of environmental standards2, including the need for 
WTO compliance, of ‘environmental standard increasing’ instruments which affect trade3 (such as 
Unilateral Environmental Instrument and Mutual Recognition Agreements). The thesis assesses the 
potential for trade related conflict between developed and developing countries arising out of 
normative environmental processes implementing environmental standards such as Unilateral 
Environmental Action (UEA)4. The thesis examines Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) as a 
trade instrument with the potential to increase environmental standards, while enquiring whether 
MRAs may reduce conflict arising out of trade related aspects of environmental standards5.  
Although the thesis does briefly discuss the reasons for such conflict, its primary aim is to analyse 
certain trade instruments that may alleviate the friction between developed and developing 
                                                          
1
 Brian R Copeland and M. Scott Taylor, ‘Trade, Growth and the Environment’ (2004) XLII Journal of Economic Literature 7; 
Please note that although the OSCOLA method of citations has been used in the thesis, for WTO Agreements and case law, 
and other international agreements the abbreviated name has been used. For a full citation of the case or agreement, see 
the first instance of the citation in the body of the text or the Bibliography. Please also note that the legal position of this 
thesis is that of September 2015 at which point it was submitted. Developments in International Environmental Law, Trade 
Law and Policy changes after this date will not be reflected in the discussions to follow. 
2
 See Chapter 3 Trade and Environment 
3
 See Chapter 2.3.3 The WTO and Standards; Chapter 3.4 Looking at the WTO; Chapter 4 Standards as General Exceptions 
to the GATT; Chapter 5.3.3 The Requirement of Necessity in WTO Jurisprudence; Chapter 7.3 MRAs: The WTO Perspective; 
and Chapter 8.4 The WTO and Environmental Standards 
4
 See Chapter 5.3 The Legality of UEAs 
5




countries while propagating environmental standards. The thesis analyses MRAs to see whether it 
implements environmental standards while reducing inter country friction in international trade. 
Whether MRAs increase standards through their functioning has been discussed in available 
literature6, but to a very small extent.  
One piece of literature however, seems to have discussed MRAs further in their relationship with 
standards. Schrodder has looked at the harmonization, equivalence and mutual recognition of 
standards in WTO law. The difference between Schroder’s analysis and this thesis is the broader 
scope of the term environmental standards7. This is also the novelty in the thesis. We do look at the 
WTO compatibility of standards as well as UEAs and MRAs, in this thesis and certainly there is an 
overlap with Schroder’s area of analysis. However we look at the WTO only to the extent of the 
compatibility of WTO rules with standards, environmental standards, UEAs and eventually MRAs. 
We look at standards in a larger – Dworkinian – scope8. 
The second area where the thesis is different is in its analysis of the characteristics of UEAs and 
MRAs to gauge whether such characteristics are conducive to the implementation of environmental 
standards. To be very clear, this does not suggest that the characteristics of MRAs or UEAs have not 
been analysed. On the contrary, there is extensive literature analysing the characteristics of MRAs 
and UEAs, and we look at this literature throughout the thesis. Where this thesis is different is in 
attempting to understand how these characteristics may potentially be utilized to combine a 
reduction in friction in international trade with the implementation of standards. 
Before analysing MRAs and UEAs, the backdrop i.e. the relationship between international trade and 
environmental issues needs to be understood. This chapter lays the premise behind considering 
international instruments found within the Trade-Environment nexus. This premise lies in the 
                                                          
6
 For example Nicolaidis and Shaffer differentiate between underlying standards and conformity assessment and also 
discuss home country and host country standards. Kalypso Nicolaidis and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Transnational Mutual 
Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 263 
7
 Humberto Zúñiga Schroder, Harmonization, Equivalence and Mutual Recognition of Standards, (Kluwer Law International 
2011); See Chapter 2.3 Standards and Chapter 2.3.1 Environmental Standards 
8
 See discussion on the Dworkinian definition of standards in Chapter 2.3 Standards 
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differences between Free Trade and Environmentalism and the conflict between the two schools of 
thought. The chapter also introduces the potential for conflict between developed and developing 
countries arising from the trade related aspects of environmental standards. The chapter then 
outlines the methodology and structure of the thesis. 
1.2 An Introduction to the Trade-Environment Nexus and the Debate on 
Environmental Standards in International Trade 
Free Trade and Environmentalism have often been considered as separate schools of thought and 
have as a consequence been addressed separately.  Furthermore, recent attempts to reconcile the 
two schools of trade and environment, as a result of the effects of globalized trade on the 
environment, have given rise to a further set of issues due to the conflicting interests of developing 
and developed countries. We look at these aspects briefly in this section as the foundation to the 
enquiries in this thesis. We discuss the first aspect of differing schools of trade and environment in 
this chapter. We introduce the issue of developed and developing country conflict stemming from 
varying environmental standards in this section but look at them in greater detail in Chapter 39 and 
510. 
Part of the difficulty in addressing issues relating to trade and the environment, lies in the fact that 
until recently free traders and environmentalists had addressed such issues under two very separate 
regimes11. Esty attributes this difference between free traders and environmentalists as a “clash of 
culture”, “a clash of paradigm” and “a clash of judgement”12. We expand on these three themes in 
the following paragraphs. 
In terms of a “clash of cultures”, Esty suggests that, as opposed to environmentalists who are 
“process-oriented”, free traders, on the other hand, are “outcome-oriented” and give more 
                                                          
9
 See Chapter 3.4.2 The Differing Interests of Developed and Developing Countries 
10
 See Chapter 5.4 The Legality of UEAs 
11
 Daniel C Esty, Greening the GATT (Institute for International Economics 1994) 9 
12
 Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 35  
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importance to the eventual goal of trade instruments13. This eventual goal for free traders is 
economic welfare, which can be achieved through the lowering of trade barriers14.  
This deep seated difference between the two schools of thought – Free Trade and Environmentalism 
– may perhaps be understood better through examining the two schools briefly. Dunkley defines 
Free Trade as, “the absence of artificial barriers to the free flow of goods and services between 
countries”15. This concept is deep rooted in the philosophy of free trade as is witnessed in the 
writing of Adam Smith:  
“A trade which is forced by means of bounties and monopolies, may be, and commonly is 
disadvantageous to the country in whose favour it is meant to be established, […]. But that 
trade which, without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between any 
two places, is always advantageous, […]”16.  
This strong belief of the advantage of free trade combined with the inter-war17 experience of the 
disastrous consequences of protectionism was the predominant feeling that was precursor to the 
formation of the GATT18. The success of the Uruguay round sought to cement this belief regarding 
the benefits of free trade and cooperation among nations, prompting the former WTO Secretary 
General, Renato Ruggiero to state: 
                                                          
13
 Esty clarifies that this does not imply that environmentalists are uninterested in the outcome of trade instruments. 
Rather, according to him the difference lies in the process of trade negotiations where trade negotiators are “comfortable 
with the diplomatic practice of working in secret” with the foresight of diffused benefits through trade liberalization. In 
contrast, he says, environmentalists prefer openness and public participation to alleviate the danger of business interests 
dominating trade negotiations. Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 36 
14
 Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 36 
15
 Graham Dunkley, Free Trade: Myth, Reality and Alternatives (Zed 2004) 9 
16
 Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (first published 1776, general editors R.H. 
Campbell and A.S. Skinner; textual editor W.B. Todd, OUP 1976) 489 
17
 The inter-war period is the time period between the end of the First World War (1919-1920) and the Beginning of the 
Second World War (1945) 
18
 Dunkley (n 15) 3 
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“By lowering barriers among nations, economies and people, it helps create interdependence 
and solidarity. Trade Liberalization is not just a recipe for growth, but also for security and 
peace, as history has shown us.”19 
Improved economic conditions in developing countries and successes of the Uruguay round have 
been portrayed by proponents of the WTO as a result of their integration into the multilateral 
system which Dunkley phrases as ‘trade determinism’ or the attribution “of all good things to free 
trade and globalisation”20.  
We contrast this school of thought with that of Environmentalism. Environmentalism is defined to 
be “[The] concern with the preservation of the natural environment, esp. from damage caused by 
human influence; the politics or policies associated with this”21. Therefore, by its very definition and 
as put forward by Esty, environmentalists are not only concerned with the eventual goal of the 
‘preservation of the natural environment’ but also with the very processes that are the means to the 
eventual goal i.e. the ‘politics and policies associated with [the preservation of the natural 
environment]’, which Free Traders look to veil22. Moreover, the justification of economic growth as 
an end may not hold ground with environmentalists as it fails to recognise intermediary processes 
that are environmentally degrading23. This “clash of culture” is often reflected in the relationship 
between trade and environmental organisations. The UNEP, for example, reports that the WTO rules 
and DSB decisions may have a detrimental effect on the way Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs) function24.  
                                                          
19
 Renato Ruggiero, Former Director General WTO, ‘A New Partnership for a New Century: Sustainable Global Development 
in a Global Age’ (Address to the Bellerive/Globe International Conference entitled "Policing the Global Economy", Geneva, 
23 March 1998) < http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/global_e.htm> accessed 29 June 2015 
20
 Dunkley (n 15) 3, 4 
21
 ‘environmentalism, n.’, OED Online,  OUP, December 2014 <www.oed.com/view/Entry/63091>  accessed 29 June 2015 
22
 Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 36; We consider these intermediary processes in relation to environmental standards, in 
later chapters. 
23
 Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 36 
24
 United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), ‘Civil society consultations on international environmental 
governance: Summary report: Nairobi, 22-23 May 2001.’ (2001) Nairobi: UNEP 5 
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Esty suggests that a further “clash of culture” between the two schools of free trade and 
environmentalism occurs due to the relative infancy of environmentalism compared to free trade25. 
Trade has been in existence since antiquity, and international trade for a few centuries. The GATT 
(including in its current form) is 66 years old. Contrastingly, environmentalism is a movement with 
no coherent international system and without an all embracing environmental regime26. Rather, an 
amalgam of parallel interests is found, often under the aegis of the United Nations, consisting of 
several multilateral and bilateral environmental treaties and environmental institutions, 
concentrating on specific subject areas27.  
As an illustration, consider the following diverse set of treaties and conventions pertaining to various 
environmental concerns (this is but a small un-exhausted list). While the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)28, which includes the Kyoto Protocol29, provides binding 
emission reduction targets for climate change and air pollution, the institutional structure which 
specifically addresses the depletion of the ozone layer and reduction targets for ozone depleting 
substances is the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer30 along with the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol)31 . A separate convention 
addressing transboundary pollution is the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution32. 
Two major treaties which address species and habitat conservation are the Convention on 
                                                          
25
 Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 37 
26
 Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 37; Although the UNEP may be considered one such body, the lack of a dispute 
settlement body and enforcement procedures renders it comparatively less effective than the WTO. Evidence of this may 
be derived from the numerous environmentally inclined case-law heard at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. 
Also, by the UNEP’s own admission, the environmental authority of the UNEP has progressively eroded, not least because 
of the multiple multilateral environmental agreements. See UNEP (2001) (n24) 1 
27
 Alexander Ovodenko and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Institutional Diffusion in International Environmental Affairs’ (2012) 88 
International Affairs 523, 525 
28
 ‘Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change’, (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 2014) <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php>  accessed 29 June 2015 
29
 ‘Kyoto Protocol’, (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2014)  
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php> accessed 29 June 2015 
30
 United Nations Environmental Programme, Handbook for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
(9
th
 Edition, UNEP, 2012) <http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/VC_Handbook/VC-Handbook-2012.pdf> accessed 29 June 
2015 
31
 United Nations Environmental Programme, The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, (Ozone 
Secretariat 2010) <http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/Treaties/treaties_decisions-hb.php?sec_id=5> accessed 29 June 
2015; Link to text of Protocol on webpage. 
32
 ‘The Convention: The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution’, (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe) <http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.html> accessed 29 June 2015; Link to text of 
Convention on webpage. 
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International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)33 and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD)34 while separate agreements such as the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)35 and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas (ICCAT)36 address specific marine species and habitats. Moreover, more general agreements 
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)37 contain provisions for the 
protection of the marine environment. Certain agreements such as the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention)38 address specific 
aspects of environmental policy.  
Although several such environmental agreements are negotiated under the United Nations (UN) 
structure, a concrete institution providing international regulations (such as the WTO for 
international trade) is as yet unavailable for international environmental concerns39. The reliability of 
the WTO is increased by the availability of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is perhaps why 
several environmentally important trade disputes, which may fall under other international 
agreements are preferred to be heard by the parties under WTO rules. There are of course 
environmental cases heard by the ICJ40, yet disputes such as the Tuna/Dolphin cases41 have been 
                                                          
33
 ‘Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora’, (CITES) 
<http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php>  accessed 29 June 2015 
34
 ‘Text of the CBD’, (Convention on Biological Diversity) <https://www.cbd.int/convention/text/default.shtml>   accessed 
13 June 2015 
35
 ‘Key Documents: The Convention’, (International Whaling Commission) <https://iwc.int/convention> accessed 29 June 
2015; Link to text of Convention on webpage. 
36
 ‘ICCAT: Home’ (The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas) <https://www.iccat.int/en/> 
accessed 29 June 2015; Link to the Basic Texts on webpage or go directly to  ‘Basic Texts’, (The International Commission 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas) <https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Commission/BasicTexts.pdf>  accessed 29 June 
2015 
37
 ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982: Overview and full text’, (United Nations; 
Oceans & Law of the Sea, 2013) 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm> accessed 29 June 2015; 
Link to text of Convention on webpage. 
38
 ‘Introduction to ESPOO Convention’, (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/Espoo_Convention_authentic_ENG.pdf> accessed 
29 June 2015; Link to text of Convention on webpage.  
39
 The UNEP as mentioned in (n 26) lacks a dispute settlement body and an implementation structure. See also UNEP 
(2001) (n 24) 
40
 See for example Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) (Judgement) [2014] ICJ; or Case 
Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgement) [1997] ICJ 
41
 The three Tuna Dolphin cases are United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Report of the Panel) (3 September 
1991) GATT DS21/R-39S/155 (US – Tuna (Mexico)); United States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Report of the Panel) 
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tried under WTO rules (GATT Article XX) even when agreements such as the ICCAT42 (a non-WTO 
agreement) was functional. One reason why the DSB is preferred to the ICJ may perhaps be because 
several ICJ awards are often un-complied with43. 
The Trade - Environment debate is also classified by Esty as a “clash of paradigms”. According to him, 
the Environmentalists views are essentially law based whereas the Free Traders hold an economic 
perspective.44 Environmentalists have traditionally been suspicious of incentive based policy and 
regulation45. According to environmentalists, this places a price-tag on the environment and the 
ability to substitute environmental obligations with money46. Furthermore, Environmentalists are 
also suspicious of the adherents of economic prosperity not giving sufficient regard to the needs of 
future generations and principles of sustainable development47. 
On the other hand, free traders are of the opinion that stringent environmental standards could lead 
to a competitive disadvantage against goods in markets with less stringent environmental 
standards48.  Compliance cost has been correlated to less productivity in several industries where 
environmental standards are higher49. Free traders see such environmental practices as coercive and 
accuse environmentalists of being indifferent to the actual effects of such practices and more 
preoccupied with their implementation. The resulting international chaos is perceived as a threat to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(16 June 1994) GATT DS29/R (US – Tuna (EEC)); and United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (Report of the Appellate Body) (16 May 2012) WTO WT/DS381/AB/R (US – Tuna II 
(Mexico)) 
42
 ICCAT (n 36) 
43
 Aloysius P. Llamzon, ‘Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice’ (2008) 18 The 
European Journal of International Law 819 
44
 Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 38 
45
 Steven J. Kelman, What Price Incentives? Economists and the Environment (Praeger 1981) 109; see also Esty, Greening 
the GATT (n 11) 38 
46
 Kelman (n 45) 110 
47
 Richard A. Johnson, ‘Commentary: Trade Sanctions and Environmental Objectives in the NAFTA’, (1993) 5 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 577, 581 
48
 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness [1993] The Yale Law Journal 2039, 
2043; Kelman (n 45), however, notes that there will be a competitive advantage in the domestic market, against foreign 
products of lower environmental standards. Furthermore, there may be a competitive advantage in the global market, if a 
market for “green” products of technology emerges. 
49
 Wayne B. Gray and Ronald J. Shadbegian, ‘Environmental Regulation and Manufacturing Productivity at the Plant Level’ 
(1993) US Department of Commerce, Centre for Economic Studies, NBER Working Paper No. 4321, 16 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w4321.pdf> accessed 29 June 2015 
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the trading system Free Traders promote and thus a threat to international harmony50. This divide is 
concerning as it has prompted scholars wary of excessive environmentalism to accuse 
environmentalists of being blindly opposed to all human endeavours of progress. As Gibson states:  
“Environmentalism […] would treat problems, real or alleged, as an opportunity to attack 
progress. As part of a broader political agenda, the truthfulness of the claims made is 
secondary to their propaganda value. The presentation of facts would be highly selective, 
sweeping generalizations would be used, along with inflammatory rhetoric. Human needs 
and desires would be portrayed as problems in themselves. Progress, science and technology 
would all in general be disparaged. This ‘ism’ would promote pessimism and anti-human 
elitism. Environmental problems, real or not, would be focused on to support the broader 
political agenda”51. 
Another effect of disparities in environmental standards is that it may lead to a “race to the 
bottom”. With the advent of globalisation, countries have had to engage in “regulatory competition” 
in order to restrict an outflow of investment and corporations, or to attract new investment. To 
prevent corporation from moving to lower environmentally regulated jurisdictions countries may 
lower their own as an incentive to global commerce52. 
Lastly, we look at Esty’s suggestion of a “clash of judgements” causing a difference between 
propagators of free trade and environmentalism. Such a clash derives primarily from the uncertainty 
in quantifying environmental harm and the value of environmental standards53. Even when 
economic theory is applied with environmental variables being considered, often assumptions are 
made due to the excessive scientific uncertainty involved in future projections54. However, in terms 
                                                          
50
 Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 39 
51
 Donald Gibson, Environmentalism: Ideology and Power (Nova Science Publishers, 2002) 8 
52
 David Vogel and Robert A Kagan, ‘Introduction: National Regulations in A Global Economy’, in David Vogel and Robert A 
Kagan (eds.), Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalisation Affects National Regulatory Policies (University of 
California Press, 2004) 3 
53
 Esty, Greening the GATT (n 11) 40 
54
 Clement Allan Tisdell (ed), Economics of Environmental Conservation (2
nd
 Ed, Edward Elgar, 2006) 21 
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of environmental policy affecting trade, certain allowances have been made for such scientific 
uncertainty through policy tools such as the precautionary principle, allowing for measures 
preventing environmental degradation in the face of serious or irreversible damage55. 
Another possible way to negate scientific uncertainty when formulating environmental policy is 
through a life cycle analysis of a manufactured product. In trade parlance this would be the issue 
surrounding Process and Production Methods (PPMs)56. Although regulated production methods at 
every step of a product’s life cycle provides for a detailed and intensive environmental supervision, 
such regulations may fall foul of WTO rules if ‘like products’, without any distinctions in the final 
products, are compared through their PPMs57. 
The issues arising out of the confluence of trade and the environment is not limited merely to the 
differences in the two schools of thought. Globalisation and a consequent economic integration 
have a marked and direct effect on an increase in friction between countries (especially between 
developed and developing countries) resulting from environmental concerns58. Part of the reason for 
such friction arises from the fact that countries may be apprehensive of varying environmental goals 
and standards of other nations59. 
Varying environmental standards of different countries lead to several issues. One of the issues with 
trade related aspects of environmental standards is that, host countries accepting imported goods 
and services are purported to ignore environmental standards in the home country. This leads from 
the ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis where manufacturing is shifted to countries with less stringent 
environmental standards60.  
                                                          
55
 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) (Rio Declaration) (U.N. Doc A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1) Principle 
15, See Chapter 2 Concepts and Definitions for a discussion on the Precautionary Principle. 
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In countries with higher environmental standards, objections include having to compete with 
economies which have a ‘lower burden’ than themselves due to the presence of lower standards. 
This in turn also breeds the fear of “a race to the bottom” that may eventually lower the standards 
of the countries with existent high standards, in order to stay in competition61.  
Furthermore, even if countries with higher standards pursued their agenda for altruistic reasons, 
such an agenda may quite often be perceived as protectionist. This issue is further exacerbated for 
environmentalists because WTO rules allow countries with lower standards to object to such high 
standards.62  
The potential conflict of the environmental interests of one nation with the trade interests of 
another are discussed in later chapters63, including with regard to the various disputes that have 
appeared at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)64. It is 
however, pertinent to note that this conflict between Developed and Developing countries and the 
seeming friction arising from environmental standards in trade is the central theme which this thesis 
wishes to address.  
Even proponents of free trade such as Bhagwati have suggested that social agendas (such as 
environmental standards) “cannot be advanced without economic prosperity”65. As Esty declares, 
the connection between trade policy and its effect on the environment cannot be denied66. As a 
result the two legal regimes of trade and environment are inherently interconnected and must be 
considered in tandem when formulating policy. Renato Ruggiero, in the earlier mentioned address to 
the Globe International Conference highlighted this interconnectivity, stating that: 
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“Today the trading system is called on from one side or another to take account of 
environmental policy, financial instability, labour standards, ethical issues, development 
policy, competition law, culture, technology, investment, marginalization, security, health - 
an ever-lengthening list of issues which can be associated in one way or another with trade. 
This underlines the degree of interdependence we have reached in our world. Clearly, the 
implications of trade liberalization go much beyond trade and economics. 
[...] 
The reality of globalisation is the reality of interdependence, an interdependence that, as I 
said at the outset, extends far beyond trade or strictly economic criteria. But trade remains 
a key element in sustaining and spreading the benefits of interdependence.”67 
It is therefore with this premise in mind that the thesis analyses environmental standards in light of 
the possibility for conflict between trade interests and environmental standards amongst developed 
and developing countries. The thesis assesses this possibility for trade related conflict between 
developed and developing countries in instruments implementing environmental standards in trade, 
such as Unilateral Environmental Action (UEA)68. The thesis thereafter examines the concept of 
Mutual Recognition (MR) and Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) as a trade instrument with 
the potential to increase environmental standards while simultaneously reducing conflict arising out 
of trade related aspects of environmental standards69. The next section provides an analysis of the 
methodology used in the thesis and the key research themes and points of departures which will be 
found in the rest of the thesis. 
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69




1.3 Methodology and Research Themes 
The thesis uses a “Black Letter” methodology of doctrinal analysis, concentrating on doctrinal 
principles associated with the transnational governance of environmental standards. Important 
instances and examples of doctrinal analysis in the thesis include discussions on Sustainable 
Development70, the concept of Necessity in International Law and especially within the 
jurisprudence of the WTO71, the Kantian theory of Cosmopolitan Law72, the Environmental Kuznets 
curve73 and associated doctrines such as Inglehart’s concept of Post-materialism74, the various 
discussions of sovereignty arising out of instruments increasing environmental standards in 
international trade75 etc. The thesis also includes the analysis of statutes and cases of the WTO76.  
This thesis is a qualitative analysis of existing paradigms and instruments in the intersection of trade 
and environment and of agreements77 which help illustrate such paradigms. However, although 
individual MRAs have been analysed, the thesis is not a case study approach. Rather, it is a 
comparative approach looking at different instruments which have the potential to increase 
environmental standards. To clarify, such instruments are not seen as isolated topics used for treaty 
or agreement analysis. Instead the comparative approach is used to look at a conflict of laws arising 
from such instruments.  
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Such a comparative approach is used in the thesis at different levels of analysis. The analysis of 
MRAs as a trade instrument with the potential to increase environmental standards, and their 
similarity, analogy and differentiation in relation to instruments such as Unilateral Environmental 
Instruments, form the basis of one level of this comparative approach78.  
As the thesis delves deeper into an analysis of one particular instrument – Mutual Recognition – we 
find the comparative approach is used to analyse different forms of Mutual Recognition79. At this 
level the comparative analysis illustrates the differences between forms of MR such as Judicial80, 
Regulatory81 and Managed82 MR. This comparative approach also illustrates an evolution of MR from 
its inception in European Jurisprudence83, to the form it achieves in international agreements84, to a 
form investigated by this thesis for the potential to decrease conflict in trade while propagating 
environmental standards85.  
MR and MRAs has been the subject of substantial academic analysis since the inception of the 
concept in Europe. Various aspects of MR have been extensively scrutinized with academic vigour. 
Several commentators have discussed MR as an instrument of transnational governance86. Other 
discussions have elaborated on the economic perspective of MR regimes and MRAs87. Yet others 
have highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of such MR regimes88. Importantly, some 
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literature focuses on the relationship between the EU and Mutual Recognition regimes89 and other 
literature even extends the analysis of EU Mutual Recognition to WTO compatibility90. Certain 
literature even has themes in close proximity to the research theme of this thesis, often being 
comparative studies on harmonization, equivalence and MR in terms of WTO law91. 
The question therefore may be asked, given this vast repertoire of scholarship on MR and MRAs, 
how the thesis furthers the research on the subject. A response to this would be the linking of 
environmental standards to MR, to investigate whether the instrument may have the potential to 
increase environmental standards particularly. Moreover, the thesis will also analyse the 
characteristics of MR which may provide the opportunity to decrease friction among trading nations. 
The thesis also looks at a broader remit of the definition of ‘standards’ than as considered by the 
WTO. Thus, instead of looking at only those standards defined by the WTO, the thesis looks at the 
WTO compatibility of instruments incorporating a much broader definition of the term 
‘environmental standards’. However, unlike Schroeder, the thesis limits the discussion to a definition 
of environmental standards exclusively, and not standards in general92.  
1.3.1 Limitations 
As a matter of convenience we provide a set of limitations and assumptions to this thesis in the form 
of a list: 
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(1) The thesis does not compare the effectiveness of the discussed instruments in increasing 
environmental standards. In other words, the thesis is not a comparative of whether UEIs or 
MRAs are more effective at increasing environmental standards. Rather, it is attempted to 
first establish whether MRAs do increase environmental standards, before analysing the 
consequences of the instruments used on the relationship between developed and 
developing countries. As mentioned earlier in the introduction, although the thesis does 
briefly discuss the reasons for such conflict, its primary aim is to analyse certain trade 
instruments that may alleviate the friction between developed and developing countries 
while propagating environmental standards. 
(2) The thesis does not discuss the possibility of an overhaul of the international trade regime. 
Several authors have argued for a radical overhaul of the trade regime in order to effectively 
address other socio-economic issues such as the effect of international trade on the 
environment. Although there is certainly an argument to be made for this theory of entirely 
overhauling the trade regime93, addressing the theory would be outside the purview of the 
thesis. Rather, the thesis concentrates on instruments already prevalent within the 
International trade system. Specifically, the thesis looks at trade instruments with the 
potential of increasing environmental standards, and more specifically at such potential of 
increasing environmental standards in MRAs.  
(3) The thesis assumes that conflict between states arising from the environmental standards 
and trade is detrimental to the effectiveness of environmental standards. To be simple, the 
thesis assumes that international friction leads to a drop in the quality of environmental 
standards. To make this assumption based on previous literature, the thesis may then 
concentrate on analysing how the characteristics of MRAs may aid in reducing inter country 
friction. 
                                                          
93
 See for example, Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs Climate Change (Simon and Schitzer, 2014); Janet 
Dine, ‘Democratization: The Contribution of Fair Trade and the Ethical Trading Movement’ (2008) 15(1) Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 177 
17 
 
(4) The thesis discusses international trade at the macroscopic level only. We define this 
macroscopic level to include international trade rules, regulations and trade statistics 
between nation states. Therefore the thesis does not involve a discussion on private 
standards. 
(5) The thesis discusses MRAs implementing standards and their effect on the trade in goods 
only. This limitation has two parts. Firstly, by discussing underlying standards only, the 
mutual recognition of conformity assessment programmes is not discussed in the thesis94. 
This is because conformity assessments are a topic of discussion on their own right and 
deviate from central theme of discussing environmental standards in international trade. 
Secondly, by discussing the effect of MRAs associated with trading in goods we leave 
services out of this thesis. Again, the discussion surrounding services is a separate and 
extensive topic on its own and merits an individual study. This also means that a discussion 
on GATS rules is limited in this thesis95. 
(6) The thesis generally assumes a demand for higher environmental standards to flow from 
Developed (standard makers) to Developing (standard takers) countries. Although Section 
3.2 The Environmental Kuznets curve is discussed in an attempt to justify this assumption of 
Developed countries demanding higher environmental standards of Developing countries, 
the general trend of the thesis is to assume the dynamic from the outset. 
(7) The US-Japan Mutual Recognition Agreement on Organic Products analysed in the thesis was 
selected due to the availability of data. MRAs are often negotiated with very little public 
access and associated data is difficult to obtain. The data obtained for the US-Japan MRA 
was through email correspondence with the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). The MRA itself was negotiated through correspondence. This set of correspondence 
has been attached to the thesis as Annex I. 
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(8) The thesis does not discuss the effect of Regional Trade Agreements on the WTO system. 
The proliferation of several Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) has had an effect on the 
trade regime. While RTAs can complement the WTO system, they are essentially 
instruments of preferential treatment96. Many commentators have discussed the various 
effects of RTAs on the WTO. Such a discussion, however, is outside the purview of this 
thesis.  Instead, the thesis looks at the relationship between the WTO and bilateral and 
plurilateral treaties, i.e. the MRAs analysed, only to the extent of the WTO compatibility of 
such treaties. However, we briefly list some of the arguments put forward in terms of the 
adverse effects RTAs and bilateral treaties have on the multilateral trade system.  
One such argument is that RTAs may be used to influence multilateral negotiations97. 
Secondly, regional trade negotiations may divert valuable resources from Developing and 
poorer countries, which would otherwise be used for multilateral negotiations98. 
Furthermore, RTAs arguably invite costly trade diversions away from the multilateral 
system99. Importantly, RTAs create parallel legal frameworks100 and often have their own 
dispute settlement mechanisms which may be incompatible to WTO laws and the 
jurisprudence of the DSB101.  
There are however, academics who argue in favour of RTAs, disagreeing that RTAs have an 
adverse affect on the multilateral trade system. In terms of trade diversion academics argue 
that trade blocs are already prevalent in the multilateral system, and thus a concrete 
bilateral or plurilateral treaty among them would increase and strengthen trade rather than 
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divert it102. Furthermore, regional trade is often seen as a stepping stone, or an integrating 
factor, towards stronger multilateral ties103. In that vein, this thesis looks at the WTO 
compatibility of UEIs and MRAs in general, and the specific MRAs analysed. 
(9) The thesis does not look at the concept of power in international relations. Power is 
extremely influential in determining international relations. Unequal power amongst 
countries may have an influence in the formulation of international policies and have a 
similar influence in the adjudication and implementation of international judgements104. 
Moreover, unequal power between nations may also influence the decision in bringing a 
case to an international adjudicating forum against a powerful country105.  
However, the enormity of such a concept prevents its discussion in the thesis. The very 
definition of the word ‘Power’ used in this context merits a nuanced and extensive 
discussion. Payne defines power as “The ability to get others–individuals, groups, or 
nations–to behave in ways that they ordinarily would not”106. Viotti & Kauppi define power 
as “the means by which a state or other actor wields or can assert actual or potential 
influence or coercion relative to other states and non state actors because of the political, 
geographic, economic and financial, technological, military, social, cultural, or other 
capabilities it possesses”107. However, Barnett and Duvall sum up the complexity in defining 
power by stating that, “no single concept can capture the forms of power in international 
politics”108. 
To delve into the dynamics of power underpinning international relations would be to 
detract from the main objective of the thesis to understand and analyse the legal 
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relationship between states in terms of environmental standards. Although power may have 
a determinant role in such a relationship, the thesis assumes its neutrality and therefore, 
avoids the discussion of power while analysing the law underpinning international 
relationships. 
(10) The thesis does not discuss the implementation of the regulations and the judgements 
influencing international trade and environmental law and policy – Similar to the concept of 
power, and as mentioned in the previous point, connected to it, is the concept of the 
implementation of judgements. Often dissimilar power amongst countries would mean that 
judgements are not equitably implemented. International judgements have often presumed 
implementation and have refused to discuss the eventuality of non-implementation109. In 
other cases, when the non-implementation of a judgement was inevitable, the courts, 
through strict interpretation, absolved themselves of any jurisdiction110. This is also true for 
the enforcement of treaties and MEAs. Implementation is also dependant on factors such as 
corruption, national interests and vote bank politics. Thus the factors influencing 
implementation is the realm of a separate discussion and the constraints of space prevents 
its discussion here. 
(11) The analysis of the NAFTA Agreement is limited to the sections on Agriculture and Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary sections and the provisions of mutual recognition within them. These two 
sections of the NAFTA were chosen due to their association with environmental standards. 
(12) The thesis does not analyse harmonization as an instrument. We explore this limitation in 
further detail immediately below.  
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One further instrument related to environmental standards affecting trade, that could potentially be 
analysed, would be Harmonization. There is in fact already available literature on the comparison of 
the two instruments111. Therefore, it is necessary to explain why harmonization is not considered in 
greater detail within the thesis. Rather it is used as a comparative tool to highlight characteristics of 
MR only. 
The argument for avoiding an analysis of harmonization in this thesis is two-fold. The first contention 
to explain the lack of an analysis of harmonization of international environmental standards stems 
from the diversity of such standards. These diverse set of standards are often seen as non-tariff 
barriers to trade as they may be used disproportionately as a means for protectionism112 thereby 
leading to “unfair trade and competition”, and there is certainly a prevalent academic argument to 
harmonize environmental standards to reduce trade barriers113. Free Traders feel that to eliminate 
such diversity in standards, harmonization – or in other words the “adoption of uniform standards” – 
is necessary114. 
There is however a counter-argument to the necessity for harmonization of standards. Diversity of 
environmental standards may occur for several reasons including differences in technology and 
considerations to national environmental circumstances such as weather, demography, geography 
etc115. A country may choose to address environmental issues differently from another country (and 
give more importance to one over another) if it feels this would be beneficial to its citizens116. In fact 
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WTO jurisprudence says as much by allowing countries to choose their own level of environmental 
protection117.  
Furthermore, such differing circumstances from which diverse environmental standards arise, also 
provide “differential advantages of production and trade competitiveness”, a fact common to every 
trading nation, whatever the level of standard prevalent within them118. Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
therefore state that the notion that the diversity in environmental standards “is illegitimate and 
constitutes ‘unfair trade’ or ‘unfair competition’ is itself illegitimate”, as is the consequent demand 
for harmonization119. Harmonization would lead to a country with lower environmental standards 
‘distorting their standards up’ and could potentially lead to an economic and welfare loss as a 
result120.  
Another argument in favour of harmonization is its preference over equivalence121. Donahue 
differentiates harmonization as the case where parties “adjust their differing standards until they 
are the same” while under equivalence parties “agree to treat their differing standards as if they 
were the same”122. According to Donahue, the two instruments are not interchangeable and while 
harmonization in an upward direction increases environmental protection, equivalence “allows the 
weaker standard to serve as a bypass route around the stronger one, thereby invalidating the 
stronger and reducing the level of protection”123.  
There are several strands to counter the above argument. Firstly, while accepting that the nature of 
harmonization is to create the same standard and that of equivalence is to agree to differing 
standards, it is pointed out that the argument does not consider the reasons for these differing 
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international environmental standards, as has been discussed above124. Moreover, although it is 
generally true that equivalence is treating differing standards “as if they were the same”, the 
objective of the standard is important towards achieving equivalence in some forms of mutual 
recognition (MR) of equivalence125.  Even WTO Agreements encourage Members to accept “as 
equivalent technical regulations of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, 
provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives of their own 
regulations”126 [emphasis added].  
Secondly, the contention that equivalence and harmonization is not interchangeable may not be 
true in its entirety. Rather, Nicolaidis states that mutual recognition can be seen as the “residual of 
harmonization”. At times, ‘left-over’ regulations are mutually recognised once harmonization has 
been assessed127. Nicolaidis also adds that “some degree of harmonization or autonomous 
convergence of underlying standards” may result from MRAs128. 
Lastly, we address Donohue’s contention that equivalence reduces the level of environmental 
protection by allowing weaker standards. Although it is certainly plausible that the negotiation of a 
high harmonized standard would increase the level of environmental protection compared to the 
recognition of an equivalent standard which is lower, Donahue does not account for two factors. The 
first factor is that the consideration of similar objectives when recognizing standards (as has been 
discussed above) keeps the environmental objectives equivalent if not the standard, and affords a 
certain amount of flexibility in considering domestic environmental circumstances. 
The second factor that may be considered is that, demanding harmonizing standards may in fact be 
environmentally detrimental if we consider the resulting international friction of such an insistence 
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for the imposition of standards. Consider for example the situation surrounding US – Tuna (Mexico) 
and the embargo which led to the case129. The US’ insistence on the banning of Purse Seine nets for 
Tuna fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific region (this could be regarded as the harmonization of 
fishing standards), led to three international cases130. Furthermore, pressure from the Inter 
American Tropical Tuna Convention (IATTC)131, led eventually to the Clinton Administration passing a 
much diluted International Dolphin Conservation Protection Act 1997 (IDCPA)132, thereby 
compromising prevalent Dolphin Safety regulations133. The Act included Purse Seine fishing by 
countries that were members of the International Dolphin Conservation Program, as “dolphin 
safe”134, in the prevalent eco labelling program mandated by the Dolphin Protection Consumer 
Information Act, 1990135. This reduction of standards may be seen as a direct result for the 
harmonization of environmental standards136. On the other hand, as Nicolaidis and Shaffer 
postulate, the necessary public and private engagement arising out of mutual recognition 
agreements breeds a familiarity which leaves room for ‘regulatory convergence’ as opposed to ‘ex-
ante harmonization’137.  
Given these above considerations, we leave Harmonization out of the purview of this thesis and 
concentrate on MRAs as a trade instrument with the potential to decrease international friction 
arising out of environmental standards, while having the potential to increase such standards. 
Furthermore, the consideration that mutual recognition may tend towards harmonization creates 
the opportunity for further research beyond the subject area of this thesis. 
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One further aspect must be clarified before moving on to the next section of this chapter. As the 
thesis analyses the concept of environmental standards in international and world trade, it is 
integral to the thesis that the compatibility of environmental standards, UEIs and MRAs, with WTO 
law be analysed as well. The thesis therefore discusses such compatibility at every opportunity138. 
The next section looks at the structure of the thesis to illustrate the continuity within the several 
themes prevalent in the thesis. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of nine substantive chapters followed by a concluding chapter. The following 
chapter, Chapter 2 elaborated on two necessary seminal concepts central to this thesis – the 
definition of Developed and Developing countries and the concept of environmental standards. 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the elaboration of concepts and definitions139. 
Chapter 2 starts by defining Developed and Developing countries140. The friction between Developed 
and Developing countries stemming out of the effects of environmental standards on trade, is 
mentioned throughout the thesis, and the nature of the parties to such friction must be defined in 
order to truly understand the issues discussed. The chapter looks at the various categorizations 
found in international organisations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the United Nations Development Program and the WTO, 
before stating the definition used in the thesis.  
Chapter 2 next looks at the basic definition of standards141. The chapter finds the definition of 
standards to create a level of “quality or attainment” which is “required, aimed at, or possible”142. It 
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also looks at the definition provided by the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO)143. 
However, it may be argued that standards in certain international agreements such as the Rio 
Declaration environmental protection standard set for development processes144 may not fall within 
such a definition. Furthermore International environmental norms may not fall under standards 
under these definitions. The chapter therefore looks towards a Dworkinian sense of standards in 
order to assess whether rules, principles and policies fall under the definition of standards. 
Dworkin’s categorisation is convenient to the thesis as it expands the scope of the definition of 
standards to include those principles of environmental law which are often considered to be ‘soft 
law’145. Chapter 2 then turns its attention to environmental standards specifically146. It discusses the 
definition provided by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution147 before elaborating on 
the different forms of environmental standards148. 
Chapter 2 next looks at the WTO compatibility of Environmental Standards149. The chapter discusses 
the definition of international environmental standards under the WTO followed by the WTO 
compatibility of standards and standard setting agreements. It considers the standards which are 
perceived as technical barriers according to WTO rules and the provisions in the TBT Agreement 
which address this. The chapter also looks at WTO plus agreements containing standards of a higher 
level than those provided or accepted by the WTO. 
Lastly, Chapter 2 looks at various principles of International Environmental Law150, which are not 
only principles central to the thesis but often found in the form of standards themselves. An 
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example of this would be the concept of Sustainable Development often found as a standard in 
international environmental agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  
Having introduced the key concept of standards the thesis then turns its attention to the 
relationship between trade and the environment in Chapter 3151. It attempts to draw a relationship 
between the economic growth of a nation and its effect on environmental standards, initially using 
the Kuznets curve hypothesis as a starting point to the discussion152. The curve suggests that after a 
point in the economic growth of a nation (calculated using its GDP), termed as the “Tipping Point 
Income”, environmental degradation decreases indirectly proportional to the income of a country153. 
This phenomenon could possibly be explained through Inglehart’s theory of Post-materialism154 
which is discussed in Chapter 3155. The EKC and Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism suggests that 
the demand for environmental standards may naturally flow from developed countries towards 
developing countries. Thus Developing countries tend to be ‘standard takers’156 i.e. exporting 
countries.  
Chapter 3 next looks at the concept of Sustainable Development as an essential theory within the 
trade-environment nexus157. The discussion projects the two parameters of ‘environmental capacity’ 
and ‘social sustainability’ as essential to analysing trade instruments with the potential of increasing 
environmental standards while avoiding international friction between trading nations. However, 
the discussion also notices the differing levels of socially acceptable environmental harm in different 
countries, which could essentially lead to environment related international trade disputes.  
                                                          
151
 See Chapter 3 Trade and Environment 
152
 See Chapter 3 Section 3.2 The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
153
 Nemat Shafik, ‘Economic Development and Environmental Quality: An Econometric Analysis’, (1994) 46 Oxford 
Economic Papers 757, 765 
154
 Ronald F Inglehart, ‘Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006’ (2008) 31 Western European Politics 
130 
155
 See Chapter 3 Section 3.2.1 Post-materialism 
156
 Certain developing countries however, have participated in developing international standards within the ISO, by 
providing secretariats to technical committees of particular manufacturing industries. However, the general trend is for 
Developing Countries to be standard takers. See Khalid Nadvi, ‘Global standards, global governance and the organisation of 
global value chains’ (2008) 8 Journal of Economic Geography 323, 329-330 
157
 See Chapter 3 Section 3.4 Sustainable Development and the Trade-Environment Relationship 
28 
 
Such disputes are often heard at the DSB of the WTO. Chapter 3 therefore looks at the WTO as an 
intermediary to trade-environment disputes158. It discusses the environmental drawbacks of banking 
on a trade organisation for settling environmentally inclined disputes and introduces Article XX of 
the GATT as the recourse taken by parties towards justifying environmental policies under the 
WTO159 as these set of Articles form the General Exceptions to the GATT. Chapter 3 thereafter looks 
at the differing interests of Developed and Developing countries within the WTO160 and interplay 
between such interests and international environmental treaty obligation161. 
As the General Exceptions to the GATT are so important to the admissibility of environmental policy 
and standards in international trade Chapter 4 is dedicated to the analysis of Article XX of the 
GATT162. As environmental standards may infringe general GATT principles, such as those in Articles 
I163, II164, III165 and XI166 the recourse for justifying environmental standards falls towards Article XX 
(b), (g) of the GATT and the Chapeau of Article XX. The jurisprudence surrounding Article XX is 
complex and continuously evolving (not least because of the organisational change of the 
multilateral trading platform from the GATT to the WTO). The thesis therefore analyses the various 
available GATT and WTO case-law, related to the environmental provisions of Article XX. This is done 
to derive the principles which shape the characteristics of environmental standards, which might 
stand the test of WTO law scrutiny. 
Chapter 5 scrutinizes UEIs to highlight the characteristics of unilateral action in order to assess the 
points at which such instruments may lead to international dispute167. The chapter attempts to 
assess the UEIs to understand the importance of – (1) a more negotiated approach, in order to 
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reduce international friction and diplomatic mistrust and (2) continued and optimal market access, 
in order to fulfil international trade obligations (such as those of the WTO) – and to understand their 
effect on the implementation of environmental standards in a globalized world economy168.  
Chapter 5 first categorizes UEAs according to the point of causation and where the effect is felt, 
thereby covering all transboundary circumstances169. The chapter explores the legality of unilateral 
action in International Law170. It highlights the question of permanent sovereignty of a State171, the 
State’s obligation towards other nations for environmental damage caused within its borders and 
the right to unilateral action for the non-fulfilment of such obligation172, and the WTO compatibility 
of unilateral action173. If unilateral action, when taken by one State has an effect outside the 
jurisdiction of the implementing state, it may have international ramifications and become cause for 
dispute174. 
Having identified these characteristics the thesis then recommends MRAs for analysis in order to 
discuss whether the characteristics that lead to international dispute in the case of UEIs may be 
circumvented through certain characteristics prevalent in MRAs. MR is based on the principle of 
unencumbered sale of a product or service in one jurisdiction without having to comply with its 
regulations if such sale is lawfully permitted in another jurisdiction, subject to the existence of an 
agreement (an MRA). MRAs being reciprocal, negotiated agreements that are voluntarily discussed 
by parties intending to form such an agreement, the potential for politico-economic friction may be 
considerably reduced as compared to unilateralist trade distorting international instruments. 
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Chapter 6175 discusses the concept of mutual recognition176 before looking at the various forms of 
MR available and that most conducive to international trade177. The chapter seeks to analyse 
whether MRAs may indeed hold an advantage over UEIs, in international trade, in the context of 
reduced international friction regarding environmental standards. Finally, the chapter looks at two 
specific MRAs - The US-Japan MRA on organic products178 and certain features of the NAFTA 
containing elements of MR which specifically concerning trade between the US and Mexico179 in 
order to understand whether negotiations and market access is available in MRAs and whether that 
may affect international environmental standards in world trade. 
Finally, Chapter 7180 addresses two major issues that require discussion when examining MR and 
MRAs. Firstly, the horizontal transfer of power to another jurisdiction raises issues of sovereignty 
which the chapter attempts to address181. Secondly, the chapter looks at the WTO compatibility of 
MRAs182. MRAs are in effect agreements of preferential treatment where parties to the agreement 
exclusively recognize the standard of the other for products and services that then may be marketed 
within their jurisdiction. MRAs therefore must be seen in light of and in comparison to the most 
favoured nation (MFN) principle of the WTO183. The thesis discusses MRAs in the WTO context, 
especially regarding regional agreements viz-à-viz the MFN principle. It also analyses the potential of 
a conflict between a GATT provision allowing mutual agreement and other WTO provisions 
agreements preventing discrimination within Member States. 
Chapter 8 finally concludes the discussion of the previous chapters by analysing and recapping the 
concept of environmental standards in International trade and comparing the two instruments of 
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UEIs and MRAs to understand whether there is an advantage in a negotiated instrument over a 
unilateral instrument in reducing friction between developed and developing countries with regards 
to environmental standards. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter lays the premise behind considering trade instruments which may have the potential to 
increase environmental standards. It discusses the differences between Free Trade and 
Environmentalism and the conflict between the two schools of thought. It also introduces the 
potential for conflict between developed and developing countries arising from the trade related 
aspects of environmental standards. This provides the basic theme for the thesis as the conflict 
arising out of the Trade-Environment nexus would be the backdrop for the discussion on 
instruments which implement environmental standards in trade.  
The chapter then provides the methodology and research themes prevalent within the thesis. It also 
illustrates previous literature available on the subject as well as the point of departure from such 
literature leading to the novelty within this research. The chapter also attempt to justify the 
instruments chosen for analysis – UEIs and MRAs – while also justifying why Harmonization is an 
instrument used in the thesis exclusively as a tool of comparison to MRAs and not for individual 
detailed analysis of its own. 
Finally, the chapter provides a skeletal structure of the thesis in the form of brief descriptions of the 
substantive chapters to follow. In that light, and as already revealed above, the next chapter looks at 
certain concepts and definitions important to the continuation of this thesis.  
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2. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to define one of the central concepts of this thesis – environmental 
standards. However, before the chapter does so, it takes the opportunity to clarify the relatively 
ambiguous distinction between developed and developing countries in International Law. 
The preceding introductory chapter discussed the aims of the thesis and the intention to compare 
the performance of mutual recognition agreements (as a mode of transnational governance of 
environmental standards) with unilateral environmental instruments, in order to address 
environmental issues and their effectiveness in increasing environmental standards. Also, it briefly 
discussed the issue of developed and developing country friction, emanating from the imposition of 
standards in international trade. 
To truly understand the issues related to the interplay of trade and environment we must 
understand the nature of the parties involved and their differing environmental and economic 
requirements and capacities, resulting from a different economic growth history. Such differences 
allow the categorization of countries into Developed, Developing and Least Developed (LDC) 
countries. Section 2.2 discusses the taxonomy used by different international institutions and 
organisations for the categorization of developed and developing countries before choosing one that 
is pertinent to the thesis. 
The chapter then turns its attention to the concept of environmental standards. This concept is 
central to the thesis, which looks at certain instruments which implement environmental standards 
in international trade. In order to compare mutual recognition (MR) and Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) with Unilateral Environmental Instruments (UEIs), in the context of 
environmental standards, it is necessary to first define what this thesis considers to be standards, 
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looking at the various kinds environmental standards available and the provisions governing them. 
Section 2.3 attempts to define the term ‘standards’ in general, in which the body of provisions 
considered to be environmental standards, lie. Section 2.3.1 then looks at environmental standards 
in detail, through a breakdown of the concept of standards eventually culminating to a definition of 
international environmental standards. . 
Finally in section 2.4, we look at various principles of International Environmental Law which are 
required to be explained in order to further the discussions in this thesis such as the Precautionary 
Principle and the principle of Sustainable Development. This chapter has several overlaps with the 
following Chapter 3 on trade and environmental issues. The combination of these two chapters 
foreshadows a discussion on the two instruments of environmental standards discussed in this thesis 
– UEIs and MRAs.  
2.2 The Categorization of Developed and Developing Countries 
The lines between what consists of a Developing country and what would be considered a 
Developed country are significantly blurred. International institutions have differing criteria for 
making the distinction. Furthermore, certain institutions, the WTO included, provide certain benefits 
to developing countries and the identification of Developing countries are therefore an important 
exercise. In this section we look at some of the categorizations available to us in international law 
before selecting one conducive to this thesis. 
The World Bank method of income group division categorizes countries according to their Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita184. In basing a categorization of states through their economic 
status, by using a comparative single currency (the US Dollar in the case of the World Bank), 
necessary adjustments are required for exchange rate fluctuations. The World Bank makes such 
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adjustments through a process known as the ‘World Bank Atlas Method’185.  This allows them to 
categorize countries into low income ($1,045 GNI or less), lower middle income (more than $1,045 
to $4,125 GNI), upper middle income (more than $4,125 to less than $12,746 GNI), and high income 
($12,746 GNI or more)186. The World Bank brackets lower and upper middle income countries as 
Developing countries187. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) categorizes the economic status of countries through a 
larger number of criterions. These criteria are based on (1) the per capita income level, (2) the 
export diversification and (3) the degree of integration into the global financial system188. The IMF 
categorizes countries as Advanced and, Emerging and Developing economies. The definition of 
Developing countries was initially decided by the IMFs Executive Board in 1975. Most members of 
the IMF (104 out of a total of 107) insisted on being categorized as Developing countries, as such a 
status would allow the use of special funds within the IMF189. Countries such as Singapore were also 
aware of the influence of such a categorization on the GATT system and the benefits thereof for 
being designated a Developing country rather than a developed one190. 
As of 2012 the IMF World Economic Outlook categorizes Advanced Economies into the sub-
categories of Euro Area, Major Advanced Economies (G7), Newly Industrialized Asian Economies, 
Other Advanced Economies (Advanced Economies excluding G7 and Euro Area), and the European 
Union and Emerging and Developing Economies into Central and Eastern Europe, Commonwealth of 
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Independent States, Developing Asia, ASEAN-5, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and 
North Africa, and finally Sub-Saharan Africa191.  
It is interesting to note the discrepancies between these two systems to illustrate the difficulty of 
choosing a benchmark for this thesis. The discrepancies come to light when comparing the position 
of developing countries in both, the IMF and the World Bank system of categorization. Let us 
consider the BRIC192 nations as an example. Under the IMF categorization all four BRIC nations are 
categorized under ‘Emerging Markets and Developing Economies’193 while under the World Bank 
system Russia is categorized as a ‘High Income Economy’, Brazil and China as ‘Upper Middle Income 
Economies’ and India is categorized as a ‘Lower Middle Income Economy’194. A more distinctive 
categorization and perhaps a more simplistic one may be required for the purpose of this thesis.  
One such categorization may be found through the UN Statistics Division (UNSD). The UNSD 
classifies North America, Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand as the developed regions of the 
world. Developing regions include all other regions except an exhaustive list of LDCs195. However this 
is noted by the UN Statistics Department to be merely for statistical purposes and that “there is no 
established convention for the designation of "Developed" and "Developing" countries or areas in 
the United Nations system”196.  
The United Nations Development Program has an even simpler categorization of developed and 
developing countries without any LDC exceptions. This was first developed by the 2009 Human 
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Development Report197. Before the 2009 report, countries under the UNDP were categorized either 
as ‘Industrial countries’ or ‘Developing countries’. The categorization of ‘Industrial countries’ was 
later replaced by: (1) member countries of the OECD and (2) countries in Central or Eastern Europe 
or members of the Commonwealth of Independent states198.  
Finally we look at the categorization prevalent within the WTO. Often in literature associated with 
the WTO, Developed countries are referred to as ‘North’ while Developing countries are referred to 
as ‘South’. This still necessitates a look into how member states are categorized within the WTO. 
Primarily, Member States considering themselves to be Developing countries may declare this to the 
WTO199. Such a ‘self-categorization’ system allows Developing countries special benefits under the 
special and differential treatment provisions (S&D provisions)200.  
The basis for allowing such differential treatment may be found in the Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation (The WTO Agreement) which recognizes the “need for positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, 
secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development”201. Another significant set of S&D provisions are found in Part IV (Trade and 
Development) of the GATT202 – such as the principle of non-reciprocity in Article XXXVI:8203.  As a 
result of non-reciprocity developing countries would not be expected to make trade commitments 
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which were detrimental to their development, trade and financial requirements, notwithstanding 
the reciprocal commitments made by developed countries204.205 
However, the lack of obligations in Part IV meant that these provisions were persuasive at best206. It 
was only through the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (Enabling Clause)207, that a legal basis was provided for 
the Generalized System of Preferences and S&D provisions under GATT agreements208. 
However, such a pronouncement may be challenged by other Member States209. Furthermore, a 
declaration of developing status by a member state does not guarantee preference by developed 
member states under the Generalized System of Preference (GSP). A GSP agreement is the 
prerogative of the developed member state giving such preference and it is up to such a country to 
choose who they consider to be a developing country in need of such a benefit210. The WTO relies on 
the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing 
Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS) for a list of LDCs211. 
Considering the WTO links to the thesis, it would be prudent to use a simplistic North-South 
categorization similar to the terminology used in other WTO related literature. However, given the 
‘self-selection’ basis of the WTO categorization, we use the UNDP formulation for developed and 
developing countries, when using the North-South terminology. 
Having considered the taxonomy of the North-South categorization, the chapter now considers the 
second concept that necessarily needs to be defined – that of environmental standards. The section 
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starts with a discussion on standards in general before specifically discussing environmental 
standards. 
2.3 Standards 
This section starts with some basic dictionary definitions of the term standards. The Chamber’s 
Twentieth Century Dictionary defines standards to be, “an established or accepted model; a degree 
or level of excellence, value, quality.”212 Similarly the Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines 
standards as a “level of quality or attainment; a required or agreed level of quality or attainment”213. 
In both these definitions, we find the creation of a level, one that is required or aimed at and 
thereby agreed to.  
However, these definitions do not satisfy several potential points of enquiry. In the context of this 
thesis an important question pertains to standards as part of international agreements. Do these 
agreements create binding rules or are they policies with the further intention of creating binding 
rules? What of the principles of environmental law that are encapsulated in international 
agreements that clearly aim at required levels of environmental safeguards214? Would such 
principles be considered standards as well?  Are they merely goals set for policy makers to reach? Do 
they have a larger, more binding nature where it is necessary to observe them in the interest of 
equity, fairness or justice? The above dictionary definitions also do not reveal the methods of 
achieving such a level.  
Let us contrast these definitions with a more functional definition of a standard setting body – the 
International Organisation for Standardization (ISO). According to the ISO, a standard is “a document 
that provides requirements, specifications, guidelines or characteristics that can be used consistently 
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to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose.”215 The ISO 
definition brings in the added dimension of documentation. According to this definition, a standard 
is no more an abstract level of quality or attainment but rather a tangible one.  
However, it is fairly difficult to reconcile this requirement of a standard with the various standards 
mentioned in international agreements. Certain provisions clearly point at less tangible concepts and 
principles of environmental law as standards to be achieved. For example, Principle 4 of the Rio 
Declaration states that, “In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection 
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation 
from it.”216 Clearly the Declaration places a level of sustainability related environmental protection 
on governmental development processes. Such a requirement would conform to the ordinary 
definition of standards but would be outside the purview of the ISO definition. 
Similarly Article 4(b) of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change requires members to 
‘Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional 
programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.”217 It does not however 
provide any specifications or guidelines to do so. 
The ISO definition may therefore be seen as a definition for only certain forms of standard 
convenient to the requirements and workings of this standard setting body. As will be seen later in 
this chapter there are several other forms of standards available (we discuss this in the case of 
environmental standards exclusively) which include requirements beyond usual product and process 
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requirements218. In order to find a definition of standards conducive to the thesis we must look 
beyond the specific definitions related to different forms of standards (we come back to them in the 
next section) and look for a definition larger in scope. 
A necessary clarification at this point is that the term ‘standard’ and the term ‘norm’ are often used 
interchangeably in discussions of this nature. For example, Beyerlin in his analysis of norms in 
international environmental law clarifies that his concept of norms is different only in terminology to 
Dworkin’s concept of standards219. Bodansky provides a slightly different categorization. He uses the 
term standards for identifying ‘less precise’ norms distinct from ‘precise’ rules220.  
A broader definition of standards may be found within Dworkin’s arguments on Legal Positivism221. 
This thesis uses Dworkin’s arguments related to positivism222 only to the extent of his definition of 
standards, in order to build a definition of the term ‘standards’ for the thesis itself. Due to the 
requirements of clarity and space, the thesis does not go any further into Dworkin’s arguments on 
positivism.  
According to Dworkin, standards consist of rules, principles and policies223. Dworkin categorizes 
standards in his general discussion on rules, and essentially through a counterargument to Hart’s 
positivism structure224. The wide scope provided by Dworkin may be favourable to the concept of 
standards depended upon in this thesis. It would allow for a broader scope to interpret standards as 
interchangeable with norms in this thesis, allowing a broader set of instruments to be analysed in 
the context of international trade and environment. 
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To Dworkin, the term ‘principle’ represented ‘the whole set of standards other than rules’225. 
However, Dworkin did make a distinction between principles and policies (policies were of course 
not rules but rather within the category of principles when used in the general sense of ‘standards 
other than rules’). ‘Policies’ were those standards that ‘set out a goal to be reached’ – goals that lead 
to any economic, political or social improvement226. ‘Principles’ in this specific context therefore 
became standards that needed to be observed not because, unlike a policy, it led to any form of 
economic, political or social improvement, but rather as a requirement of justice or fairness or, as 
Dworkin puts it – some other dimension of morality227.  
This leads to the question of what a ‘rule’ is. Dworkin does deliberate the difference between a legal 
rule and a legal principle. According to him, “[b]oth sets of standards point to a particular decision 
about legal obligation in particular circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction 
they give. Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, 
then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it 
contributes nothing to the decision”228. In comparison a legal principle will not set out legal 
consequences that follow automatically when the conditions provided are met.229 Altogether, to 
Dworkin, the term standards encompassed his concept of principles, policies and of course rules. 
However, Dworkin is also quick to acknowledge that at times it may not be clear from the form of 
the standard, whether it is a rule or a principle. Sometimes a rule and a principle can play much the 
same role and the difference between them is almost a matter of form alone230. This concept has 
been agreed with by academics such as MacCormick. According to MacCormick a rule’s appearance 
as a principle is dependent on the coherence of the rule itself. Therefore, if a set of rules, consistent 
with a standard (MacCormick prefers the term ‘norms’), is considered to be a ‘specific or concrete 
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manifestation’ of it and one that appears to be a sensible then such a standard may be considered a 
‘principle’ thereby justifying all or any of the specific rules encompassed by it231. 
 Similarly, Raz acknowledges the interchangeability of rules and principles, only distinguishing 
‘principles’ as norms of ‘greater generality and greater importance’ than rules. Such distinctions, in 
his opinion are devoid of philosophical importance232.   As Aarnio puts it, principles and rules have a 
similar or analogical role in legal discretion. He concurs with Raz on the greater generality of 
principles over rules and that the value content of principles is more apparent, but recognizes no 
other characteristics to distinguish them233. Therefore MacCormick, Raz and Arnio are in agreement 
with Dworkin with the claim that rules and principles show only a difference in degree as both are 
forms of standards. 
In essence therefore, it is possible to define standards through the context of the above discussion. 
We find standards to be a general assortment of rules, principles and policies. Dworkin’s 
categorisation is convenient to the thesis as it creates an increased scope for the definition of 
standards, that do not merely limit environmental standards to legally enforceable limits alone but 
extends the definition to certain principles found in environmental law which, due to the character 
of international environmental law, are often relegated to ‘soft law’. Soft law is often considered to 
be ‘the articulation of norms in written form’234. 
Also, by adopting this broad approach to the definition of standards in general, we may not be 
required to analyse the discrepancies within the approaches of positivism and indeed Dworkin’s 
criticism of them. Therefore, nuances between principles, policies and rules are of less concern to us 
than are the other forms of categorization that environmental standards are subject to. For example, 
it is outside the scope of this thesis to consider whether sustainable development is a political goal 
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or has ‘matured’ into a legal principle, as has been considered by Beyerlin235. Rather, we may 
consider the inclusion of sustainable development goals within a treaty or an agreement to be a 
standard and therefore look to its analysis through the lens of implementation. 
To do this we must first dwell briefly on the different forms of environmental standards available to 
us. An exact definition of international environmental standards is hard to come by, but what 
consists of a standard is possible to determine, through the subject areas addressed by standard 
setting documents (such as international treaties). A definition of specific forms of standards (such 
as environmental quality standards) is more easily available, but to look at specific standards before 
discussing a broader definition of environmental standards leaves us with a problem similar to the 
one looked at in the previous section (compare the ISO definition provided, to the broader picture of 
the Dworkin discussion). We must first seek a more general definition before venturing towards the 
specific distinctions of different forms of standards. 
2.3.1 Environmental Standards 
To understand and define environmental standards we do look at the different forms of standards 
available. This we do in the following section. Environmental concern itself has changed significantly 
as a result of globalisation. Traditional concern was regarding more immediate effects to human 
health by local environmental factors such as water and air pollution. However, with the 
simultaneous globalisation of environmental realization and environmental problems to and 
accruing from a globalisation of trade, environmental concern shifted to more long term and less 
obvious forms of environmental degradation such as climate change and extinction of species due to 
habitat loss as a result of global trade chains, which require international and coordinated action236.  
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A convenient point to start a discussion of Environmental standards is the 21st Report of the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution237. In this section we look at the definition as well as the 
categorization of such standards. We provide this categorization along with examples of such 
standards in international trade.  
The 21st Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution defines environmental 
standards as “any judgement about the acceptability of environmental modifications resulting from 
human activities which fulfil both the following conditions: (1) It is formally stated after some 
consideration and intended to apply generally to a defined class of cases and; (2) because of its 
relationship to certain sanctions, rewards or values, it can be expected to assert an influence, direct 
or indirect, on activities that affect the environment”238 
One may observe an almost Dworkinian scope in the Report’s definition of Environmental Standards. 
The use of the word judgement, rather than specifying a document, illustrates the intention of the 
Commission to broaden the scope of the definition of environmental standards. The Commission 
admits in its Report that the term environmental standards was used, ‘broadly to include standards 
which are not mandatory but contained in guidelines, codes of practice or sets of criteria for 
deciding individual cases; standards not set by governments which carry authority for other reasons, 
especially the scientific eminence or market power of those who set them; and some standards 
which are not numerical.’239 This is clearly in line with the intention of the thesis and the discussion 
in the previous section. 
The definition also reveals two other characteristics of environmental standards. First, it is formally 
stated after some consideration. This might imply pre-agreement negotiations in the case of 
International Environmental Standards or the methodology in arriving at them. The standard is also 
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said to be applicable to a defined class of cases, indicating the variability in the kinds of standards 
available and which will be discussed in following paragraphs.  
Secondly, the definition connects standards to sanctions, rewards and values and thereby naturally 
infers the influence such a condition may have to activities affecting the environment. If such 
activities are trade related, then such influence may lead to consequences for international trade 
negotiations and the general friction arising from the North-South concerns regarding the influence 
of standards.  
Sanctions, rewards and values may be more prevalent in national legislations as they are often 
looked upon as technical barriers to trade in international agreements. However certain 
international agreements have such sanctions prevalent and agreed upon by parties to such 
agreement. An example would be the economic sanctions associated with environmental issues 
attached to the NAFTA through the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (a 
side agreement to the NAFTA). Through Article 36 of the side agreement, Parties may suspend 
benefits if a Party fails to pay a monetary enforcement assessment imposed by a panel240. Such 
monetary enforcement arises out of a series of procedures241 due to ‘a persistent pattern of failure’ 
by a Party to effectively enforce its environmental law242. 
As mentioned earlier, the definition of environmental standards in the Report is broad in scope. The 
ambiguities that arose from the various definitions of standards in the previous section may be 
reconciled by this fact. According to the Report environmental standards may be statutory standards 
such as emission limits and Environmental Quality Standards as well as non-statutory protocols, 
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guidelines and targets243. However, neither of these categories includes principles of International 
Environmental Law, and therefore, we look at these principles separately in a later section244.  
The Report primarily divides standards using the criterion of direct and indirect effect on 
environmental modification. It first categorizes standards to those related to ‘pathway points’ of a 
substance and their effect on contact with an ‘entity susceptible to damage’ at that point245. The 
second category contains standards indirectly related to environmental modification.246 Later 
chapters in this thesis notice (and discuss) a higher degree of international disagreement in relation 
to the second category of standards when they affect trade. This discussion is most relevant to the 
North-South disagreements on PPMs and nprPPMs247. The following section discusses some of the 
relevant forms included in each along with suitable examples of international standards. 
2.3.2 Forms of Standards  
Pathway point standards are some of the more recognizable and prevalent standards, especially in 
the context of national regulations. These include the various air water, soil and biota related 
standards available. Examples of national regulations are abundant in these forms. However, 
considering that the thesis primarily concerns international standards, we also provide examples 
from international agreements. This section looks at three types of pathway point standards – 
quality, emission and product standards. The section then looks at process and life cycle analysis 
standards, which are often an important point of contention in international North-South trade 
discussions. 
Note also that wherever possible, the section substantiates the discussion with definitions from the 
UN Glossary. This is not only because of the significance of the UN as an international organisation, 
                                                          
243
 Summary of 21
st
 report (n 236) 10 
244








 Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (n 237) Para 1.18 
247
 Process and Production Method (PPMs) and Non-Product Related Process and Production Methods (nprPPMs); PPMs 
and the controversy surrounding nprPPMs have been discussed below in Section 2.3.3.2.1 PPMs. 
47 
 
but also of the WTO recognition of such definitions. For example, Article 1.1 of the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade provides that, “[g]eneral terms for standardization and procedures for 
assessment of conformity shall normally have the meaning given to them by definitions adopted 
within the United Nations system and by international standardizing bodies taking into account their 
context and in the light of the object and purpose of this Agreement.”248 
Environmental quality standards are defined by the UN to be “a limit for environmental 
disturbances; in particular, from ambient concentration of pollutants and wastes that determines 
the maximum allowable degradation of environmental media.”249 This is also a definition relied on 
by the OECD250. This definition of standards, however, is not explicit about the environmental 
entities it covers. It allows the determination of a limiting level to environmental degradation but 
fails to specify the ‘environmental media’ it refers to. 
The EU regards environmental quality standards to be, “the concentration of a particular pollutant 
or group of pollutants in water, sediment (any material transported by water and settled to the 
bottom) or biota (all living organisms of an area) which should not be exceeded in order to protect 
human health and the environment”.251 This definition is more specific regarding the environmental 
entities it refers to. It noticeably omits air pollution from its definition. It also adds an 
anthropocentric dimension to the eco-centric purpose of a quality standard. This is reflective of the 
types of environmental concern that instigates environmental action and is discussed later in the 
thesis252. 
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The ISO set of standards for soil quality are an example of international environmental quality 
standards253. These contain standards for particle density in the soil254 and determination of water 
retention characteristics255, and sampling requirements including guidance256 and quality control and 
assurance257. The ISO also has a separate set of standards for soil contamination providing various 
investigation and technique standards258.  
Another international set of guidelines, and one related to controlling pollutants effecting biota, are 
the JAMP Guidelines for Monitoring Contaminants in Biota259 formulated under the OSPAR 
Convention260. The guidelines contain provisions for sampling and analysis of contaminants in fish, 
shellfish and seabird eggs261. The guidelines provide a species specific pollutant level analysis262 with 
sampling guidelines. 
Examples of national standards include EC quality standards for bathing waters in the 2006 Bathing 
Water Directive263. The Directive creates obligations for Member States to assess bathing water 
setting out levels of assessment264 and procedures for calculating such levels265.  
The subject of air pollution could possibly be argued to fall under UN definition of Quality standards, 
had in not been for a separate categorization of emission standards within the UN glossary of terms. 
Emission standards, as defined by the UN, are “the maximum amount of polluting discharge legally 
allowed from a single source, mobile or stationary”266, which appears to be a general definition 
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similar to that of quality standards were it not for the definition of ‘Emissions’ within the same 
document. The term ‘emissions’ is defined to be the “discharge of pollutants into the atmosphere 
from stationary […] and mobile sources”267. 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an important example of 
an international agreement suggesting emission standards. Article 2 of the convention states its 
‘ultimate objective’ is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The level the 
UNFCCC aims to achieve is one that would ‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’268. The UNFCC aims to achieve these objectives through several agreements; the 
most important and widest in terms of parties is the Kyoto protocol. The protocol aims at reducing a 
listed set of greenhouse gasses (GHGs)269 through binding emission limits270 on Annex I countries of 
the UNFCCC271. 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe is another UNFCCC supervised international 
organisation containing eight protocols to date, related to emission standards272. Another example 
of an international set of guidelines for emission standards is the 2005 World Health Organisation 
(WHO) Guideline for Particulate matter, Ozone, Nitrogen dioxide and Sulphur dioxide. The guidelines 
provide recommended levels of each substance as well as target levels273. 
Product standards according to the 21st Report are those that ‘specifying the composition of a 
product’274. The TBT Agreement definition of both technical regulations275 and standards276 are 
concerned with product standards as well. Both definitions elaborate on the meaning of product 
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composition by stating that such standards are “document[s] which lays down product 
characteristics or their related processes and production methods”.277 Such standards aim to protect 
the environment and the consumer from potential damage from either the product itself or a 
substance in the product278. Such standards are distinguished from process and life cycle standards 
as they are related to the end product and are detectable at that point279. Regulations controlling 
substance levels in products for human consumption (such as food products and drinking water) are 
common examples of such standards. 
The EU Drinking Water Directive280 is an example of a legislation providing such product quality 
standards which sets various levels of microbial and chemical substances in drinking water. A similar 
example from a developing country would be the Indian Standards for Drinking Water which 
includes tolerance limits of substances in drinking water281.  
Process standards identify a set or sets of techniques for a specified industrial process282. They are 
often related to Life cycle-based standards which set certain criteria that the life cycle of a product 
should satisfy283. These may influence the end product just as in product standards, however, the 
standard applied at a point in the processing or life cycle of the product may not be detectable in the 
end product itself284.  
Various eco labelling schemes fall under this category, as labels are designed to indicate a processing 
or life cycle standard that may not be otherwise visible to the consumer.  An example of such eco 
labels is the Nordic Swan285 eco label, governed by the Nordic Council286, an inter-parliamentary 
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forum of elected members of Nordic countries. The Nordic Eco label evaluates the environmental 
impact of a product through its entire life cycle, providing criterion to ensure that climate 
requirements are taken into account, and that CO2 emissions (and other harmful gasses) are 
limited287. 
Discriminating products through life cycle analysis and thereby their process and production 
methods (PPMs) are a contentious issue within the WTO. There are two distinguishable forms of 
PPMs. The distinguishing factor is dependent on whether such PPM requirements affect the 
characteristic of the end product only (PPM) or whether it affects a part of the production system 
and is not dependant on the characteristics of the end product (nprPPM). WTO Members generally 
agree that if end products (that are otherwise ‘like products’) can be distinguished because of their 
PPMs then criterion may be placed on the method of production and processing under WTO rules288. 
However, measures, based on nprPPMs that leave no apparent distinguishable feature on the end 
product are subject to vigorous debate between Member States. WTO rules explicitly prohibit the 
discrimination of like products and WTO jurisprudence has often deliberated on this matter. Section 
2.3.3.2.1 of this chapter further examines the issue of standards with regards to PPMs and ‘like 
products’. 
2.3.3 The WTO and Standards 
The chapter now turns its attention to the WTO compatibility of environmental standards and their 
interpretation in different WTO agreements. We first look at the definition of international 
environmental standards under the WTO. This is followed by a discussion on the WTO compatibility 
of standards and standard setting agreements. The discussion then looks at the  standards perceived 
as technical barriers to trade followed by the provisions in the TBT Agreement that address this. 
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The WTO is not a standard setting body but a legal regime supervising their effects on trade289. The 
WTO acknowledges the standards of specific international standard setting bodies and organisations 
and looks towards such organisation to define the term ‘international standards’. In US — Tuna II 
(Mexico) the Panel deliberated thus: 
“The term ‘international standard’ is not defined in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement, but is 
defined in the ISO/IEC Guide 2. In accordance with the terms of Annex 1, in the absence of a 
specific definition of this term in Annex 1, the term ‘international standard’ should be 
understood to have the same meaning in the TBT Agreement as in the ISO/IEC Guide 2, which 
defines it as a ‘standard that is adopted by an international standardizing/standards 
organisation and made available to the public”290. 
This necessitates an identification of relevant international standards organisations. To list the 
organisations relevant to environmental standards requires a reading of certain WTO agreements 
and documents.  We first look at the WTO Agreements with provisions relating to international 
standards and the corresponding WTO jurisprudence. Specifically we look at Article 3.1 and Annex A 
of the SPS Agreement, and Annex 1.1 and Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement. Thereafter, we look at 
the certain GATT/WTO documents which list such international standards and standardization 
organisations.  
We start with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement). The SPS Agreement provides that Member States must attempt to harmonize their 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures as widely as possible. To facilitate this, Member States are 
advised to source their sanitary or phytosanitary measures from international standards, guidelines 
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or recommendations291. The Appellate Body in Canada — Continued Suspension noted that the 
relevant “international standards, guidelines or recommendations” that are referred to, are those 
set by the international organisations listed in Annex A paragraph 3 of the SPS Agreement292. 
Annex A Paragraph 3 is as follows: 
 “Annex A Definitions 
3. International standards, guidelines and recommendations 
(a) for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide residues, 
contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and guidelines of hygienic 
practice; 
(b) for animal health and zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed under the auspices of the International Office of Epizootics; 
(c) for plant health, the international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed 
under the auspices of the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention in 
cooperation with regional organisations operating within the framework of the International 
Plant Protection Convention; and 
(d) for matters not covered by the above organisations, appropriate standards, guidelines and 
recommendations promulgated by other relevant international organisations open for 
membership to all Members, as identified by the Committee.”293 
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It is worth noting that the WTO has not identified any ‘other’ relevant international organisation 
under 3(d). According to Schroder, this may be because there is “little regulatory space not covered” 
by the three organisations mentioned in the Annex294.  
The concept of standards may also be determined by the definition of technical regulations and 
standards found in the TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement covers both mandatory as well as 
voluntary standards. However, the terminology used in the TBT Agreement is slightly different. A 
mandatory standard within the TBT Agreement is referred to as a ‘Technical regulation’ while 
voluntary standard are referred to as a ‘Standard’. The Explanatory note to Article Annex 1.2 
explains this terminology: 
“The terms as defined in ISO/IEC Guide 2 cover products, processes and services. This Agreement 
deals only with technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures related to 
products or processes and production methods. Standards as defined by ISO/IEC Guide 2 may be 
mandatory or voluntary. For the purpose of this Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and 
technical regulations as mandatory documents.”295 This connection has later been endorsed by the 
AB in EC – Sardines296. 
Technical regulations under the TBT Agreement are, “Document[s] which lays down product 
characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable 
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory.”297 TBT standards are similarly 
documents but in this case are approved by a “recognized body that provides, for common and 
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production 
methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.”298  
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Noticeably, the TBT Annexes, and indeed the TBT Agreement itself, do not specify any standard 
setting organisations. However, as mentioned above there are other GATT/WTO documents that 
may provide a connection with international standard setting bodies/organisations. Schroder lists a 
total of four such documents299. These are the ‘Proposed GATT Code of Conduct for Preventing 
Technical Barriers to Trade’300, the ‘List of International Standardizing Bodies for purposes of Articles 
10.4 and 13.3 of the [Tokyo Round Standards] Agreement’301, the ‘Information provided by bodies 
involved in the preparation of international standards’302 and the ‘Second TBT Triennial Review’303.  
The organisations most relevant to a discussion on environmental standards found in these four lists 
are the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), ISO, the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the Codex Alimentarius Commission304, the 
OECD, the World Organisation of Animal Health (OIE), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)305.  
Recounting the US — Tuna II (Mexico) judgement, standards set by these bodies would be 
considered international standards in terms of the WTO regime. This determines the interpretation 
of international environmental standards within the WTO. However, it does not provide for a 
discussion on the governance and compatibility of standards created by members in bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements306. The following sections look at the WTO provisions that may be 
problematic to the formation of trade affecting environmental standards and the provisions that 
may allow a digression from relevant WTO obligations.  
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2.3.3.1 The Compatibility of Standards with the WTO 
The problem of compatibility arises due to the fact that standards in bilateral/plurilateral 
agreements may be regarded as quantitative restrictions. The GATT generally eliminates quantitative 
restrictions of any kind in the trade of goods. GATT Article XI.1 (The General Elimination of 
Quantitative Restrictions) states that: 
“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any 
other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for 
the territory of any other contracting party.”307 
The reason behind this intention to eliminate quantitative restrictions is recognized by the Panel in 
Turkey — Textiles308. The Panel acknowledges that it is tariffs rather than quantitative restrictions 
that are GATT’s border protection ‘of choice’309. According to them, “Quantitative restrictions 
impose absolute limits on imports, while tariffs do not. In contrast to MFN tariffs which permit the 
most efficient competitor to supply imports, quantitative restrictions usually have a trade-distorting 
effect, their allocation can be problematic and their administration may not be transparent.”310 
The question therefore arises, whether ‘standards’ would fall within the meaning of the term 
‘prohibitions or restriction’ as stated in Article XI.1 GATT. According to the Panel in Japan — Trade in 
Semiconductors, the wording of Article XI:1 is comprehensive and applies “to all measures instituted 
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or maintained by a [Member] prohibiting or restricting the importation, exportation, or sale for 
export of products other than measures that take the form of duties, taxes or other charges”.311 
The Panel in India – Quantitative Restrictions concurred with this view admitting that “the text of 
Article XI:1 is very broad in scope, providing for a general ban on import or export restrictions or 
prohibitions ‘other than duties, taxes or other charges’. […] The scope of the term ‘restriction’ is also 
broad, as seen in its ordinary meaning, which is ‘a limitation on action, a limiting condition or 
regulation’”.312 
 The Panel in India — Autos deliberates that,  
“whether [a] measure can appropriately be described as a restriction on importation turns on 
the issue of whether Article XI can be considered to cover situations where products are 
technically allowed into the market without an express formal quantitative restriction, but are 
only allowed under certain conditions which make the importation more onerous than if the 
condition had not existed, thus generating a disincentive to import. 
 On a plain reading, it is clear that a ‘restriction’ need not be a blanket prohibition or a precise 
numerical limit. Indeed, the term ‘restriction’ cannot mean merely ‘prohibitions’ on 
importation, since Article XI:1 expressly covers both ‘prohibition and restriction’. Furthermore, 
the Panel considers that the expression ‘limiting condition’ used by the India — Quantitative 
Restrictions panel to define the term ‘restriction’ and which this Panel endorses, is helpful in 
identifying the scope of the notion in the context of the facts before it. That phrase suggests 
the need to identify not merely a condition placed on importation, but a condition that is 
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limiting i.e. that has a limiting effect. In the context of Article XI, that limiting effect must be 
on importation itself.”313  
Could this concept of ‘limiting effect’ also be extended to environmental standards? The facts in the 
US — Shrimp case is a useful example at this juncture. The US imposed an import ban on shrimp and 
shrimp products harvested by vessels of foreign nations where such exporting country had not been 
certified by United States’ authorities as using methods not leading to the incidental killing of sea 
turtles above certain levels314. Bearing in mind the discussions earlier in this chapter, the US 
provision could qualify as an environmental standard.  
Considering the provisions, the Panel regarded that, “[the US provision in question] expressly 
requires the imposition of an import ban on imports from non-certified countries. […] The United 
States bans imports of shrimp or shrimp products from any country not meeting certain policy 
conditions. We finally note that previous panels have considered similar measures restricting 
imports to be ‘prohibitions or restrictions’ within the meaning of Article XI.”315 The Panel found that 
the United States violated Article XI316 
As the Panel noted in Brazil — Re-treaded Tyres, “[t]here is no ambiguity as to what ‘prohibitions’ on 
importation means: Members shall not forbid the importation of any product of any other Member 
into their markets.”317 However, Article XI does make an exception for standards. According to 
Article XI.2(b) the provisions of Article XI.1 do not extend to the “Import and export prohibitions or 
restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or 
marketing of commodities in international trade;”318 The subject matter of these standards may be 
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those formulated by international organisations (as discussed above) or they could be argued to be 
those formulated within the ambit of the General exception clauses in GATT Article XX319. 
The level of standard, of course, may be determined by the Member State itself. This was recognized 
by the AB in Australia — Salmon, where they stated that “the SPS Agreement does not contain 
an explicit provision which obliges WTO Members to determine the appropriate level of protection. 
Such an obligation is, however, implicit in several provisions of the SPS Agreement.”320 The Panel 
also held a similar view in EC – Sardines noting that Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement “affirm that it is 
up to the Members to decide which policy objectives they wish to pursue and the levels at which 
they wish to pursue them.”321 
However once such a level has been determined, Article 4 of the SPS Agreement provides that 
“Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as equivalent, 
even if these measures differ from their own or from those used by other Members trading in the 
same product, if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its 
measures achieve the importing Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection.”322 Similarly, the TBT Agreement also stipulates that “Members shall give positive 
consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other Members, even if these 
regulations differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfil 
the objectives of their own regulations.”323 
2.3.3.2 Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade 
A further issue with standards, even ones that are prima facie compatible with WTO provisions, is 
their use as technical barriers to trade (TBTs). We discuss the North-South issues emanating from 
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this use of standards in detail in the following chapters. In fact, one of the intentions of discussing 
MRAs later in this thesis324 is to find a solution to the friction arising from the imposition of 
standards on developing countries.  
However, in this chapter the discussion on TBTs is restricted to an analysis of the available provisions 
addressing the potential of standards being used as technical barriers, within the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). We discuss the relevant provisions – Article 2.1 and 
2.1, and the jurisprudence surrounding these provisions – in the following paragraphs. The 
relationship between these provisions and Article XX of the General Exceptions of GATT is discussed 
in Chapter 4325. 
TBT Article 2.1 stipulates that,  
“Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the 
territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.”326 
Article 2.1 TBT clearly seeks to uphold the MFN (Article I GATT)327 and National Treatment (Article 
III.4 GATT)328 principles of the GATT. The Panel in EC — Trademarks and Geographical Indications 
(Australia) notes this similarity between Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Article III.4 of GATT. 
The Panel states that:  
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“Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement refers to ‘treatment no less favourable’. An essential 
element of a claim under Article 2.1 is that, in respect of technical regulations, the treatment 
accorded to imported products is ‘less favourable’ than that accorded to like products of 
national origin. The Panel notes the similarity in the terms used in Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement and Article III of GATT 1994, which also refers to ‘treatment no less favourable’. 
The preamble to the TBT Agreement expressly sets out the desire ‘to further the objectives of 
GATT 1994’.”329 
WTO Panels in cases such as  EC — Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia)330, US – 
Clove Cigarettes331and US – Tuna II (Mexico)332have utilized this principle of the unfavourable 
treatment of ‘like products’ to assess the claim of national regulations being incompatible with the 
TBT obligations of corresponding Member States. The question here of course is whether a standard 
may yet be allowed under the General Exceptions in GATT Article XX if found incompatible with 
Article 2.1 TBT333. 
Members are also required to ensure that standards do not create ‘unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade’.334 For this purpose Article 2.2 stipulates that, standards cannot be “more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment 
would create”.335  
The protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment is listed 
in the TBT as one such ‘legitimate objective’.336 In the Panel Decision of US – Clove Cigarettes it was 
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held that reducing youth smoking was a ‘legitimate objective’ of the disputed legislation and was 
also not ‘more trade restrictive than necessary’.337 The Panel further asserts that, “[i]n EC — 
Asbestos, the Appellate Body stated that ‘the objective pursued by the measure is the preservation 
of human life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life-
threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The value pursued is both vital and important in 
the highest degree.’ In addition, we recall that in Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body 
agreed with the panel that ‘few interests are more “vital” and “important” than protecting human 
beings from health risks’.”338One might argue that this importance extends to environmental 
standards. 
The Panel in both US – Clove Cigarettes339 and US – Tuna II (Mexico)340 states that the analysis of a 
provision under Article 2.2 is in two parts. The standard must firstly, fulfil a ‘legitimate objective’ and 
must also show not to be ‘more trade restrictive than necessary’. 
Through EC — Sardines, the Panel determined that Article 2.2 provides an inherent right for a 
Member State to choose its level of standards (this has been mentioned above). However, as the 
Panel in EC – Sardines also noted that Article 2.2 “impose[s] some limits on the regulatory autonomy 
of Members that decide to adopt technical regulations: Members cannot create obstacles to trade 
which are unnecessary or which, in their application, amount to arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Thus, the TBT Agreement, like the 
GATT 1994, whose objective it is to further, accords a degree of deference with respect to the 
domestic policy objectives which Members wish to pursue. At the same time, however, the TBT 
Agreement, like the GATT 1994, shows less deference to the means which Members choose to 
employ to achieve their domestic policy goals.”341 The relationship between the provisions of Article 
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2.2 TBT and Article XX of the GATT was also noticed by the Panel in US – Clove Cigarettes342 and US – 
Tuna II (Mexico)343. 
The TBT Agreement further recommends that, if in the formation of standards if relevant 
international standards exist “Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for 
their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an 
ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for 
instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological 
problems.”344 
If a standard is ‘prepared, adopted or applied’ for one of the legitimate objectives explicitly 
mentioned in paragraph 2, and is in accordance with relevant international standards, that standard 
may be presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.345 
The Panel in US – Tuna II (Mexico) agreed with the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines that Article 2.4 
provides three elements to examine a claim of its violation: (1) The existence of a relevant 
international standard, (2) whether that international standard has been used as a basis for the 
disputed provision and (3) whether the international standard is an ineffective or inappropriate 
means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives of the disputed standard346. It may be argued 
that the test of effectiveness and appropriateness would allow a member to formulate their own 
standards if the ‘legitimate objective’ is at a higher level than that of the international standard. 
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The next important question in terms of environmental standards (especially Product, Process and 
Life-cycle related standards) is regarding Process and Production Methods (PPMs). We have seen 
above that both, the definition of technical regulations and standards include PPMs347. However, the 
inclusion of the word ‘related’, has initiated the debate on whether non product related PPMs 
(nprPPMs) are excluded348.  
There are two distinguishable forms of PPMs. The distinguishing factor is dependent on whether 
such PPM requirements affect the characteristic of the end product only (PPM) or whether it affects 
a part of the production system and is not dependant on the characteristics of the end product 
(nprPPM). We use examples of regulations from the textile industry to illustrate the difference 
between PPMs and nprPPMs.  
An example of a PPM is found in the UK mandatory government buying standards that list certain 
substances, including pesticides and dyes that cannot be contained in the final product in quantities 
more than 1 ppm (part per million)349. As the standard requires that the cotton produced should not 
have any traces of pesticides then that would be a product related PPM as the point of testing the 
requirement of the standard is at the end product. An example of nprPPMs can be found in the 
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processing and manufacturing criteria of the Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS)350, where the 
prohibition or control of the quantities of metals, dyes and pesticides, and other environmental 
safeguards are found throughout the processing and production of the product. The points of testing 
for the criteria are therefore, throughout the manufacturing process. A product would fail to acquire 
the standard even if the end product is pesticide free.  
Whether by specifying ‘related’ the TBT intends to exclude nprPPMs, has not been clearly defined351. 
Rotherham argues that, although most members agree the term to exclude nprPPMs, there are 
some who argue that the fact that the second part of either definition fails to mention the word 
‘related’ when stating that the definition includes terminology, symbols, packaging, marking and 
especially labelling “as they apply to a product, process or production method” might indicate that 
nprPPMs are included352.  
However, analysing the negotiations preceding the formation of the TBT Agreement reveals the 
intention of the parties to a certain extent. The modification of ‘technical regulations’ and 
‘standards’ to include the word ‘related’ and subsequently the phrase ‘their related’ (applied later 
only to technical regulations) was proposed by Mexico during the negotiations and legal drafting 
stages of the TBT Agreement353. Joshi argues that, given this recommendation was accepted, 
“voluntary and mandatory requirements based on nprPPMS are not covered by the TBT 
Agreement”354. Chang too points to the negotiations of the amendment to the TBT Agreement, 
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where nprPPMs were explicitly excluded and argues that consequently, nprPPMs cannot be 
considered when interpreting the text355. 
2.3.4 The Difference between De Facto and De Jure Standards 
Considering the definition and scope of the term environmental standards discussed above, we can 
broadly divide international environmental standards into de facto and de jure standards. De facto 
standards consist of market standards. De jure standards would include official standards created by 
the formation of policies, and rules and specific provisions in international agreements. Often such 
provisions do not themselves dictate the level of standard desired (although they might) but rather 
point to standardization bodies that create such standards356. 
Market standards concerning the environment may be developed due to market and consumer 
demands. For example, the Tuna industry in the US experienced similar market trends after the US – 
Tuna cases in the WTO357. Although the Panel decided against the US measures that prohibited tuna 
fishing methods leading to increased dolphin mortality rates as by-catch (the Panel decision was 
never adopted in both Tuna cases), eco labelled “dolphin safe” tuna have considerably reduced the 
market of unlabelled tuna358 becoming a de facto standard in the US market.  
They may also be developed by private concerned parties. In time such standards may attain a larger 
acceptability through the proliferation of companies to other markets or even as a copying 
mechanism by other private groups and even have the potential to become global standards thereby 
evolving into de jure standards.  
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The Organic Food Label standard is one such standard that has proliferated to global proportions, 
from fairly humble beginnings. Starting off as a voluntary and self-regulatory form of certification 
amongst farmers, the labelling scheme can now be found internationally and is often regulated by 
governments while formal standardization may be formulated by international organisations such as 
the ISO.359  
Examples of de jure standards include the various instances of standards found in international 
agreements and treaties as mentioned in the previous section. They also include the standards 
created by standardization bodies which are relied upon by legislations and authoritative bodies.  
2.4 International Principles of Environmental Law  
There are certain international environmental principles that govern international relationships that 
are required to be mentioned at this point in the thesis. These principles potentially fall under the 
ambiguous area between principles and rules in the Dworkinian sense360. These are overarching 
principles that influence international relationships. These principles are relied upon throughout the 
thesis and therefore discussed with an introductory intention in the following sections361. 
2.4.1 Principle not to Cause Transboundary Harm 
The Principle not to cause Transboundary harm may be found in several international agreements. 
Both, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development362  and the Convention on Biological 
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Diversity (CBD) 363 provide that States have, “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction.” This is what the ‘Principle not to cause transboundary harm’ 
entails. The Principle is often called the Principle of Prevention364 or the Principle of Preventive 
action365  and carries an obligation on a state to safeguard the environmental interests outside its 
jurisdiction.  
The Principle is recalled in ICJ judgements as well. In its advisory opinion on the ‘Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ the ICJ notes the “existence of the general obligation of States to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control, respect the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond national control.”366 Similarly, in the ‘Corfu Channel Case’, the ICJ lays down that it 
was, “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other States”367.  
The ILC’s draft articles on ‘Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities’ expresses 
this obligation towards other states in relation to transboundary environmental harm. The draft 
articles provide that ‘the state of origin’ shall be the one to take appropriate action to prevent 
transboundary harm368. 
Given that the implementation of this standard obligation and the legislative form it may take is 
decided by the ‘state of origin’ of the environmental concern369, a home country level of standards 
may potentially be grounds for discontent among states for two reasons. Firstly the inadequacy and 
the level of the standard to safeguard the interests of the state may be challenged in the first place. 
This was the case in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) dispute, where the 
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‘unilateral diversion’ of the Danube, by Czechoslovakia and the construction of an over flow dam at 
Čunovo, severely restricted the Danube water in Hungary and led to Hungary conveying its 
grievances to the ICJ370.  
The other issue from a prevention of transboundary harm is the potential overreaching of standards. 
States on the receiving end of environmental standards may perceive strict standards to be a barrier 
to trade. For example the EC ban on the sale of seal products371 within the European market was 
implemented to reduce animal cruelty torture and pain arising from the seal hunt of several external 
countries due to the market demands within the European market372. The potential of increasing 
animal welfare through a ban in its own market is perhaps an admission by the EC that the common 
market is a significant cause of the original problem373 and a transboundary one, given the origin of 
the products were outside the EU. However, Canada and Norway argued that the EU Seal Regime 
violated the non-discrimination obligations under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT, according seal 
products from Canada and Norway (imported products) treatment less favourable than that 
accorded to like seal products of domestic origin, created an unnecessary obstacle to trade that is 
inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement because it is more trade restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, and that it imposed quantitative restrictions on trade 
inconsistently with Article XI:1 of the GATT.374 Thus the intention of preventing transboundary harm 
may often be perceived as intended barriers to trade. 
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2.4.2 Environmental Impact Assessments 
The Rio Declaration also mentions Environmental Impact assessments. It states that, “Environmental 
Impact Assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are 
likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a 
competent national authority”375. The declaration therefore creates an obligation for states to 
undertake EIAs for any activity including ones that may have transboundary effect. This obligation 
may even be seen as a necessity and a forerunner to the previous obligation of not causing 
transboundary harm. An EIA may help pre-empt and thereby prevent situations that could 
potentially lead to environmental issues. 
The Cartagena protocol also has a risk assessment and scientific evidence obligations for its 
Members.  It requires a risk assessment to be carried out in a scientifically sound manner376. To fulfil 
this need, it provides a methodology of assessment, involving (1) identification of the potentiality of 
adverse effects, (2) evaluation of the possibility of their realization and thereby their consequences, 
(3) an estimation of the overall risk and eventually (4) a recommendation on whether such risk is 
acceptable or manageable or not377. 
However, there may be potential disagreement on whether a situation warrants an EIA. The Rio 
declaration does not specify the requirements for a carrying out an EIA. Rather it is in regional 
treaties that are more specific of the requirement. Several international bilateral and plurilateral 
treaties have EIA obligations included within their framework. One such example is the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which provides for research and scientific 
assessment378.   
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The ICJ Trail Smelter Arbitration recognized provided several post-award monitoring provisions. It 
directed the installation of observation stations, equipment necessary to give information of gas 
conditions and sulphur dioxide recorders, and regular reporting requirements379. 
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) ICJ case, Justice Weeramantry (in a 
separate opinion) contended that there was a requirement for continuing EIA. He elaborates on this: 
“Environmental law in its current state of development would read into treaties which may 
reasonably be considered to have a significant impact upon the environment, a duty of 
environmental impact assessment and this means also, whether the treaty expressly so provides or 
not, a duty of monitoring the environmental impacts of any substantial project during the operation 
of the scheme.”380 
2.4.3 The Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary approach is relevant in the making of standards when there is scientific 
uncertainty regarding the effect of a potential threat to the environment. The Precautionary 
Principle is found in the Rio Declaration, which states that, “In order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capability. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost affecting measures to prevent environmental degradation.”381  
Often, in terms of precautionary action there is a difference in the threshold level allowing for action 
on the face of scientific uncertainty. The Rio Declaration threshold from the above definition seems 
to be a ‘threat of serious or irreversible damage’. Compared to Rio, the Cartagena Protocol has a 
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seemingly lower threshold (and thereby a higher environmental standard) of “potential adverse 
effects”382. 
However, the status of the Precautionary principle is ambiguous. Several international tribunals have 
refrained from providing the principle with a definitive status in International law. The Appellate 
Body in EC – Hormones noted that, “The status of the precautionary principle in international law 
continues to be the subject of debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators and judges. 
The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallized into a general principle of 
customary international environmental law. Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a 
principle of general or customary international law appears less than clear.”383 The Appellate Body 
continued by stating that it was unnecessary, and imprudent, for them to take a position on this 
important, but abstract, question, in the present case384. They further observed that in the 
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ, although recognizing new norms in the field of environmental 
protection and standards, failed to identify the precautionary principle as one of them. The ICJ did 
not declare the overriding effect of the principle on other obligations of the state385.  
The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros judgement, although earlier than either the Rio Declaration or the 
Cartagena Protocol, provided a very high threshold in which the principle could be applied (thereby 
decreasing the standard of environmental protection). According to the ICJ, although the scientific 
uncertainties might be serious, they could not establish “the objective existence of a "peril" in the 
sense of a component element of a state of necessity. […] [T]he mere apprehension of a possible 
"peril" could not suffice in that respect.”386 However, as stated before, the court failed to provide a 
clear applicability of the principle in international environmental law. 
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2.4.4 Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration underlines the Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility: “States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.  In view of the different contributions to 
global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities.  The 
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of 
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment 
and of the technologies and financial resources they command.” 
The principle can be divided into two recognizable aspects. Sands387 recommends reading the Rio 
definition in two parts. The first sentence contains what Sands calls ‘Principle of Co-operation’388. It 
suggests the object of the responsibility that states have in terms of environmental safeguards. The 
next two sentences prescribe the character of such a responsibility – it is common and differentiated 
due to the circumstances and conditions prevalent in international states. Such circumstances result 
in differing environmental standards and differing obligations on states389. 
The differing emission targets in the Kyoto Protocol have already been mentioned above390. 
Similarly, the Montreal protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has a different 
compliance period to the Protocol391. 
2.4.5 Sustainable Development  
In its advisory opinion on the ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’  the ICJ states that, 
“[t]he environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the 
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very health of human beings, including generations unborn”392. The ICJ continues its deliberations on 
the environment in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros judgement. It states:  
“Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly interfered with 
nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration of the effects upon the environment. 
Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind – for present 
and future generations – of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, 
new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during 
the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new standards 
given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when continuing with 
activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the 
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.”393 
The ICJ defines ‘Sustainable Development’ as the “need to reconcile economic development with the 
protection of the environment”394. 
The Brundtland Report provides a definition of Sustainable Development stating that it is, 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”395 
Principle 4 of the Rio declaration also sees the connection between environmental protection and 
sustainable development. According to the principle, “In order to achieve sustainable development, 
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot 
be considered in isolation from it.”396 
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Sustainable development therefore has two important aspects. Firstly, as recognized by the 
Brundtland Report, environmental protection is of the essence. Secondly, the reason for such 
protection is anthropocentric not only in its current objectives but also in its outlook – it is 
intergenerational, and seeks to secure the environment for future generations for whom the present 
generation holds the ‘world in trust’397. In this regard Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration states that, 
“[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.”398 
2.5 Conclusion 
The object of this chapter is to explain certain concepts central to the thesis. As stated, the overall 
purpose of the thesis is to compare the performance of mutual recognition agreements (as a mode 
of transnational governance of environmental standards) with unilateral environmental instruments, 
in order to address environmental issues and their effectiveness in increasing environmental 
standards. The topic lies in the intersection of the trade and environmental law regimes. The 
following Chapter 3 illustrates several arguments associated with this intersection of trade and the 
environment. Therefore Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 must be read together, as the description of the 
backdrop within which the specific issue of instruments propagating environmental standards is 
discussed. 
The chapter first discusses the designation of developed and developing countries within the context 
of the thesis399. The thesis uses the North-South terminology often used in WTO literature, 
interchangeably with the terms ‘Developed’ and ‘Developing’ countries (where Developed countries 
are referred to as ‘North’ and Developing countries are referred to as ‘South’). However, as the WTO 
designation of ‘Developed’ and ‘Developing’ is self-assigned by Member States and often disputed, 
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the thesis uses the UNDP formulation for assigning the status of ‘Developed’ and ‘Developing’ 
countries. 
The Chapter then attempts at defining an outline of the concept of ‘standards’ in environmental 
law400. The definition of standards in the Rio Declaration or the UNFCC is abstract, failing to provide a 
narrow enough definition that would be legally viable. On the other hand the more functional 
definition provided by the ISO is excessively specific, and pertains to only certain forms of standards. 
Comparatively, the Dworkinian concept of ‘standards’ which includes principles, rules and policies 
allows a broad scope of the definition and thereby increases the number of forms of standards 
potentially discussed under the thesis.  
The forms of environmental standards are divided into standards related to ‘pathway points’ of a 
substance and their effect on contact with an ‘entity susceptible to damage’ at that point, and 
standards indirectly related to environmental modification. Pathway point standards include 
Environmental quality standards, emission standards and product standards, while examples of 
indirect standards would include process standards and life-cycle analysis standards. The section 
also briefly discusses the contention and discrimination of products through process and life-cycle 
analysis of standards across the North-South divide. This contention is also one of the central issues 
addressed throughout this thesis. One aspect of this argument is further illustrated in section 
2.3.3.2.1 on PPMs under the WTO analysis section of the chapter401. 
The WTO analysis first discusses the definition of international standards under the WTO regime. It 
finds the WTO to be dependent on listed international standardization bodies for its definition of 
‘international standards’. Under the TBT and SPS Agreements of the WTO, the standards formulated 
by the listed international standardization organisations, are to be considered as international 
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standards. The Section identifies the various standardization bodies that may be regarded as bodies 
formulating environmental standards.  
Section 2.3.3 then investigates the compatibility of environmental standards with the WTO regime. 
GATT Article XI.1 the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions is particularly problematic as 
environmental standards may be regarded as quantitative restrictions. A reading of various WTO 
jurisprudence reveals that standards may indeed be in violation of Article XI GATT, however, there is 
an exception for standards within Article XI.2(b). The subject matter of standards under the WTO 
regime, especially under the GATT could be deduced through the provisions of General Exceptions 
Article XX (GATT) as well402. Also, Section 2.3.3.1 of this chapter notices a prerogative of the standard 
formulating country to decide on its own level of protection403. However, such a prerogative is 
attached with an obligation to recognize equivalent standards404; a concept which foreshadows one 
of the instruments analysed in this thesis – Mutual Recognition405.  
Section 2.3.3.2 of this chapter also introduced the concept of using standards as technical barriers to 
trade. This is one of the predominant North-South points of contention which the thesis attempts to 
introduce at this stage. This section explored the TBT Agreement provisions that seek to prevent 
standards being used in a trade distortionary way. The last part of the section differentiated 
between De Facto and De Jure standards. 
Section 2.4 introduced certain international principles of Environmental law whose themes run 
through the thesis. These are (1) Principle not to Cause Transboundary Harm; (2) Environmental 
Impact Assessment; (3) The Precautionary Principle; (4) Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
and; (5) Sustainable Development.  
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The following Chapter 3 looks further into this intersection on trade and environment. It investigates 
the reasons of conflict between trade and environmental regimes and the relationship between 
economic growth and environmental degradation. It also looks at the WTO as an intermediary of 
trade and environmental interests and the reasons for looking at other instruments that propagate 
environmental standards. Eventually it introduces the choice between the unilateral imposition of 
environmental standards and MRAs as a form of transnational governance.  
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3. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Having introduced the key concept of standards and the concept of developed and developing 
countries, as understood for this study, the thesis now turns its attention to the relationship 
between trade and the environment. In this chapter we attempt to draw a relationship between the 
economic growth of a nation and its effect on environmental standards.  
Such a relationship is necessary to define in order to understand the flow of environmental 
standards i.e. the demand for it from developed countries on developing countries, and why that 
occurs. Understanding this relationship may help in understanding the friction between developed 
and developing countries in relation to environmental standards affecting trade. This in turn will 
help in the assessment of the trade instruments analysed in this thesis – Unilateral Environmental 
Instruments (UEIs) and Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). Furthermore, when understanding 
the nature of mutual recognition in Chapters 6406, the question may also arise whether it is indeed 
different from other instruments increasing environmental standards, where developed countries 
are standard ‘givers’ and developing countries are standard ‘takers’407. 
However, if it is possible to assess that in most cases the demand for environmental standards would 
arise in developed countries, we may negate such a question, and instead concentrate on 
instruments which would characteristically decrease international tension arising out of rigid 
demands, by allowing a degree of flexibility in the means to achieving such an end as long as the 
objective remains the same. 
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In order to illustrate the relationship between economic growth and environmental standards, the 
chapter starts with the concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)408. The EKC forms a 
correlation between per capita income of a nation and environmental deterioration. Section 3.2 also 
compares this structure of the EKC to Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism409.  
Section 3.2.3 then discusses the views of academics such as Stern410 and Esty411 who further the 
argument for a more complex trade-environment correlation than merely a two dimensional per 
capita income against environmental degradation relationship. They argue three further 
components of the relationship – technique, composition and scale412.  
Section 3.3 looks at the concept of Sustainable Development in the context of the trade-
environment relationship413. The section further highlights the ‘anthropocentric – ecocentric 
cleavage’414 arising out of this divided school of thought leading from the concept of sustainable 
development. This cleavage relates to the basis of environmental concern from which arise 
environmental action and standards415.  
Section 3.4 next looks at the reasons why the thesis particularly looks at the WTO416. Although the 
WTO and its treaties and case-law are discussed throughout the thesis, including in previous 
chapters, in Section 3.4.1 we look at some of the reasons why looking at the WTO for environmental 
policy making may hold certain disadvantages. Furthermore, Section 3.4.1 mentions Article XX 
(General Exceptions) of the GATT and some of the case-law417 surrounding Article XX as part of the 
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discussion surrounding the drawbacks of considering the WTO for global environmental issues418. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, however, Article XX GATT also serves to discuss the permissibility of 
standards that would otherwise be incompatible with WTO provisions. This relationship between 
environmental standards and Article XX of the GATT merits a much larger dialogue and therefore has 
been separately discussed in Chapter 4419.  However this Article and the case-laws are revisited in 
the Chapter 4 in greater detail in the context of environmental standards. 
Section 3.4.2 looks at the differing priorities and national agendas of developed and developing 
country members of the WTO, in the context of environmental standards. It analyses how States 
arrive at the WTO negotiating table with pre-determined trade interests which may hinder 
negotiations of international environmental standards in the multilateral arena420. Section 3.4.3 
highlights the existence of global linkages and reiterates the importance of multilateral trade forums 
such as the WTO in addressing issues regarding trade related environmental standards421. 
3.2 The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
The phenomenon of increasing environmental 
friction as a result of economic growth had 
been substantiated by some academics through 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
hypothesis422. According to this hypothesis, the 
reverse ‘U’ of the curve suggests that 
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environmental deterioration increases with an increase in economic growth until a certain point is 
reached indicating an average per capita income level423 - called the Turning Point Income (TPI). 
Therefore, pre TPI, the environmental deterioration is directly proportional to economic growth424.  
The EKC as a concept first came to prominence through Grossman and Krueger’s study on the 
environmental impacts of NAFTA in 1991425 and subsequently through the 1992 World Bank 
Development Report426 addressing development and the environment.427 As a concept connecting 
economic development to environmental deterioration, the EKC may help shed light on a discussion 
on a correlation of environmental standards with economic development.  
The EKC is divided into two identifiable parts – the post-TPI (Environmental Improvement) segment 
and the pre-TPI (Environmental deterioration/decay) segment. The theory suggests that, although 
with initial industrialization, the environmental health of a country first tends to deteriorate, as 
economic progress continues, on reaching a certain per capita income level – the TPI – the 
environmental degradation trend becomes inversely proportionate to economic growth. Therefore, 
the environmental health of a country starts improving beyond post-TPI.  
This had prompted several economists to state that free trade and thereby increased GDP would 
eventually lead to stricter environmental standards and regulations428. Stern explains this excitement 
amongst economists with regards to the EKC because, if the concept is accurate, “economic growth 
would be the means to eventual environmental improvement”
429. Academics like Judith Rees state: 
“[T]he sustainability concept has changed radically. Ecological morality has no place in the 
new conception, the environment is viewed in strictly functional terms as a deliverer of goods 
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and services. The notion that the global resource base, including environmental systems, 
places an inevitable, absolute limit in economic development has been rejected. This 
rejection renders obsolete the no-growth solution to environmental problems which had 
been so popular in the 1970s. The emphasis has shifted dramatically; no longer is it a 
question of totally structuring society to meet the needs of the environment but of ensuring 
that the productivity of the environment is maintained in order to further long term 
economic and social development. It is easy to see why the notion of sustainable 
development has become so popular; basically it allows us to have our cake and eat it. No 
longer does environmental protection mean sacrifice and confrontation with dominant 
materialist values.”430 
Other academics too seem to echo similar sentiments. Beckerman, for example states that,  
“there is clear evidence, although economic growth usually leads to environmental 
degradation in the early stages of the process, in the end the best – and probably the only – 
way to attain a decent environment in most countries is to become rich.”431 
While Sustainable Development may indeed be a desirable instrument towards reconciling trade and 
environmental concerns, it is difficult to see the relationship between trade and the environment in 
such absolute terms as those of academics such as Judith Rees. As a result other academics have 
been more cautious in their approach towards the interpretation of the EKC. Stern, Common and 
Barbier note that although some pollutants were consistent with the EKC hypothesis while others 
were not, several academics and policy makers seem to ‘miss this qualification’, which in the opinion 
of Stern et al, is a ‘serious oversight’432. Arrow et al, also corroborate the fact that the EKC has been 
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“shown to apply to a selected set of pollutants only” and caution that “Economic growth is not a 
panacea for environmental quality”433. 
Any analysis of environmental standards of nations on the EKC must consider the implications of the 
pre-TPI segment of a curve on the environment. One of the underlying themes through this thesis is 
the differing environmental standards between pre-TPI and post-TPI countries due to the increasing 
environmental deterioration in pre TPI nations, and the increased environmental friction as a 
consequence. Such underlying dynamics fuel the main purpose of this thesis to compare unilateral 
environmental instruments with mutual recognition, in order to analyse whether a policy instrument 
may be able to reduce such international friction while increasing or maintaining the desired 
environmental standards of post-TPI nations.  
However before such analysis, we must first understand why there is such a difference in 
environmental standards between pre-TPI and post-TPI countries as the EKC suggests. The premise 
behind the theory of a post TPI decrease in environmental degradation, in the EKC, is derived from 
the assumption that after crossing the TPI, higher economic growth should lead to environmentally 
beneficial technology and as a result, market demands for higher standards434. The World Bank 
added credence to this school of thought by propagating the hypothesis in their World Development 
Report, 1992435.  As suggested, the post-TPI segment includes developed nations, and has, according 
to the EKC, witnessed a reversal in trend with Environmental Degradation decreasing alongside a 
simultaneous rise in Economic Growth. This phenomenon is also discussed in Inglehart’s theory of 
“Post-materialism”436. 
 
                                                          
433
 Kenneth Arrow et al, ‘Economic Growth Carrying Capacity, and the Environment’ (1995) 268 Science 520, 521 
434
 Esty, Bridging the Trade Environment Divide (n 411) 115 
435
 World Development Report 1992 (n 426) 38; Also mentioned in Stern (n 410) 1421 
436
 See Ronald F Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton 
University Press 1977) and Ronald F Inglehart, ‘Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006’ (2008) 31 




According to Inglehart, as society437 evolves with rising per capita income, ‘materialistic’ values of 
economic and physical security are substituted by ‘post-materialistic’ values438 439. In terms of 
concerns specifically regarding the environment, Inglehart notices in his questions to both the older 
and younger cohort, that there is a distinct increase in advocating stronger measures for 
environmental protection440. This is argued to be a shift from simple material consumption concerns 
concerning depletion of resources and environmental pollution, to a more abstract (and presumably 
complex) shift in cultural values to “quality of life issues”441. The proof that Inglehart provides uses 
substantial qualitative research through interviews throughout Europe442.  Martinez-Alier explains 
that although environmental concerns are an integral part of these “quality of life” issues, and 
certainly not a “post-materialistic phenomenon”, there banding together with other concerns such 
as human rights, feminism, peace, etc., under the encompassing head of “quality of life”, renders 
them “post-materialistic”443.  
A caveat to this process of thinking, however, is the realization that such research was carried out at 
a time of relative economic abundance (or at least relative economic comfort) and, as a 
consequence, of abundant supply. Moreover, as Krutilla suggests, “While we may expect production 
of goods and services to increase without interruption, the level of living444 may not necessarily be 
improved.”445 Krutilla further cites the works of Barnett and Morse446 to reveal that, although 
Inglehart discovered a change towards greater concern for environmental improvement, the actual 
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quality of the physical environment was, in fact, deteriorating447. This may be a result of simplifying 
the relationship between economic growth and environmental improvement into an overtly linear 
form. The more complex nature of the relationship has been further discussed below in Section 3.3 
to understand the multiple factors that determine the dynamics between the two448. This thesis 
however looks at the increased demand for environmental standards, an issue also considered by 
Krutilla, and the further issue of whether such an increase in environmental standards leads to an 
actual improvement in the standard of living of a population is not part of this study449. 
Martinez-Alier, in his research, goes further to ask whether there is a correlation between wealth 
and environmentalism450. Although there is a general trend in the affirmative, Martinez-Alier’s 
comparison of US and Mexican (NAFTA) trade laws would hint at ambiguity, at least in the 
determination of the “green-ness” of a country. For example, the WTO case of US-Tuna/Dolphin451 
reveals higher environmental concerns in the US as compared to Mexico (a country with lower GDP). 
However, as Martinez-Alier points out, NAFTA laws on maize farming are advantageous to the US 
methods of mass farming than the environmentally friendlier small scale peasant farming in Mexico. 
Furthermore, oil transfers from Mexico to the US reveal a greater consumption pattern in the US. In 
light of these revelations, Martinez-Alier asks whether it is indeed possible to determine which 
country is greener452, and therefore in the light of that ambiguity, whether the original question of a 
correlation between wealth and environmentalism can be determined with certainty. 
An ambiguity in the answer to this question may always remain. However, as it may perhaps be that 
production methods are connected to consumption patterns, a comparison of mass farming to small 
scale farming may be an unfair one since the choice of production method may be a direct 
consequence of demand for a product (and therefore may change with an increase in demand) 
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rather than a deliberate attempt at ‘greener’ production. A fairer analysis would be that of the 
attempt to maintain or increase environmental standards in the face of increased production.  
3.2.2 Criticisms of the EKC 
Although the EKC allows a reasonable basis for understanding why the demand for environmental 
standards flow from developed nations to developing nations, it is of objective academic interest to 
see the criticisms levelled at the EKC. The criticisms are not only towards the theoretical structure of 
the EKC but also of the practical implications of such a theory on environmental standards. We look 
at the practical implications of the EKC hypothesis first. 
The pattern of the curve leading from a material to a post-material society allows the assumption 
that post-TPI there is an increase in environmental standards. In several countries policymakers have 
interpreted the EKC results in a way that allows the dangerous trend to grow unsustainably first and 
then clean up453. Even if one was to assume the accurate predictability of the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve, it is detrimental to the wellbeing of the planet to expect a predetermined economic pathway 
and not take active policy decisions to counter part of the Curve’s predictions. Sustainable 
development is a world-wide issue but to some extent more relevant to developing countries than 
to developed countries.  Because of population growth, climatic conditions and world-wide demand 
for their natural resources, the economic and environmental bases of developing countries are more 
threatened than developed countries454.  
Using GDP figures of developing and developed nations as indicative of their positioning in the EKC 
one may assess the potential for growth in developing nations to reach the GDP of developed 
countries. Although this growth is a necessary aspect of sustainable development, it does “increase 
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the overall pressures on environmental resources”455. Munasinghe states that in “middle income or 
newly industrializing countries (NICs), the intensity of natural resource use increases to support 
urban–industrial centres, and pollution levels rise rapidly”456. Moreover, empirical research suggests 
that pollution costs are already quite high in these countries. For example, recent World Bank 
estimates of mortality and morbidity from urban air pollution in India and China suggest annual 
losses in the range of 2-3% of GDP457. Therefore to use the EKC as a justification for further 
unfettered economic growth in developing economies (with a prevalent high rate of pollution and 
environmental degradation) may prove severely detrimental to the environment. 
There are also a few prominent criticisms levelled at the EKC hypothesis, itself. Furthermore, the 
increase of environmental degradation in some LDCs might not be a direct result of their increase in 
economic income but because of the borderless nature of environmental problems such as cross 
border pollution. An example of such cross border pollution may be found in the facts of the Trail 
Smelter Arbitration where a smelter in the area known as Trail, in Canada let to increased emissions 
of Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) in the neighbouring Washington state in the United States of America. 
Subsequent increases in production saw a corresponding increase in SO2 emissions and, as claimed 
by the US, a larger area of environmental damage458. Thus an increase in emissions may be due to 
the processes of neighbouring states and, as a result, not have an equivalent increase in per capita 
income, and yet Dasgupta et al, reveal that such considerations are often unaccounted for in 
research related to the EKC459.  
Stern et al, also state that countries such as Japan which import a majority of their raw material 
requirements, may be “exporting environmental impacts” to the countries they source their raw 
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material from460. Therefore, although environmental degradation might be stemmed, beyond a 
certain per capita income level on the EKC, this may not necessarily be due to an improvement of 
standards but merely a shift in the position of environmentally degrading processes461.  
Another such highly ambiguous variable is the time-factor determinant of the graph, especially 
regarding the TPI. Although the TPI has been shown to change for various environmental factors in 
various countries at various points of time, they have been dissimilar values for authors such as 
Stern462. This strongly hints towards the fact that a conclusion dependant on so many variables and 
factors cannot have such a simplistic hypothesis to be generally consistent. As Perman and Stern 
states, “[taking] diagnostic statistics and specification tests into account and [using] appropriate 
techniques, [it is found] that the EKC does not exist.”463Rather, Stern finds that a more realistic view 
of the per capita income – environmental degradation relationship is that emissions of most 
pollutants and flow of waste are, in fact, rising with a rise in per capita income464.  
Moreover there may be certain 
environmental factors that may not show an 
increase in degradation at all, thereby 
revealing no apparent relationship with per 
capita income. This is, again, evidence of the 
EKC hypothesis not accounting for all 
variables. Other more positive globalisation 
factors such as Technology Transfer (TT), 
international global sustainability efforts 
or simply domestic policies intended for the wellbeing of the citizens, might show a decrease in an 
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environmental degradation factor or no substantial increase of factors that were not originally a 
problem. A very telling example of this point is the graph of the consumption of substances that 
deplete the Ozone Layer (opposite). 
However, to conclude absolutely that the EKC does not exist, as Perman and Stern does, may not be 
entirely accurate. Empirical evidence, as revealed in the studies of several authors does show the 
EKC to exist for several substances that are important to the existence of corresponding 
environmental standards. It is important to conclude from this section however, that the EKC may be 
too simplistic in its form to account for the trade and environment dynamic in its entirety. The EKC is 
therefore important to the extent that it positions countries with various states of economic 
standing in relation to their environmental standards. There are, however, other factors that need to 
be recognized, and perhaps superimposed over the EKC, in order to understand the relationship 
between trade and environment while giving the EKC due consideration. We look at these factors in 
the next section. 
3.2.3 Other factors affecting the Trade-Environment Relationship 
As discussed above, the relationship between economic growth and environmental standards is 
more complex than a mere direct proportionality than the EKC provides. The effects of economic 
growth on trade cannot be construed in a two dimensional dynamic. Both Esty and Stern have 
identified three distinguishable components, which have a close relationship with environmental 
development – Technique, Composition and Scale465.  
Technique refers to development of environmentally beneficial technology and a move towards 
environmentally beneficial best practices. Composition refers to a preference for cleaner products 
by the market. Both these components are directly proportional to environmental development as 
an increase in either logically leads towards environmentally friendly practices. The third component 
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of Scale refers to consumption and production patterns and is inversely proportionate to 
environmental development466. Thus, larger the amount of consumption and production, the more 
environmentally degrading emissions are produced.  
According to Esty, all three components increase with an increase in economic growth467. Therefore 
if these three components are factored into the parameters of the EKC, the environmental health of 
a nation is then dependant on the degree of rise in all three components rather than per capita 
income alone. Thus, even after crossing the income level point of the Kuznets Curve that 
hypothesizes a decrease in environmental degradation, this may not be the case if the consumption 
and production patterns of a nation (Scale) outweigh technological development (Technique) and 
market demands for greener products (Composition). Thus, unlike what is hypothesized by the EKC, 
economic development and free trade might not necessarily have the linear relationship, or as Stern 
et al, states – “the assumption of unidirectional causality”468 – they are purported to have. 
Martinez-Alier, also notices this relationship between scale and environmental development, and 
pronounces that the economic advantage gained through technology and increased productivity ‘go 
now to buy goods and services in such increased amounts that the throughput of energy and 
materials in the economy is probably not decreasing’469.  
Thus, to conclude the observations of this section discussing the EKC, although we may see a general 
trend in the movement of the demand for standards from developed economies to developing 
economies we may not assume the connection to be entirely based on economic development. 
Although the concept of a ‘post-material’ society does hold certain credence in associating economic 
development to the demand for higher environmental standards, factors such as scale, technique 
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and composition must be considered in analysing the Trade-Environment Nexus and the demand for 
environmental standards. 
3.4 Sustainable Development and the Trade-Environment Relationship 
Environmental degradation is one of the problems that this thesis attempts to address. One possible 
solution to the problem is environmentalism (as defined above)470, and more precisely (in the 
interest of balancing Trade and Environmental interests) in Sustainable Development. The concept 
of Sustainable Development has been introduced in Section 2.4.5 of the previous chapter471.  
Broadly placed, Sustainable Development, as stated by the Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (Brundtland Report)472, “Is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”473 More 
specifically, it has been defined by Goodland to be “development without throughput growth 
beyond environmental carrying capacity and which is socially sustainable.”474 Similarly, the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) defines Sustainable Development to be the “Improvement in the 
quality of human life within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems”475 
Crucially, the definition of Sustainable Development provides two parameters for the working of 
Trade-Environment policy. These two parameters are, ‘environmental capacity’ and ‘social 
sustainability’. The Brundtland Report too touches on these two parameters in its definition of 
sustainability by stating that Sustainable Development contains two ‘key concepts’: 
“1. The concept of ‘needs’ in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which 
overriding priority should be given, and 
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2. The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the 
environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.”476 
The Brundtland Report’s second concept within its discussion on Sustainable Development 
acknowledges the limitation placed by technology on environmental capacity. This is perhaps 
indicative of the deviating schools of environmentalism as has been discussed by several 
commentators477. 
This divide has been coined by Eckersley as the ‘anthropocentric – ecocentric cleavage’478. The same 
divide is found in Arne Naess’ distinction between the ‘shallow ecology movement’ and the ‘deep 
ecology movement’479. The shallow ecology movement is defined to be, “[the] fight against pollution 
and resource depletion. [It’s] central objective: the health and affluence of people in the developed 
country”480. It is quite clearly anthropocentric in its outlook, in the sense that it is mindful of 
environmental degradation as far as it affects humanity (or a part thereof). Conversely, the deep 
ecology movement is defined to be the “rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of the 
relational, total-field image”481. This view of the deep ecology movement has in fact been noted to 
be synonymous to Ecocentrism, “designating a broad based ecological politics loosely coalescing 
around opposition to ‘anthropocentrism’”482.  
Concern for the environment has primarily been for anthropocentric reasons. This can clearly be 
seen in the wording and the structure of multilateral environmental treaties and agreements. For 
example the Stockholm Declaration which explicitly declares its intentions to protect the ‘human 
environment’ states that, “Man is both a creature and a moulder of his environment, which gives 
him physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, spiritual, moral and social 
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growth”483. Similarly the Rio Declaration states that, “Human beings are at the centre of concerns for 
sustainable development”484. 
At the intersection between trade and the environment, having an anthropocentric outlook may not 
always be advantageous to addressing environmental concerns. A severely anthropocentric view 
would necessitate a prioritizing of what may be considered valuable to humanity. In such 
circumstances, trade and economic benefits often undermine environmental concerns.  
For example, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), 1999485, lists Asbestos as a toxic 
substance under Schedule I of CEPA486. Asbestos and Asbestos products are highly regulated through 
several Federal and State laws487.  The Export Control List in Schedule 3 of CEPA, lists several 
asbestos forms488, such as crocidolite asbestos listed in Part 2 of the list489. Export of substances, 
listed to Part 2, are subject to consent from the importing country490. One notable substance missing 
from the Export Control List is chrysotile asbestos and therefore its export is not restricted. It is 
interesting to note that chrysotile asbestos is the only form of asbestos extracted in Canada491 and 
therefore of significant trade interest.  
In terms of environmental standards, the prioritization of trade and economic concerns often 
distorts the level of risk to the environment due to human activity that is socially acceptable. This 
prioritization of trade and economic concerns is often a hindrance to a higher level of 
‘environmental modifications allowed by human activity’. Therefore the ‘judgement’ regarding such 
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modification, as mentioned in the definition of environmental standards by the Report of the Royal 
commission492, is dependent on the amount of digression from economic benefits that a society may 
allow, or can afford. Given the different economic needs of various countries, such different 
economic needs are often one of the factors that lead to differing environmental standards for the 
same environmental concern. 
To understand such discrepancies in environmental standards we may look at the way international 
law addresses environmental concern. The earliest, most developed and still the most proliferate 
use of international law is with regards to transboundary issues such as air and water pollution and 
the protection of migratory species. Most such problems are regional in nature and regulated by 
regional organisations and agreements.  
Some problems, however, are global issues, such as those related to climate change and the 
depletion of the ozone layer. In such circumstances, global solutions are required as they affect all 
states. However, they may not necessarily affect all states equally or states may not have the equal 
capacity to combat such concerns. Such differing capacity also leads to differing environmental 
standards493.  
It may also be the case that a national problem may be of concern to the global community. In the 
environmental context such global concern would relate to issues of biodiversity, the conservation 
of natural heritage and sustainable development. It may be the case that for more alarming 
instances of environmental concern, States may impose unilateral environmental standards on other 
States. Such standards often lead to more complex issues of sovereignty and questions of a State’s 
responsibility to the global community at large. These issues have been discussed in Chapter 5 
regarding unilateral environmental instruments494. 
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What is clear, however, is that environmental concerns are subject to laws differing not only in 
content but in form as well. Transboundary environmental concerns are often addressed through 
customary or general international law. In the case of global environmental concerns, it is usually the 
law of international treaties and agreements that provide opportunities to address such issues. 
However, international law and, treaties and agreements require interpretation in case of disputes 
and in case of adverse effects on third parties.  
Both general international law and the inclusion of third party interests for specific treaties and 
agreements require a larger forum that is more inclusive than specific treaty groupings. The UN may 
be such a forum. However the lack of a dispute settlement body leaves the UN outside the purview 
of this thesis. To look for dispute settlement bodies which are representative of at least a greater 
proportion of the world’s nations one must look towards either the ICJ, or the)  Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) within the WTO. Although several ICJ cases have been considered, the issue of non-
compliance of ICJ awards is often a factor495 which favours the DSB to be a more robust decision 
making body and for the reasons set out in the next section.  
3.4 Looking at the WTO 
The WTO’s image as a policy maker and its DSB are both conducive to the goal of reconciling trade 
and environmental issues496. In fact, trade negotiators considered the WTO’s improved dispute 
settlement procedures, vis-à-vis other international organisations, and the fact that several 
loopholes of previous trade agreements had been closed, as a step towards better environmental 
considerations in trade497. We therefore look at the influence of WTO policy and the interpretation 
of WTO legislation by the DSB and its effects on trade and environmental instruments throughout 
this thesis. Also we have already discussed and considered the definition of standards in terms of the 
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WTO498. In the next chapter we look at standards specifically in terms of exceptions granted under 
the GATT Article XX499. When discussing unilateral environmental instruments and mutual 
recognition agreements, we analyse such instruments in light of WTO legislations to consider their 
validity under WTO law. However, before such consideration, it is important to understand that 
although the WTO is influential to environmental standards, it is primarily a trade organisation and 
as such there are certain drawbacks to its consideration. We look at these drawbacks in the 
following sections.  
3.4.1 Drawbacks of the WTO 
Its global position notwithstanding, the WTO has a glaring drawback, in terms of being an 
environmental policy maker. It is, primarily, an organisation formed for the regulation and benefit of 
international trade, with members consisting of States, represented mainly by their respective trade 
ministries and with a traditional mandate of trade liberalization. The WTO’s priority and leanings is 
bound to be towards trade, and this is clearly reflected in the WTO’s emerging jurisprudence. In 
other words, although the WTO may be the best option for trade-environment convergence, it could 
possibly be its own, biggest hindrance in the matter500. 
Moreover, it was not until 1996 that a shift in environmental policy was witnessed within the WTO. 
Before that, the GATT was reputed to be unsympathetic to environmental issues. The 1992 GATT 
Secretarial Report on ‘Trade and Environment’ mentions that it is not possible for a country to make 
market access to its own market dependant on the environmental policies and practices of an 
exporting country501. It was only in the final days of the Uruguay round of negotiations that trade 
negotiators started paying attention to the environment502.  
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The ambiguity inherent in the WTO legislation facilitating environmental safeguards, and the 
jurisprudence developing from it, are also factors affecting the effective reconciliation of trade and 
environmental issues. Of the few environmental cases adjudicated under the WTO the judgement 
and reasoning of the original panels have often been considered flawed, especially in terms of 
disallowing the use of Article XX (general exceptions)503. It is only through the subsequent rulings of 
the WTO’s Appellate body that a certain amount of confidence has been restored in the WTO’s 
commitment towards the environment504. For example, in the Appellate Body judgement in US – 
Shrimp, the AB corrects the Panel assumption that requiring from exporting countries compliance 
with, or adoption of, certain policies prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a priori 
incapable of justification under Article XX. The AB states that: 
“Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific exceptions of Article XX inutile, 
a result abhorrent to the principles of interpretation we are bound to apply.”505 
Charnovitz lists similar interpretations by the AB in US – Gasoline506 and EC – Asbestos507 as well. 
According to Charnovitz, ‘well-thought-out’ AB decisions, even when the Panel decisions were not 
reversed508, “inspired confidence in the adjudication process, and convinced many environmentalists 
that legitimate environmental measures would be permitted by the WTO.”509 
The following paragraphs are a short discussion on Article XX GATT in the context of the nature of 
the drawback of looking towards the WTO for environmental standards. A detailed discussion on 
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environmental standards under Article XX is found in the following chapter, including an analysis of 
the jurisprudence mentioned in the following paragraphs510. 
Article XX is usually the recourse taken by parties in justifying environmental policies, under the 
WTO. The relevant sections of Article XX are its Chapeau to Article XX which prevents the use of such 
restrictions as technical barriers to trade, Article XX(b) which necessitates restrictions for the 
protection of human, animal and plant life or health and Article XX(g) which requires restrictions for 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources511. 
The ambiguity lies within the technical wordings of the sections. For example, in Article XX(b) the 
difficulty is not in identifying the measures in question, but on showing whether these measures are 
‘necessary’, as required under the Article. This is often referred to as the ‘necessity test’. The 
jurisprudence surrounding this test is somewhat confusing. It would seem that the ‘necessity’ of a 
certain measure would lean more towards the ‘indispensability’ of that measure rather than its role 
in obtaining a policy objective. To establish necessity a set of factors have to be determined, as laid 
down by the Appellate body in Korea – Various measures on Beef512 and applied in EC – Asbestos513. 
These Factors are, however, individual to every case. Furthermore, the burden of providing evidence 
towards these factors lie with the defending government and if alternative measures are suggested 
by the complainant then the defendant has a further burden to prove why the alternatives are not 
as feasible as the measures in dispute514. 
Similarly, in Article XX(g) the criteria for the disputed measure has: to be concerning an exhaustible 
natural resource; to pertain to conservation of that resource; to be made effective in conjunction 
with domestic production or consumption; and to be within its remit. The definition of ‘exhaustible 
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natural resources’ was, however, deemed, by the Appellate Body, in US – Shrimp515, to be 
evolutionary, and could not be determined merely in the context of the period when the legislation 
was drafted516.  
The Chapeau of Article XX517 has also led to certain controversial interpretation, including from the 
Appellate Body. In US – Shrimp and US – Gasoline for example, the AB has stated that the Chapeau 
of Article XX has to be used ‘reasonably’518. Considering the AB rejection of the US environmental 
measures to protect turtles in US – Shrimp, Gaines is of the view that: “it is not and should not be 
the role of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to substitute its environmental policy judgment for the 
not-unreasonable policy judgment of a WTO member” and that “discrimination only fails the 
chapeau test if one cannot reasonably explain its basis”519. 
Another instance of a controversial and seemingly environmentally unfriendly interpretation of the 
GATT XX Chapeau by the AB was in US – Gasoline where the AB held that: 
“The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions of Article XX may be 
invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the 
legal obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General 
Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the 
measures falling within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due 
regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the 
other parties concerned.”520 
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Furthermore the AB also stated that, “The burden of demonstrating that a measure provisionally 
justified as being within one of the exceptions set out in the individual paragraphs of Article XX does 
not, in its application, constitute abuse of such exception under the chapeau, rests on the party 
invoking the exception”521. 
Accordingly, the rights of the exporting country have to be regarded along with the duties of the 
regulating government. In other words, the arbitrariness and unjustifiability of a certain measure 
becomes an increasingly easier charge especially given the fact that, in this case as well, the burden 
of proving otherwise lies with the defending government522. 
Two other WTO agreements, formulated during the Uruguay Round of talks, are the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards agreement (SPS) and the Technical Barriers to Trade agreement (TBT). The 
SPS provides that sanitary and phytosanitary measures for agriculture and agricultural products are 
applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. The TBT 
addresses measures in similar lines to the SPS, and endeavours to prevent those measures not 
mentioned in the SPS from being used as barriers to trade. However, in both agreements, the 
product standards, as long as they are consistent with international standards, are to be set by the 
individual countries523. 
In a bid to address environmental matters more effectively, the Committee on Trade and the 
Environment (CTE) was formed within the WTO in 1994524. Whether the CTE has affectively 
addressed these matters is a different matter altogether. The CTE has been subject, quite often, to 
criticism due to its seeming inability to effectively propose changes to WTO law525. What the CTE is 
valued for, of course, is that it forms an affective venue for national trade and environmental 
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officials and representatives from different Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and UN 
Environmental Programmes526. 
Environmental standards are discussed within the WTO framework, under two committees: The 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) and the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Committee). An example of this dual committee consideration of environmental standards can be 
found in the WTO’s work on eco-labelling. In this regard the Doha Ministerial Conference made this 
an issue of special focus for the CTE527. In 2003 the TBT Committee held a learning event on labelling 
where participants “stressed that labelling schemes need to be as least trade restrictive as possible 
and that adherence to the obligations under the TBT Agreement could facilitate this”528.  
However, this dual committee structure has also been one of the criticisms against the WTO’s 
handling of environmental standards. To continue with the example of eco-labels, several 
commentators are of the view that discussing eco-labelling in two separate committees has added 
to the confusion surrounding the subject529. Moreover, the disinclination of several Members in 
progressing the debate on eco labels has added to the ineffectiveness of the CTE. An EC proposal, 
prior to the Cancún Ministerial Conference, to allow for CTE sessions discussing the increasing of the 
usage of voluntary eco labelling programmes was categorically rejected by all non-European and 
developing countries530. 
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in its study of ecolabels531 has been 
particularly critical of the WTO dual committee approach to the issue of ecolabels. As the CTE may 
only make recommendations on whether any modifications of the provisions of the multilateral 
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trading system are required532, in the UNEP’s view, the CTE does not have adequate authority to 
implement environmentally friendly changes. On the other hand the TBT Committee (according to 
the UNEP) is reluctant in distinguishing eco labels from other labelling programmes and therefore 
uninterested in their development533.  
The reason for slow progress and limited change does not, however, lie with the CTE alone. Most 
international policy making is subject to a two-level procedure and this in itself diffuses the blame to 
other parties. Policies start of as domestic processes amongst stake-holders leading to the formation 
of national positions. These positions are then, fervently argued upon in the international arena, 
with each state looking to further their best interests534. Given that, usually, trade lobbies are 
stronger than environmental lobbies, respective governments arrive at the WTO negotiating table 
with trade policies as a priority and environmental policies as an exception.  
As a result, the increased interest in environmental policies has been perceived more as a hindrance 
rather than an opportunity to work towards converging goals.  Parties with commercial interests are 
also fearful of the fact that the infusion of stronger environmental policies into the working of the 
WTO serve as a moderating effect on trade liberalization535. This was clearly witnessed when, in the 
second US – Restriction on imports in Tuna536, the challenge on a US tuna imports ban by the EC was 
met with a threat of counter challenging an EC directive to ban US fur products537. This distraction 
from the actual motive of the WTO prompted a few states to observe that: “Contracting parties 
should not let the important principles of GATT be trampled upon by governments trying to protect 
the environment they deemed appropriate.”538 
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3.4.2 The Differing Interests of Developed and Developing Countries 
However, what is deemed appropriate is, in itself, a variety of contradicting concerns. Different 
states have different national agendas to fulfil. Not only do they bring prioritized trade concerns to 
the negotiating table, but they bring extremely opposing prioritized trade concerns. And, although 
equal voting rights in the WTO is regarded as a step forward in international negotiations (as 
opposed to other organisations such as the UN), this may not necessarily convert into equal 
opportunity to further ones interests.  
This has translated into major divisions within the WTO, derived from mutual suspicion and 
contradictory concerns regarding environmental issues. Not only are the usual North-South divides 
present, but, as trade has liberalized and the focus has changed, several North-South coalitions as 
well as North-North and South-South conflicts have appeared as well539.  
The problem, as is well understood by all members, is that the development process cannot gain 
momentum in the presence of barriers to market access and if the terms of trade of developing 
countries are continually depressed. This concern is made clear in Agenda 21, echoing the 
recommendations of the Rio Declaration540. 
Yet, the fact that environmental concerns are derived from Northern state priorities does not seem 
to facilitate the cause. Additionally, mistrust amongst the developing countries further stems from 
their grievance against trade and environment policies being isolated from their economic concerns 
at the multilateral negotiating table541. An example would be the change in priorities at the WTO 
mentioned next. 
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 When the GATT was first envisaged, a differential and more favourable treatment was decided to be 
accorded to developing and least developed countries542. Several concessions were given towards 
freer trade for developing countries with a lesser expected reciprocity. Agriculture was also a priority 
during these rounds of negotiations. However, this all changed with the Uruguay Round of talks. 
Priorities changed to northern interests such as intellectual property (TRIPS) and services (GATS)543. 
Most of the earlier concessions were taken as a buffer period for developing countries to comply 
with GATT requirements, or as a time for them to safeguard their interests. The eventual goal still 
remains all round free trade as it is considered to be most beneficial for all countries concerned544 .  
North-South friction is further fuelled because, even in sectors where greater market access has 
been negotiated, such promises have turned out to be false. In agriculture and textiles, for example, 
where developing countries are known to have an advantage, and where concessions and 
preferential treatment were negotiated during the Uruguay round, developed countries continue to 
implement excessive tariff and non-tariff barriers545.  
Developed countries use a plethora of barriers to dilute developing country interests, such as 
agricultural subsidies, ant-dumping rules and unilateral trade measures. In this way environmental 
policies have come to be perceived by developing countries as another means to thwart the 
economic growth of developing nations. The difficulty is in distinguishing true and pretended 
environmentalism, and that environment protectionism can easily be justified as environmental 
protection546.  
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3.4.3 Global Linkages 
International trade forms the main impetus for developing countries to achieve fast growth. Through 
trade they can import the means to make their assets more productive. While a competitive micro 
economy and a stable macro economy are important factors of growth, global linkages – a 
consequence of globalisation – is another such factor, and one that is relevant to this thesis. 
According to Juhasz, global linkages consist of trade in goods and services, foreign investment and 
technology and the ability to meet world standards including environmental standards547. Although 
Juhasz lists the elements of global linkages separately, in reality these linkages are inseparable for 
growth and are interdependent. 
Several conclusions may be drawn from this interconnectivity. Firstly, the connection between the 
linkage of environmental standard and the trade in goods and services renders international 
organisations of trade, such as the WTO, and international environmental bodies such as the UNEP 
as well as multilateral bodies and treaties concerning both trade and environment, as the 
institutions most suitable for dispute settlement and policy determination in terms of international 
relations, and the international trade – environment nexus. Among such institutions, the ones where 
there exists a functional dispute settlement body with the ability to ensure compliance of the 
judgements passed on a dispute would be considered even more important in addressing trade 
related environmental concerns. It is for this reason that this thesis considers the WTO as an 
overarching institution whose policies and rules must be taken into consideration when analysing 
instruments that may enhance environmental standards in trade. The compatibility of such 
instruments with WTO legislation and with the judgements of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
must necessarily be considered548. 
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Developing countries tend to see the call for sustainable development and the raising of 
environmental standards suspiciously and this is discussed in greater detail in the discussion on 
unilateral action549. Furthermore Juhasz lists other reasons for the inapplicability of strict developed 
country principles, citing the OECD as a standard: 
“Developing Countries cannot afford OECD standards because the cost of their 
implementation would destabilize their macroeconomic policies; 
Even if they could afford these costs, their export industries need to be subsidized to keep 
them competitive in the World market; 
Sustainable development of natural resources is a world-wide concept and developing 
countries cannot and should not carry the burden of conservation alone.”550 
3.5 Conclusion 
We looked at the concept of environmental standards and the concept of developed and developing 
countries in the previous chapter. The objective of this chapter was to understand the relationship 
between trade and the environment, in order to understand why the demand for higher 
environmental standards usually flows from developed to developing countries. This does not 
however imply that developing countries do not demand higher environmental standards 
themselves, but rather that the general trend is for a demand for higher standards from countries of 
a higher economic growth.  
The reason behind addressing this issue early in the thesis is to understand the nature of 
environmental standards before analysing different instruments that propagate such standards. To 
establish that the flow of standards generally tends to be in a certain direction allows us to search 
for environmental instruments that make this process more efficient while considering factors and 
circumstances prevalent in both developed and developing countries. The overall objective of this 
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thesis then is to find an instrument that propagates environmental standards while reducing North-
South friction arising from this demand for higher standards. 
The Chapter used the concept of the EKC to understand the relationship between economic growth 
and environmental standards. The EKC forms a correlation between per capita income of a nation 
and environmental deterioration. It suggests a Turning Point Index (TPI) on the graph beyond which 
an increasing per capita income leads to a decrease in environmental degradation, thereby 
suggesting an increase in environmental standards. This implies that the demand for increased 
environmental standards is found more often in countries higher in the economic growth scale (per 
capita income) that are beyond the TPI. 
However, academics such Esty and Martinez-Alier argue that a more complex dynamic exists 
between trade and environmental standards than a two dimensional ‘per capita income against 
environmental degradation’ relationship. They argue three further components of the relationship – 
technique, composition and scale. The chapter therefore argues that the relationship between 
environmental standards and economic growth exists in a model similar to the EKC if we 
superimpose the argument of the three additional components on the EKC. In other words 
technique composition and scale must be taken into consideration when considering the 
relationship between trade and environment. 
The next section reintroduced the concept of sustainable development. The concept was first 
generally defined in the previous chapter. In this chapter we see the concept in light of the trade – 
environment relationship. Through the concept, and especially considering the definition of 
sustainable development in the Brundtland Report, we find two important parameters that need 
recognition in a trade – environment context and certainly in this thesis. These parameters are 
‘environmental capacity’ and ‘social sustainability’.  
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Considering the Brundtland Report’s acknowledgement of the limitation of environmental capacity 
through the ‘state of technology’ and ‘social organisation’, and the commentary of several 
academics such as Hays and O’Riordan, we understand the division prevalent  in environmentalism 
highlighting the ‘anthropocentric – ecocentric cleavage’. This cleavage relates to the basis of 
environmental concern from which arise environmental action and standards. 
Understanding these concepts allows an insight into the nature of environmental concern. An 
overtly anthropocentric outlook may lead to a prioritization of trade over environmental concerns. It 
also provides an insight into the way trade related environmental issues may be addressed in 
international forums such as the WTO.  
The next section in this chapter therefore looked at the WTO. It discussed the reasons why the WTO 
is considered an overarching institution that is constantly analysed throughout the thesis. The 
presence of the DSB provides the WTO with a strong dispute resolution mechanism which makes it 
an important organisation in the trade – environment discussion. Compared to the UNEP, which also 
provides policy related to trade and environment, the WTO holds a distinct advantage because of its 
effective dispute settlement abilities. The relatively successful implementation of awards arising of 
DSB judgments provides the WTO an edge in effectiveness over other international dispute 
resolution bodies such as the ICJ551. 
However, before discussing the compatibility of environmental standard implementing instruments 
with WTO regulations, the chapter discussed the drawbacks of considering the WTO as an 
environmental policy maker, or at the very least an influencer of environmental policy. The most 
significant drawback with the WTO in the context of looking at it as an environmental policy maker, 
is that is it primarily a trade organisation. The WTO prioritizes trade efficiency and market access, 
and therefore one may be cautious of the WTO Secretariat’s environmental inclinations.  
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Furthermore, the WTO regulations referred to in this thesis i.e. the GATT Article XX and the 
jurisprudence surrounding Article XX have been considered to be ambiguous by academics such as 
Charnovitz, Cameron, Campbell etc. We mention this drawback in this chapter, but leave a detailed 
analysis of Article XX and the case-law involving the general exceptions for Chapter 4 Standards as 
General Exceptions to the GATT. 
As discussed above, another drawback within the WTO is the fact that environmental standards are 
addressed in two separate committees – the CTE and the TBT Committee. This dual committee 
approach has been a criticism against the WTO’s handling of environmental standards. 
Finally the Chapter looked at the differences in interests between developed and developing 
countries and also the trade-environmental relationships developing due to global linkages. 
In the next chapter we look at the environmental standards in the context of WTO regulations. We 




4. STANDARDS AS GENERAL EXCEPTIONS TO 
THE GATT 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 looked at the definition of standards under the WTO. The chapter also looked at the 
broader definition of standards used in this thesis. It is possible that standards defined in the 
broader context, and indeed standards as defined by the WTO may be deemed to be in violation of 
the general provisions of the GATT. The GATT prohibits border restrictions on goods, especially 
through (but not limited to) Articles I552, II553 and XI554. The GATT also prohibits discrimination 
between domestic and foreign products through Article III555.  
To justify such a standard, that would otherwise fall foul of WTO provisions, Member states may 
look to Article XX556 of the GATT. Article XX of the GATT provides exceptions to the general 
agreement. The environmentally relevant provisions of the Article state: 
“Article XX: General Exceptions 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures: 
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(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
[…] 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; 
[…]”557 
If a standard is considered to be in violation of any of the general provisions it may still be justified 
through the list of exceptions provided under GATT Article XX558. The AB in US – Gasoline reiterates 
this by stating that, “[t]he exceptions listed in Article XX […] relate to all the obligations under the 
General Agreement: the national treatment obligation and the most-favoured nation obligation, of 
course, but others as well.”559 
The jurisprudence surrounding Article XX is complex and continuously evolving (not least because of 
the organisational change of the multilateral trading platform from the GATT to the WTO). In this 
chapter we analyse the various available GATT and WTO case-law related to the environmental 
provisions of Article XX. We look at decisions from both levels of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
– the Panel and the Appellate Body (AB)560.  
The object of Chapter 4 of this thesis is to derive the principles incorporated into these decisions, 
which shape the standards that may be justified under Article XX. In terms of environmental 
standards effecting trade in goods, the related provisions of the General Exceptions are Article XX(b) 
and (g) as well as the Chapeau to the Article. This chapter therefore consists entirely of an analysis of 
pertinent WTO and GATT case-law surrounding these provisions. The chapter is divided according to 
the three relevant provisions mentioned. Although the Chapeau appears before the two provisions 
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in the wording of Article XX, due to the stipulation by the AB in US -Shrimp561 to apply the Chapeau 
at a later stage to the provisions, the chapter follows the same format in its structure.  
Section 4.2 covers issues necessary for the understanding of Article XX, prior to analysing its sub-
parts. It looks at the effect that the structural change, from the GATT to the WTO, including the 
insertion of the WTO Preamble, had on trade environmental concerns within the WTO562. This 
comprises the inclusion of the sustainable development principle and the validity of extra-
jurisdictional environmental standards within the WTO ethos. Section 4.2 also considers two issues 
prior to an analysis of the general exceptions. Firstly, it discusses on whom the burden of justifying 
Article XX, lies. Secondly, it addresses the possibility of the general exceptions being invoked 
simultaneously with an argument of WTO compatibility.  
Subsequently Section 4.2.1 discusses the order of applying the provisions of Article XX563. As 
mentioned above, a standard or measure is first examined against the relevant provision of Article 
XX followed by the conditions stipulated in the Chapeau.  
Section 4.3 looks at Article XX(b) of the GATT564. It is divided into two further sections. Section 4.3.1 
looks at what constitutes a measure designed ‘to protect human, animal or plant life’, as required by 
the provision565. Section 4.3.2 looks at the test of ‘necessity’, conditional to which a standard or 
measure may be justified under Article XX(b)566. For both instances the DSB has had ample 
opportunity, in terms of disputes brought to them, to settle the issues. The sections therefore look 
at the decisions of the DSB to define both terms. 
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Section 4.4 looks at Article XX(g) of the GATT and is divided into three sections567. Section 4.4.1 looks 
at the definition of ‘exhaustible natural resources’568. The question asked of both the Panel and the 
AB is whether the term includes living resources or is limited only to non-living resources. The 
section looks at the various case-laws which addresses the issue. Section 4.4.2 discusses the term 
‘relating to’569. Unlike Article XX(b), Article XX(g) does not require the test of ‘necessity’. Rather, a 
standard or measure in question must relate to the conservation of ‘exhaustible natural resources’. 
The section analyses relevant case-law to see whether this change in terminology broadens or limits 
the scope of standards included within Article XX(g). Section 4.4.3 looks at the meaning of the term 
‘made effective in conjunction with’ as discussed by the DSB570. 
Section 4.5 moves on to the analysis of the Chapeau to Article XX571. The Section looks at the scope 
of the Chapeau and how its scope different from the provisions of the Article.  It discusses the 
relationship between the provisions and the Chapeau. Section 4.5 then divides into a further section 
(Section 4.5.1)that discusses the terms ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ and ‘disguised 
restriction on international trade’ as defined by WTO case-law572. 
The chapter finally concludes by recapping the principles established by the DSB which limit and 
mould the characteristics of international environmental standards573. 
4.2 Article XX: General Exceptions 
From the previous chapters we get a general sense of the often conflicting schools of trade and 
environment. Article XX of the GATT  being the general exceptions to an international, multilateral 
trade agreement is found at the crossroads of these two conflicting schools (specifically the 
environmental exceptions found in Article XX(b) and (g)). The AB in Brazil — Retreaded Tyres 
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discussing Article XX(b) concluded that this “illustrates the tensions that may exist between, on the 
one hand, international trade and, on the other hand, public health and environmental concerns”574. 
However, Article XX is also, in a sense, reconciliatory of the two otherwise contradictory schools of 
trade and environment. Trebilcock and Howse even query whether Article XX is tantamount to a 
GATT environmental charter575.   
Given the WTO jurisprudence available to us on Article XX, the primacy (or even the equality) of 
environmental concerns over trade interests may still be debatable (although not altogether 
deniable), in the context of an international trade organisation where the recourse to environmental 
relief is in the form of general exceptions. What is visible, however, is a shift in the importance given 
to environmental concerns from the time of the GATT as an organisation to the formation of the 
WTO576. It is a shift we will find mentioned throughout this chapter, as we analyse various case law. 
The DSB (whether as a Panel or the AB) highlight this changing attitude of the multilateral trade 
regime since the GATT evolved into the WTO following the Uruguay round. 
This shift was visible in the Preamble of the WTO Agreement which the AB in US – Shrimp 
highlighted as significant in their interpretation of Article XX577. According to the AB the language of 
the WTO Preamble was “recognition by WTO negotiators that optimal use of the world’s resources 
should be made in accordance with the objective of sustainable development. As this preambular 
language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we believe it must add 
colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO 
Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994.”578 What the AB seems to be hinting at here is a greater 
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recognition of environmental concerns when interpreting Article XX, which according to the AB is 
what the WTO Members intended. 
A relatively biased attitude against environmental issues may be argued to have been visible in case-
law under the GATT579. In the US – Tuna/Dolphin I case580, for example, Mexico challenged US 
measures that banned imports of tuna products from Eastern Tropical Pacific, if caught in a manner 
that increased dolphin mortality and also had certain labelling requirements in place581. The Panel 
declared that in the case of both Article XX(b) and (g)582, the exceptions could not apply to the 
protection of plant or animal life outside the jurisdiction of the Member State583. In other words, the 
Panel declared the provisions of Article XX to not have extra-jurisdictional effect.  
The Panel explained that, firstly, that the drafting history of Article XX(b) eluded to the protection of 
human, animal and plant health in the importing country. The Panel recalled that exception (b) in 
the New York Draft of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) Charter584 originally read: “For the 
purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health, if corresponding domestic safeguards 
under similar conditions exist in the same country”585. The Panel did acknowledge, however, that the 
draft wording of the precursor to the general exceptions was later changed to its present Article 
XX(b) wording in the Geneva Charter of the ITO586, as it was considered unnecessary587. This does 
beg the question why, in their assessment of the drafting history of Article XX(b), the Panel only 
considered the inclusion of a domestic limitation to Article XX(b) in one of the drafts to the ITO, and 
not the later exclusion of it. 
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Secondly, the Panel felt that accepting the extra-jurisdictional effect of Article XX would allow the 
importing Member State to unilaterally impose environmental standards from which other Member 
States could not deviate without jeopardising their legal rights under the GATT588. 
However, later judgements seemingly rendered this assessment by the Panel in US – Tuna (Mexico) 
void. The Panel in US - Shrimp deliberated on whether Article XX justifies a measure of a Member 
State that is “conditioning access to its market for a given product upon the adoption by the 
exporting Members of certain policies”589. Although, the Panel felt that such a measure could not be 
justified, the AB disagreed with the Panel’s findings. The AB declared that “[C]onditioning access to a 
Member’s domestic market on whether exporting Member’s comply with, or adopt, a policy or 
policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect 
of measures falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX.”590  
The US measures on shrimp imports, on whose deliberations the conclusions of the above paragraph 
was reached by the AB is an example of such a standard. In this dispute, the US banned the 
importation of shrimp and shrimp products from countries not certified by US authorities. Countries 
wishing to export shrimp and shrimp products to the US could obtain a certification by 
demonstrating that turtle mortality rates did not cross a prescribed level due to shrimping (thus 
creating a standard for shrimp exports). Such a measure did therefore have the extraterritorial effect 
of conditioning the policies of an exporting Member State591.  
The AB felt that such measures could be justified under Article XX as “Paragraphs (a) to (j) comprise 
measures that are recognized as exceptions to substantive obligations established in the GATT 1994, 
because the domestic policies embodied in such measures have been recognized as important and 
legitimate in character. It is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting countries 
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compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies [..] prescribed by the importing country, renders a 
measure a priori incapable of justification under Article XX. Such an interpretation renders most, if 
not all, of the specific exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of 
interpretation we are bound to apply.”592 
Conditioning access on an exporting Member is in essence an extraterritorial effect. It seems, 
therefore that such extraterritorial measures may be allowed to a certain degree. In other words, 
imposing policies that set a certain level of standards for imported goods may therefore be justified 
under Article XX of the GATT593. 
Before analysing the application of the relevant provisions of Article XX that are justifying 
environmental standards we address two issues related to the invocation of the general exceptions. 
These issues are necessary for understanding its application. The first of these issues is the burden of 
justifying Article XX. The second issue is whether the General Exceptions may be invoked while 
simultaneously arguing the compatibility of the measure in question with other provisions of the 
GATT. We address the issue of justification first. 
From the Panel report in Canada – Administration on the Foreign Investment Review Act594 and the 
Panel report in US – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930595 it is evident that the Member State 
invoking the exceptions has to demonstrate its necessity. The test for necessity is discussed later in 
this chapter596; however it is interesting to note here that the burden of justifying the invocation of 
Article XX is on the Member State invoking it. This was reiterated in US – Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna597. The Panel in EC – Asbestos agreed with this notion of the burden of justification lying with 
the Party invoking Article XX, but clarified, however that this, “does not release the complaining 
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party from having to supply sufficient arguments and evidence in response to the claims of the 
defending party.”598 
The second issue, as already highlighted, is of simultaneous invocation of a provision of the GATT 
and the general exception to such provisions. In the US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (‘US Tuna’) 
the question arose as to whether a Member state could simultaneously argue that a measure was 
compatible with the general rules of the GATT and could yet invoke Article XX. The Panel in US-Tuna 
deliberated that although the interpretation of Article XX is narrow and that it is not necessary to 
examine a measure under Article XX unless it is invoked, nevertheless, “a party to a dispute could 
argue in the alternative that Article XX might apply, without this argument constituting ipso facto an 
admission that a measure in question would otherwise be inconsistent with the General 
Agreement.”599 An environmental standard could therefore continue to be argued as within the 
remit of WTO approved standards while being invoked as a necessary exception to the provisions of 
the GATT in case the argument of WTO compatibility is denied.  
Thus far, we have observed the shift in the post WTO multilateral trade forum towards greater 
acceptability of environmental concerns. This includes the validity of extra-jurisdictional 
environmental standards to the extent that they may condition access to the importing Member’s 
market. We also highlighted the conditions of invoking Article XX, including the fact that the burden 
of justifying Article XX lies with the Member seeking to invoke its provisions and the availability of 
the general exceptions simultaneously with an argument of WTO compatibility. Once the General 
Exceptions have been invoked, we must look towards the application of Article XX to understand the 
characteristics of environmental standards, which although not compatible to general GATT 
provisions, are compatible with the WTO as allowed exceptions. The following section 4.2.1 
therefore looks at the application of Article XX once it has been invoked. 
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4.2.1 Application of Article XX 
Looking at the text to Article XX, it is quite clear that there are two parts to the Article – the opening 
clause (known as the Chapeau in WTO parlance) and the provisions (a) to (j) of Article XX. When 
invoking the General Exceptions, both aspects of the Article must be considered. The way both the 
Chapeau and the relevant provisions are applied, provides an insight into what the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), the AB and by association, the WTO would consider characteristics of a WTO 
compatible environmental standard. The order in which the Chapeau and the provisions are applied 
is also noteworthy. In the following paragraphs we therefore look at the AB mandate to consider, 
both, the Chapeau and the provisions, the order of doing so and the reasoning provided by the AB. 
The next sub-sections then look at the provisions and the Chapeau specifically and their effect on 
environmental standards. 
In the US – Gasoline case, the Panel had found the US measures in question to be in violation of 
Article III.4 and subsequently could not be justified under the general exceptions of Article XX(b) or 
(g). As a result the Panel decided that it was not necessary to examine the disputed measure against 
the conditions provided in the Chapeau600.  
The AB however disagreed with the conclusions of the Panel and decided that the same measures 
were in fact justified by Article XX(g)601. The question then arose whether the conditions of the 
Chapeau were now pertinent. The AB therefore formulated this ‘two-tiered’ analysis of measures 
that sought to invoke the general exceptions. The AB stated that, “the measure at issue must not 
only come under one or another of the particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to (j) – listed under 
Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX.”602  
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The order of applying the analysis was, however left ambiguous by the AB in US - Gasoline. The Panel 
in US – Shrimp seemed to conclude from the US – Gasoline judgement that, whether the Chapeau or 
the provisions of Article XX should be examined first was immaterial. Thus having analysed the 
disputed measure against the Chapeau, and found the measure to be in violation603, the Panel 
concluded that if a measure falls foul of the Chapeau of Article XX it is not necessary to examine the 
measure under the relevant provisions of the Article604.  
The AB disagreed with this reasoning determining that the provisions were equally important and 
seemed to suggest that the sequence of the analysis formulated in US – Gasoline needs to be 
maintained605. The Appellate Body reasoned that, “[t]he task of interpreting the Chapeau so as to 
prevent the abuse or misuse of the specific exemptions provided for in Article XX is rendered very 
difficult, if indeed it remains possible at all, where the interpreter (like the Panel in this case) has not 
first identified and examined the specific exception threatened with abuse. The standards 
established in the Chapeau are, moreover, necessarily broad in scope and reach: the prohibition of 
the application of a measure ‘in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’ or ‘a disguised 
restriction on international trade.’ When applied in a particular case, the actual contours and 
contents of these standards will vary as the kind of measure under examination varies.”606  
Moreover, the AB further reminded the Panel of their interpretation in US – Gasoline, that "the 
purpose and object of the introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention of 'abuse of 
the exceptions of [Article XX]'"607, rather than ‘the object and purpose of the whole of the GATT 
1994 and the WTO Agreement’ as the AB felt the Panel had done in US - Shrimp608. Therefore it is 
                                                          
603
 US – Shrimp (Panel) Para 7.49 and Para 7.60 – 7.61 
604
 US – Shrimp (Panel) Para 7.63 
605
 US – Shrimp (AB) Para 117 
606
 US – Shrimp (AB) Para 120 
607
 US – Gasoline (AB) Page 22 
608
 US – Shrimp (AB) Para 116 
122 
 
necessary to examine the measure against the provisions of Article XX before examining it against 
the Chapeau.609 
We therefore analyse the influence of Article XX on environmental standards in the order prescribed 
by the AB, first looking at the relevant provisions (Article XX(b) and (g)) followed by the conditions of 
the Chapeau. This aids in determining the specific characteristics an environmental standard 
requires to be WTO compatible before testing the standard against the broader conditions of the 
Chapeau. 
4.3 Article XX(b) 
Article XX(b) allows Member States to formulate standards and measures that are “necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health”. Thus a very wide ranging set of standards may be 
argued under the provisions of Article XX(b) given the connection between human health and 
environmental issues610.  Considering the disputes that have already been brought under the GATT 
or the WTO, measures argued under Article XX(b) include the protection of species such as 
dolphins611 and turtles612 as well as health and environment related issues such as smoking 
restrictions613 and asbestos use614.  
This scope of Article XX(b) was elaborated upon by the Panel in US – Gasoline. According to the 
Panel, when analysing a standard or measure against Article XX(b) certain ‘elements’ had to be 
established by the Member invoking the Article. Firstly, that “the policy in respect of the measures 
for which the provision was invoked fell within the range of policies designed to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health”; Secondly, that the inconsistent measures for which the exception was 
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being invoked were necessary to fulfil the policy objective”; and lastly, that the measures were 
applied in conformity with the requirements of the [Chapeau] of Article XX”. 615  
We discuss the last element later in Section 4.5616. In the following sub-sections we look at the first 
two elements required to justify a measure under Article XX(b). A point of note here is that the order 
of the determination of both elements, was set by the Panel in EC — Asbestos. The Panel stated that 
“whether the policy in respect of the measure for which the provisions of Article XX(b) were invoked 
falls within the range of policies” must be established before the test of necessity is applied to the 
measure617. We look at the two elements in the order set by the Panel.  
4.3.1 Article XX(b): ‘to protect human, animal or plant life or health’ 
The first element towards the justifiability of a standard or measure under Article XX(b)is the 
determination of whether it is designed to protect human, animal or plant health. This element is of 
course subject to each individual case and dependent on the reasoning of the court. For example, in 
the abovementioned US – Gasoline dispute, the Panel admitted that US measures to reduce air 
pollution resulting from the consumption of gasoline was a ‘policy within the range of those 
concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life or health mentioned in Article XX(b)’ 
without elaborating on the reason behind their admission other than to highlight the agreement of 
all parties concerned618. 
In EC — Tariff Preferences the Panel stated that when “examining whether the [measures] are 
designed to achieve the stated health objectives, the Panel needs to consider not only the express 
provisions of the EC Regulations, but also the design, architecture and structure of the measure” 619. 
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The Panel used the reasoning put forward by the AB in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II620. In this 
dispute the Panel found that the disputed EC measure621 was not related to the ‘policy objective of 
protecting the health of European Communities citizens’ as argued by the EC. Rather, on reading the 
disputed measure the Panel understood its objective to be “development policy, in particular the 
eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development in the developing countries" 
and that "[t]hese objectives are to favour sustainable development, so as to improve the conditions 
under which the beneficiary countries are combating drug production and trafficking”.622 
Similarly, in US – Shrimp the Appellate Body stated that "the relationship between the general 
structure and design of the measure […], and the policy goal it purports to serve, that is, the 
conservation of sea turtles"623 needs to be examined in order to determine whether the measure 
pertains to the Article XX(b) i.e. to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
Therefore, seemingly, the determination of whether a measure falls within the range of policies 
designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health and thereby admissible for consideration 
under Article XX(b) is partly determined by the policy goals it seeks to achieve.  
4.3.2 Article XX(b): Necessity 
The second element required to justify a measure under Article XX(b) is that of ‘necessity’. In 
addressing the necessity of a measure, it is prudent to first identify the aspect of the measure that 
falls under such scrutiny. A difference must be made between the policy goal the measure wishes to 
achieve, and the means used to achieve the measure. The Panel in US — Gasoline, held that “it was 
not the necessity of the policy goal that was to be examined” but rather the necessity of the 
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particular measure to achieve such policy goal624. The reader will recall from Chapter 2 that the level 
of standard i.e. the policy goal, is determined by the host country as stated by the AB in Australia – 
Salmon and EC – Sardines625.  It is rather the method in which these standards or measures are 
achieved that determines the justifiability of a standard or measure under Article XX. 
This reasoning may be seen to a certain degree in the AB’s judgement in US – Gasoline when 
addressing the Panel’s findings on Article XX(g)626. The AB, taking note of the fact that “the Panel 
[had] asked itself whether the ‘less favourable treatment’ of imported gasoline was ‘primarily aimed 
at’ the conservation of natural resources, rather than whether the ‘measure’, i.e. the baseline 
establishment rules, were ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation of clean air” found that the Panel “was 
in error in referring to its legal conclusion on Article III:4 instead of the measure in issue.”627 Thus it 
may be inferred that in invoking Article XX, it is already presumed that the measure in question 
should be analysed as an exceptions to the provisions of the GATT, and thus the test for ‘necessity’ 
inherent in paragraph (b) is based on factors other than whether the original policy or intention falls 
foul of the provisions of the GATT. We now look as these factors essential for the test of ‘necessity’.  
The AB in Korea — Various Measures on Beef deliberated on the term ‘necessary’628. The AB states 
thus in their judgement: “the reach of the word ‘necessary’ is not limited to that which is 
‘indispensable’ or ‘of absolute necessity’ or ‘inevitable’. Measures which are indispensable or of 
absolute necessity or inevitable to secure compliance certainly fulfil the requirements of Article 
XX(d). But other measures, too, may fall within the ambit of this exception. As used in Article XX(d), 
the term ‘necessary’ refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this 
continuum lies ‘necessary’ understood as ‘indispensable’; at the other end, is ‘necessary’ taken to 
mean as ‘making a contribution to’. We consider that a ‘necessary’ measure is, in this continuum, 
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located significantly closer to the pole of ‘indispensable’ than to the opposite pole of simply ‘making 
a contribution to’.”629 
Although the AB in Korea – Various Measures on Beef looked at the meaning of ‘necessary’ within 
the ambit of Article XX(d)630, the Panel in EC – Tariff Preferences used this reasoning of the AB for the 
meaning of ‘necessary’ in Article XX(b) as well stating that, “the same considerations apply to both 
these subparagraphs of Article XX because the structure of Articles XX(b) and XX(d) is very similar. 
The Panel considers that the approach of analysis followed by the AB in Korea – Various Measures 
on Beef is also appropriate for the analysis of a measure under Article XX(b).”631 Therefore, using the 
reasoning in these two judgements, it may be deduced that in considering the ‘necessity’ of a 
measure invoking Article XX(b) the indispensability of the measure in terms of its objective would be 
a strong factor towards its validity under the General Exceptions. The greater the contribution of the 
measure to its objectives, the more easily might it be considered to be "necessary".632 This would 
indicate the requirement for an assessment of the contribution a measure has towards its objective 
in order to determine its ‘indispensability’.  
The AB in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, attempted such an evaluation of the contribution a measure has 
towards its objective. According to the AB, “[s]uch a contribution exists when there is a genuine 
relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue. The 
selection of a methodology to assess a measure’s contribution is a function of the nature of the risk, 
the objective pursued, and the level of protection sought. It ultimately also depends on the nature, 
quantity, and quality of evidence existing at the time the analysis is made. Because the Panel, as the 
trier of the facts, is in a position to evaluate these circumstances, it should enjoy a certain latitude in 
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designing the appropriate methodology to use and deciding how to structure or organize the 
analysis of the contribution of the measure at issue to the realization of the ends pursued by it.”633 
The AB, however, further cautions that “[t]his latitude is not [..] boundless” and the Panel must 
determine the relation between the objective and the means “in accordance with the requirements 
of Article XX […].”634 
Thus, although the AB sets out the various criteria the Panel must take into consideration in 
assessing a methodology to evaluate a measure’s contribution towards its objective, it does give the 
Panel a certain degree of flexibility in forming such methodology (subject, of course, to the edicts of 
proportionality, reason and Article XX). According to WTO case-law such method may be either 
quantitative or qualitative. In EC — Asbestos, the Appellate Body stated that there is no requirement 
under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 to quantify, as such, the risk to human life or health. A risk may 
be evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms.”635 The AB in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
acknowledged that the “same line of reasoning applies to the analysis of the contribution, which can 
be done either in quantitative or in qualitative terms.”636 
The AB in Brazil — Retreaded Tyres dealt with the contribution of an import ban under Article XX(b). 
The AB explained that “when a measure produces restrictive effects on international trade as severe 
as those resulting from an import ban, it appears […] that it would be difficult for a Panel to find that 
measure necessary unless it is satisfied that the measure is apt to make a material contribution to 
the achievement of its objective.”637 However, the AB clarified that, “This does not mean that an 
import ban, or another trade-restrictive measure, the contribution of which is not immediately 
observable, cannot be justified under Article XX(b).”638   
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Environmental and public health issues are complex and need equally complex solutions consisting 
of multiple interacting measures. The contribution of some of these measures may not be 
immediately obvious and be difficult to isolate “from those attributable to the other measures that 
are part of the same comprehensive policy”639. Furthermore, some environmental issues such as 
global warming and climate change may necessitate measures, the results of which may take a 
substantial amount of time to manifest. As acknowledged by the AB these measures “can only be 
evaluated with the benefit of time”640. 
This concept of delayed realization of contributive value was acknowledged also by the AB in US – 
Gasoline in the context of Article XX(g)641 where they stated that, "in the field of conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources, a substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse 
before the effects attributable to implementation of a given measure may be observable."642 
The AB in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres therefore elaborated on the concept of material contribution to 
the achievement of a measure’s objective. According to the AB a demonstration of the material 
contribution can be made “by resorting to evidence or data, pertaining to the past or the present, 
that establish that the import ban at issue makes a material contribution to the protection of public 
health or environmental objectives pursued” but also could consist of “quantitative projections in 
the future, or qualitative reasoning based on a set of hypotheses that are tested and supported by 
sufficient evidence.”643 This reasoning of the AB seems to indicate an acceptance of the 
precautionary approach, as discussed in the previous chapter. Although, as the reader will recall, in 
EC – Hormones the AB was uncertain about the acceptance of the precautionary principle by the 
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Member States644, clearly the principle appears to be an acceptable characteristic in the 
determination of necessity. 
This brings us to the import question of the treatment of scientific data and risk assessment in 
determining necessity. In EC — Asbestos the AB gave the Panel ‘a margin of discretion in assessing 
the value of the evidence, and the weight to be ascribed to that evidence’ and thus the Panel ‘was 
entitled, in the exercise of its discretion, to determine that certain elements of evidence should be 
accorded more weight than other elements’.645  The dispute related to a French ban on the 
manufacture, importation and exportation, and domestic sale and transfer of asbestos products, 
whose effects (or rather the extent of the effects) was disputed646. 
Furthermore, the AB also considered the prerogative of the country setting the environmental 
standard in considering scientific evidence. According to the AB, “[i]n justifying a measure under 
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, a Member may also rely, in good faith, on scientific sources which, at 
that time, may represent a divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion. A Member is not obliged, 
in setting health policy, automatically to follow what, at a given time, may constitute a majority 
scientific opinion. Therefore, a panel need not, necessarily, reach a decision under Article XX(b) of 
the GATT 1994 on the basis of the ‘preponderant’ weight of the evidence.”647 In EC — Hormones, the 
AB had similarly stated that ‘responsible and representative governments may act in good faith on 
the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected 
sources.’648 
EC – Asbestos also brought up the question of alternative measures. Canada argued in their appeal 
in EC – Asbestos that, the Panel had incorrectly interpreted that the level of health protection 
inherent in the measure was a ‘halt’ to the spread of asbestos-related health risks, since it failed to 
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take into consideration the risk associated with the use of substitute products without a framework 
for controlled use649.  
To this the AB stated that WTO Members have ‘the right to determine the level of protection of 
health that they consider appropriate in a given situation’. According to the AB, France had 
determined that the chosen level of health protection i.e. the prohibition of all forms of amphibole 
asbestos, and the restriction of chrysotile asbestos, is a ‘halt’ to the spread of asbestos-related 
health risks and therefore the measure at issue ‘is clearly designed and apt to achieve that level of 
health protection’650.  
The important thing to note here is that an environmental standard does not necessarily have to 
eradicate a health risk in its entirety but rather create a level determined by the Member state. 
Therefore, in the EC – Asbestos dispute, although Canada disputed PCG fibres as not being entirely 
without risk to human health, the AB felt that it was sufficient that scientific evidence indicated the 
risk posed by the PCG fibres to be less than the risk posed by chrysotile asbestos fibres. Thus it is 
“perfectly legitimate for a Member to seek to halt the spread of a highly risky product while allowing 
the use of a less risky product in its place.”651 Therefore, it is not necessary for a standard to 
eliminate the risk inherent to its objective in its entirety but rather to create a level of acceptable 
risk below which reasonably available alternatives may be acceptable. 
However, an available alternative may perhaps be problematic to the desired standards of a 
Member State in some cases. The AB in EC — Asbestos deliberated in length on the question of 
‘reasonably available’ alternative measures, stating that a measure is “necessary” within the 
meaning of GATT Article XX(b) “if an alternative measure which [a Member] could reasonably be 
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is [not] available to 
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it.”652 The AB then discussed at precedent set previously on the subject. We look at these 
judgements as discussed by the AB in EC – Asbestos. 
The AB in EC – Asbestos indicated that the Panel in US – Gasoline, “held, in essence that an 
alternative measure did not cease to be "reasonably" available simply because the alternative 
measure involved administrative difficulties for a Member.”653 The AB acknowledged that this issue 
was not addressed by the AB in US – Gasoline and proceeded to do so in EC – Asbestos, instead 
finding that ‘several factors must be taken into account’, besides the difficulty of implementation, in 
ascertaining whether a suggested alternative measure is “reasonably available”654.  
The AB then pointed towards the Panel judgement in Thailand – Cigarettes. The Panel In Thailand —
Cigarettes, observed that for evaluating whether a measure is ‘necessary’ under Article XX(b), “[t]he 
import restrictions imposed […] could be considered to be “necessary” in terms of Article XX(b) only 
if there were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent 
with it, which […] could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives.”655 
The AB then discussed their previous judgement in Korea – Beef where they had found the Panel in 
Korea – Beef to have rightly used the principle set by the Panel in US — Section 337 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930656. According to the Panel in US – Section 337, a Member State is not able to justify a 
measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as “necessary” if an ‘alternative measure which it 
could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is 
available to it’. Moreover, if an alternative GATT consistent measure is not available, a Member 
State is ‘bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least 
degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions’657.  
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The AB in EC - Asbestos then addressed the issue of alternative measures that would achieve the 
same end and that is less restrictive of trade than a prohibition. The AB wishes to determine, in 
terms of France’s asbestos ban, whether a controlled use of asbestos was a reasonable alternative to 
an outright prohibition, and one that would achieve the same objectives sought by the measure at 
issue.658 According to the AB, a Member State “could not reasonably be expected to employ any 
alternative measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the very risk that the Decree 
seeks to ‘halt’. Such an alternative measure would, in effect, prevent [a Member State] from 
achieving its chosen level of health protection.”659  
The AB in Brazil — Re-treaded Tyres also reiterated that a reasonably available alternative must 
allow for a Member to achieve the desired level of protection. With such objective in mind, the AB 
concludes that Brazil’s chosen level of protection is the ‘reduction of [these] risks … to the maximum 
extent possible’. Therefore, according to the AB a measure or practice cannot be viewed as an 
alternative unless it ‘preserve[s] for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of 
protection with respect to the objective pursued’.660 
The AB in Korea – Beef further stated that, “[t]he more vital or important [the] common interests or 
values’ pursued, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ measures designed to achieve those 
ends”.661 It may therefore be an arguable point to make here that, international principles of 
environmental law, such as ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’662 and ‘Sustainable 
Development’663 have enough common interests to render a measure pertaining to such principles 
to be ‘necessary’ under the WTO. These are however questions that have not yet, been required to 
be addressed by the DSB. 
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4.4 Article XX(g) 
In this sub-section we analyse the parameters set on environmental standards, by Article XX(g) of 
the GATT.  The General Exceptions within Article XX(g) are those “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption”664. On a cursory reading of the text to Article XX(g) we find 
three elements to the Article in need of discussion and thus the section is divided accordingly.  
Firstly, a definition of ‘Exhaustible Natural Resources’ is required. The question arises whether 
natural resources is limited to non-living resources or would fish populations, forests and other 
resources of anthropocentric interest be included within the definition. If it is the latter, then the 
scope of standards justifiable under Article XX(g) increases manifold. We therefore look at this issue 
in the first sub-section. 
The second observation of note is the difference in the requirement of measures being ‘related to’ in 
the case of Article XX(g) while we have already observed the requirement of ‘necessity’ for Article 
XX(b). It is interesting to note whether the requirement of ‘relating to’ and not ‘necessity’ increases 
the scope of Article XX(g). We discuss this in Section 4.4.2665. 
Lastly, we discuss the requirement for these measures to be ‘in conjunction with’ restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption. This may be a manifestation of the National Treatment 
principle within the General Exceptions. The point of interest is its effect on environmental 
standards. 
4.4.1 Article XX(g): Exhaustible Natural Resources 
The primary question arising out of an analysis of Article XX(g) is whether, natural resources would 
include ‘living’ resources or would be limited to the conservation  of non-living resources only. This 
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issue is important in the context of the thesis as environmental standards related to conservation 
efforts and those ensuring the safety and sustainability of species, would otherwise be excluded 
from the ambit of this provision if ‘living’ resources are to be excluded. 
Complainants in the US – Shrimp case666 seemed to argue that the term ‘exhaustible natural 
resources would mean to include ‘mineral’ and ‘non-living’ resources only. The reasoning behind this 
claim was that the term “‘exhaustible’ referred to finite sources, such as minerals, rather than 
biological or renewable sources”667. However the AB in US – Shrimp disagreed with the contention of 
the complainants stating that Article XX(g) was not limited to the conservation of ‘mineral’ or ‘non-
living’ natural resources. The AB felt that ‘exhaustible’ natural resources and ‘renewable’ natural 
resources were not ‘mutually exclusive’668. Although living species are capable of reproduction and 
may, therefore, be considered ‘renewable’, in a sense, they are however “susceptible to depletion, 
exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human activities”669. As the AB stated, “[l]iving 
resources are just as ‘finite’ as petroleum, iron ore and other non-living resources.”670 
The complainants also referred to the drafting history of Article XX(g) to further argue limiting the 
exception to ‘non-living resources’671. They pointed to the preparatory meetings of the original ITO 
Draft chapter which focused on ‘raw materials’672, ‘products’673 and ‘minerals’674.  The AB clarified 
however that the wording to Article XX(g), including the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’, were 
crafted more than 50 years ago. Therefore, they require being interpreted in accordance with 
contemporary concerns such as the protection and conservation of the environment675.  
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The AB further pointed out the changes in the WTO since the drafting of the GATT including the 
attachment of the Preamble to the WTO Agreement676. The Preamble attached to the WTO 
environmental principles such as sustainable development677.  The AB felt that the signatories to 
that Agreement were, therefore, “fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of environmental 
protection as a goal of national and international policy”678.  
Thus according to the AB, “[f]rom the perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO 
Agreement, we note that the generic term ‘natural resources’ in Article XX(g) is not ‘static’ in its 
content or reference but is rather ‘by definition, evolutionary’. It is, therefore, pertinent to note that 
modern international conventions and declarations make frequent references to natural resources 
as embracing both living and non-living resources.”679  
The AB also acknowledged the expectations of the international community with regards to 
sustainable development in their interpretation of exhaustible natural resources: “Given the recent 
acknowledgement by the international community of the importance of concerted bilateral or 
multilateral action to protect living natural resources, and recalling the explicit recognition by WTO 
Members of the objective of sustainable development in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we 
believe it is too late in the day to suppose that Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 may be read as 
referring only to the conservation of exhaustible mineral or other non-living natural resources. 
Moreover, two adopted GATT 1947 panel reports previously found fish to be an ‘exhaustible natural 
resource’ within the meaning of Article XX(g). We hold that, in line with the principle of effectiveness 
in treaty interpretation, measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-
living, may fall within Article XX(g).”680 
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Importantly, in terms of environmental standards and policies, the AB seems to indicate that the 
changing nature the WTO, post-Uruguay round, affects the nature of Article XX, and indeed all WTO 
documents, towards a more environmental friendly interpretation. 
4.4.2 Article XX(g): ‘relating to’ 
A very visible difference between Article XX(b) and (g) is the requirement of ‘necessity’. Unlike 
Article XX(b), Article XX(g) does not require a measure to be ‘necessary’.  Rather it requires a 
measure to be ‘relating to’ the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. A discussion on the 
meaning of the term ‘relating to’ is required to understand the scope of Article XX(g) and the 
standards it includes.  
The inherent ambiguity in the term ‘relating to’ was noted by the Panel in US – Gasoline. The Panel 
felt that the term, “did not in isolation provide precise guidance as to the required link between the 
measures and the conservation objective.”681 The Panel therefore looked towards the reasoning of 
the Panel in Canada – Herring and Salmon in its interpretation of Article XX(g) for further guidance 
on the matter682. According to the Panel in Canada – Herring and Salmon, the difference in 
terminology of the different Article XX provisions, “[suggested] that Article XX(g) does not only cover 
measures that are necessary or essential for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources but a 
wider range of measures.”683 
The Panel in Canada – Herring and Salmon further elaborated that, “the purpose of including Article 
XX(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy 
purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder 
the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources”684. Therefore, 
according to the Panel, “while a trade measure did not have to be necessary or essential to the 
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conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, it had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of 
an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as ‘relating to’ conservation within the meaning of 
Article XX(g). (Emphasis added)”685. 
The AB in US – Gasoline, noted that the participants and third parties to the dispute accepted the 
reasoning of the Panel in Canada – Herring and Salmon and subsequently the Panel in US – Gasoline, 
that the term ‘relating to’ is synonymous with the term ‘primarily aimed at’. The AB therefore 
decided not to examine the matter any further, thereby presumably assenting to the reasoning of 
the Panel. The AB did however caution that, “the phrase ‘primarily aimed at’ is not itself treaty 
language and was not designed as a simple litmus test for inclusion or exclusion from Article 
XX(g).”686  
The AB in US – Gasoline did, however, disagree with the Panel’s usage of Article XX(g) with regards 
to the term ‘relating to’. The Panel had held that it “saw no direct connection between less 
favourable treatment of imported gasoline that was chemically identical to domestic gasoline, and 
the United States objective of improving air quality in the United States” and thus the measure at 
issue was “not primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources”687.  
The AB disagreed with this reasoning of the Panel. According to the AB, the Panel had wrongly asked 
whether the ‘less favourable treatment’ of imported gasoline was ‘primarily aimed at’ the 
conservation of natural resources. The AB felt that the pertinent question was whether the 
‘measure’, was ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation of natural resources688. The AB reasoned that the 
Panel had erred by referring to its legal conclusion on the provision of the GATT that was in 
violation689 rather than of the measure being disputed. To have the General exceptions in Article XX 
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invoked meant that a provision of the general agreement has been violated already690. The AB 
further added that the Chapeau of Article XX “makes it clear that it is the ‘measures’ which are to be 
examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding of ‘less favourable treatment.’691”692  
In US — Shrimp, the AB reasoned that for a measure to be “primarily aimed at” the conservation of 
natural resources, the ‘means’ must, in principle, be ‘reasonably related to the ends’693. The AB felt 
that for the measure in dispute in US – Shrimp, “the means and ends relationship between [the 
measure] and the legitimate policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, 
[was] observably a close and real one”694. The AB therefore concluded that the measure in question 
was ‘relating to’ the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article 
XX(g) of the GATT 1994.”695 
The AB in US – Gasoline, subsequently discussed the relationship between the provisions of the 
GATT and Article XX thus: “Article XX(g) and its phrase, ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources’, need to be read in context and in such a manner as to give effect to the purposes 
and objects of the General Agreement. The context of Article XX(g) includes the provisions of the 
rest of the General Agreement, including in particular Articles I, III and XI; conversely, the context of 
Articles I and III and XI includes Article XX. Accordingly, the phrase ‘relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources’ may not be read so expansively as seriously to subvert the purpose 
and object of Article III:4. Nor may Article III:4 be given so broad a reach as effectively to emasculate 
Article XX(g) and the policies and interests it embodies. The relationship between the affirmative 
commitments set out in, e.g., Articles I, III and XI, and the policies and interests embodied in the 
‘General Exceptions’ listed in Article XX, can be given meaning within the framework of the General 
Agreement and its object and purpose by a treaty interpreter only on a case-to-case basis, by careful 
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scrutiny of the factual and legal context in a given dispute, without disregarding the words actually 
used by the WTO Members themselves to express their intent and purpose.”696  
4.4.3 Article XX(g): ‘made effective in conjunction with’  
A further test in order to justify a standard or measure under Article XX(g) is the comparable 
application of the standard (or measure) to a like domestic product. This is due to the second part of 
Article XX(g) which mandates that measures that relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources must also be “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption”697.  
In US — Gasoline, the AB discussed the definition and the combined effect of the terms ‘made 
effective’ and ‘in conjunction with’. According to the AB, “the ordinary or natural meaning of ‘made 
effective’ when used in connection with a measure — a governmental act or regulation — may be 
seen to refer to such measure being ‘operative’, as ‘in force’, or as having ‘come into effect’. 
Similarly, the phrase ‘in conjunction with’ may be read quite plainly as ‘together with’ or ‘jointly 
with’.”698 Combining the two definitions, the AB concluded that the second clause of Article XX(g) 
refers to “governmental measures […] being promulgated or brought into effect together with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption of natural resources”699. The AB further 
concluded that the second part of Article XX(g) was “a requirement of even-handedness in the 
imposition of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of 
exhaustible natural resources.”700 
However, equivalent restrictions on similar domestic products, or as the AB mentions – ‘Even-
handedness’ – does not imply the same level of restrictions. In fact, identical treatment or for that 
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matter a strict application of other GATT provisions would render Article XX redundant. On the other 
hand, no restrictions at all would make it very difficult to justify a standard or a measure on an 
imported product. The problem at hand is similar to the one discussed in the previous section i.e. 
since the general exceptions are invoked when a provision of the GATT is violated, should the 
principles of the general agreement still be considered701. In the case of the second part to Article 
XX(g) it is the similarity to the national treatment principle of the GATT702 that is in debate.  
Addressing this issue in US – Gasoline, the AB stated that there was “no textual basis for requiring 
identical treatment of domestic and imported products”703. In line with their reasoning for the 
relationship between the GATT and Article XX704, the AB concluded that “where there is identity of 
treatment — constituting real, not merely formal, equality of treatment — it is difficult to see how 
inconsistency with Article III:4 would have arisen in the first place”705.  
However the AB also cautioned that if limitations are placed upon imported products alone, with no 
restrictions on domestically-produced like products, then the measure “cannot be accepted as 
primarily or even substantially designed for implementing conservationist goals. The measure would 
simply be naked discrimination for protecting locally-produced goods.”706 
An instance of such reasoning can be found in the Panel decision of Canada – Herring and Salmon 707. 
One of the several factors highlighted by the Panel in their analysis of Article XX(g), was that Canada 
limited purchases of unprocessed fish only by foreign processors and consumers and not by 
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domestic processors and consumers708. As a consequence the Panel found the disputed measures to 
not be justified by Article XX(g)709. 
Similarly in US — Shrimp the AB found that previous to the disputed measure, which regulated the 
mode of harvesting of imported shrimps, the US had instituted similar domestic regulations for the 
national shrimp trawling fleet.  Therefore, although the disputed measure did not apply to domestic 
shrimp trawlers, the AB felt that ‘in principle’, the measure was an even-handed measure710. As a 
result the AB declared that the measure was justified under Article XX(g)711. 
4.5 Article XX Chapeau 
Once we have analysed the provisions of Article XX, in accordance with the discussion in the 
introduction to Article XX above, it is now prudent to discuss the Chapeau of Article XX. The reader 
will recall that the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline mandated that the provisions as well as the 
Chapeau of Article XX must be fulfilled for a standard or measure to be able to invoke the General 
Exceptions to the GATT, while in US – Shrimp the AB further mandated that such a standard or 
measure must be analysed in the order illustrated in US – Gasoline. We therefore, now look at the 
content of the Chapeau to Article XX. 
The Chapeau to Article XX states: 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:”712 
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A point of note here is that the Chapeau, does not address the measure in question or its contents, 
(which is within the remit of the provisions of Article XX) but instead in “the manner in which that 
measure is applied.”713 The Panel in US – Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies noted 
that the Chapeau to Article XX “made it clear that it was the application of the measure and not the 
measure itself that needed to be examined”714. According to the AB in US – Gasoline, this 
characteristic of the Chapeau, and indeed its very purpose and object, “is generally the prevention of 
abuse of the exceptions” of Article XX715.  
Thus the AB in US – Gasoline further elaborated that, “[t]he Chapeau is animated by the principle 
that while the exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be 
so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the 
substantive rules of the General Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in 
other words, the measures falling within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with 
due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the 
other parties concerned.”716 
This relationship between the rights and duties of the Member invoking the exceptions was also 
mentioned by the AB in US – Shrimp. The AB found that “a balance must be struck between the right 
of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect 
the treaty rights of the other Members”717. The AB further elaborated that in their view, “the 
language of the Chapeau makes clear that each of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX 
is a limited and conditional exception from the substantive obligations contained in the other 
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provisions of the GATT 1994, that is to say, the ultimate availability of the exception is subject to the 
compliance by the invoking Member with the requirements of the Chapeau”.718  
The AB explains that, “[t]his principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of 
international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this general principle, 
the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a 
state’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right ‘impinges on the field covered by [a] 
treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably.”719 
Cheng explains what a reasonable and bona fide exercise of a Member’s right would entail720. 
According to Cheng, a reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right should be “appropriate and 
necessary for the purpose of the right (i.e., in furtherance of the interests which the right is intended 
to protect) […], fair and equitable as between the parties and not one which is calculated to procure 
for one of them an unfair advantage in the light of the obligation assumed.”721 In fact, an 
unreasonable exercise of such a right may even be considered “inconsistent with the bona fide 
execution of the treaty obligation and a breach of the treaty”722. 
However, the AB also cautions that “[t]he location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the 
Chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at 
stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ.”723 
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4.5.1 Article XX Chapeau: ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ and 
‘disguised restriction on international trade’ 
In its judgement in US — Shrimp, the Appellate Body highlighted three elements as a test of 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’. 
Firstly, the application of the standard or measure must ‘result in discrimination’. Secondly, such 
discrimination ‘must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character’. Lastly this discrimination ‘must occur 
between countries where the same conditions prevail’724. This section therefore looks at these three 
elements in order to understand the limits to an environmental standard, beyond which it may be 
deemed arbitrary or unjustified. 
In US — Gasoline, the Appellate Body held that the concepts of ‘‘arbitrary discrimination’, 
‘unjustifiable discrimination’ and ‘disguised restriction’ on international trade must be read ‘side-by-
side’ as they ‘impart meaning to one another’725. According to the AB, the concept of ‘disguised 
restriction’ has inherent within it the concept of ‘disguised discrimination in international trade’ but 
is not exhausted by it726. Therefore the AB further concluded that, “the kinds of considerations 
pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts to ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination’, may also be taken into account in determining the presence of a 
‘disguised restriction’ on international trade.”727 
It may be inferred from a reading of WTO jurisprudence that what constitutes discrimination under 
Article XX may be different from the parameters of discrimination in other provisions of the GATT. 
The process for determining discrimination of the General Exceptions has been consistently stated 
by the AB, to be different from that of the other substantive provisions of the GATT. In US – Gasoline 
the AB stated that, “[t]he provisions of the Chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s) by 
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which a violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred.”728 This was because 
doing so would render the application of Article XX ‘unprofitable’ and ‘[t]o proceed down that path 
would be both to empty the Chapeau of its contents and to deprive the exceptions in paragraphs (a) 
to (j) of meaning’.729 Thus according to the AB, the Chapeau prohibits the application of the General 
Exceptions in a way which would otherwise be consistent with the provisions of Article XX by 
disallowing ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail’ and where there is a ‘disguised restriction’ on international trade.730 
However, as mentioned above, the AB also cautions on the ambiguity of the wording of the 
Chapeau. The AB concludes that the requirements of the Chapeau may have ‘different fields of 
application.’731 To understand what constitutes ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ and a 
‘disguised restriction’ on international trade we must look at the different instances in WTO case-law 
where the various measures in question have been deemed to have been inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Chapeau. 
In US — Gasoline the AB considered the conduct of the US with regards to other Member states, 
identifying ‘omissions’ made by the US – firstly, “to explore adequately means, including in particular 
cooperation with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the administrative 
problems relied on as justification by the United States for rejecting individual baselines for foreign 
refiners” and secondly, “to count the costs for foreign refiners that would result from the imposition 
of statutory baselines.”732 According to the AB such omissions were beyond and above what was 
required to determine a violation of Article III.4. Thus the AB seems to imply that a violation, which 
would otherwise give the opportunity to invoke the General Exceptions, when determined to be far 
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in excess may fall foul of the Chapeau. The AB determined that “[t]he resulting discrimination must 
have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable.”733  
Thus the AB concluded that the measures being discussed in US – Gasoline would constitute an 
‘unjustifiable discrimination’ and a ‘disguised restriction on international trade.’ The reader will 
recall that the very same measures was deemed to be consistent with Article XX(g) but the AB 
further clarified that the measures “although within the terms of Article XX(g), are not entitled to the 
justifying protection afforded by Article XX as a whole.”734 
Similar to US – Gasoline, the question of the imposition of standards, rather than negotiation or at 
the very least a consideration for the measures and circumstances available in countries on which 
such standards are being imposed, was also addressed by the AB in US – Shrimp. In analysing the US 
measures at issue in the light of the Chapeau of Article XX, the AB noted the “intended and actual 
coercive effect on other governments” to “adopt essentially the same policy” as the US. The AB 
likened these prevailing circumstances to an ‘economic embargo’ which required “all other 
exporting Members, if they wish to exercise their GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same policy 
(together with an approved enforcement programme) as that applied to, and enforced on, United 
States domestic shrimp trawlers.”735 
It is of note here that by applying the conditions uniformly to international and domestic shrimp 
trawlers the US essentially fulfilled their National Treatment obligations under the GATT736. The AB 
did acknowledge that the US had “applie[d] a uniform standard throughout its territories regardless 
of the particular conditions existing in certain parts of the country”737. The AB further acknowledged 
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that “[i]t may be quite acceptable for a government, in adopting and implementing a domestic 
policy, to adopt a single standard applicable to all its citizens throughout that country.”738  
However, the AB refused to extend such uniformity beyond domestic application. According to the 
AB, “it is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member to use an economic 
embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory 
programme, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within that Member’s territory, without 
taking into consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of those other 
Members.”739 
The AB also noted that for the US measures740 under dispute the mere use of Turtle Excluder Devices 
(TEDs) did not relieve the home country from the prohibition of export. Shrimps of such countries 
were still not permitted for imports if they originated in waters of countries not certified under the 
certifying condition of the disputed measure. To the AB this “resulting situation [was] difficult to 
reconcile with the declared policy objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles” thus suggesting 
that this measure, in its application, “[was] more concerned with effectively influencing WTO 
Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied by the 
United States to its domestic shrimp trawlers, even though many of those Members may be 
differently situated”. Importantly, by reviewing these conditions, the AB reiterated the principle that 
“discrimination results not only when countries in which the same conditions prevail are differently 
treated, but also when the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the regulatory programme for the conditions prevailing in those exporting 
countries.”741 
Furthermore, the AB felt that the certification requirements of the measure “impose[d] a single, 
rigid and unbending requirement that countries applying for certification […] adopt a comprehensive 
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regulatory programme that is essentially the same as the United States programme, without 
inquiring into the appropriateness of that programme for the conditions prevailing in the exporting 
countries.” According to the AB there was seemingly little or no flexibility in how officials make the 
determination for certification pursuant to these provisions. Thus, to the AB “this rigidity and 
inflexibility also constitute ‘arbitrary discrimination’ within the meaning of the Chapeau.”742 
In US – Shrimp the AB also addressed the issue of the ‘due process’ of the measure in question. The 
issue in question was to determine whether the certification process as required by the measure 
was a “transparent, predictable certification process”743. The AB found the certification processes 
under the disputed measure to be, “principally of administrative ex parte inquiry or verification”744 
by the relevant authority745. The AB further found that there was no ‘formal opportunity’ for an 
applicant country to state its claims for certification or to clarify or justify its position against any 
arguments made against it prior to a decision on grating it certification. Neither were the authorities 
required to provide a formal reason for, or even notify the country of, its decision. The exporting 
country was required to determine the decision of the authorities through a published list in the 
Federal Register, of permitted importing countries. There was no procedure for review of, or appeal 
from, a denial of an application is provided. The AB therefore found the certification process of the 
US to be “singularly informal and casual, and to be conducted in a manner such that these processes 
could result in the negation of rights of Members”746, who have no way of determining whether the 
certification procedures are “being applied in a fair and just manner by the appropriate 
governmental agencies of the United States.”747 The AB therefore further found the certification 
procedure to be discriminatory under the conditions of the Chapeau to Article XX.748 
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Another aspect analysed in WTO jurisprudence, in determining the conditions of arbitrary or 
unjustified discrimination, was similar criteria applied to all effected Member states. This is similar to 
the MFN principle of the WTO and again it may be argued that the General Exceptions are available 
to justify derogation to the principle. However, there may be a need for objective criteria for any 
discrimination as was discussed by the Panel in EC – Tariff Preferences.749 
In the EC – Tariff Preferences case the Panel had to determine the justification of the EC’s Drug 
Arrangement schemes with other Member states, under Article XX(b). Following the analysis of 
Article XX(b) the Panel had to look at whether the conditions of the Chapeau had also been fulfilled 
as well750. In determining whether there had been any ‘unjustified discrimination’ the Panel 
particularly looked at the inclusion of Pakistan as a beneficiary of the Drug Arrangement751 while Iran 
was excluded from such benefits752. There were in total 12 beneficiary countries to the 
Arrangements.753  
Using the statistics provided by the EC, to justify that the 12 beneficiary countries were the most 
seriously drug affected, the Panel highlighted that the drug seizures in Iran (not a beneficiary 
country), were substantially higher than Pakistan (one of the beneficiary countries).754 Moreover, by 
virtue of the statistics provided by the EC, the Panel felt that the conditions in terms of the 
seriousness of the drug problem prevailing in Pakistan in 1994 (at which time Pakistan was not a 
beneficiary of the Drug Arrangements) were very similar to those prevailing in Pakistan in the year 
2000. The Panel therefore stated that they failed to see “how the application of the same claimed 
objective criteria justified the exclusion of Pakistan prior to 2002 and, at the same time, its inclusion 
as of that year.”755 The Panel felt that such treatment of Iran, and possibly of other countries, is 
discriminatory and the EC had failed to provide a justification for such discrimination. The EC, 
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according to the Panel had also failed to show that the discrimination was not arbitrary and 
unjustifiable as between countries where the same conditions prevail.756 
The question of whether an exception due to the instructions of a judicial or quasi-judicial body, 
could constitute an ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’, was addressed by the Panel as well as 
the AB in Brazil – Re-treaded Tyres with diverging conclusions. Brazil had in place an import ban on 
remoulded tyres. However, Brazil had to institute an exemption to this ban to MURCOSUR 
Members757. This was in order to comply with a ruling issued by a MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal that 
had found the Brazil ban to be a violation of its obligations under MERCOSUR, thereby leading to the 
MURCOSUR exemptions.758 
The Panel concluded that the MERCOSUR exemptions “[did] not seem to be motivated by capricious 
or unpredictable reasons [as it] was adopted further to a ruling within the framework of MERCOSUR, 
which has binding legal effects for Brazil, as a party to MERCOSUR.”759 The Panel further stated that 
the MURCOSUR exemptions, although discriminatory, was not “a priori unreasonable”, as the 
MURCOSUR agreement was recognized under Article XXIV of the GATT, allowing preferential 
treatment760.  
The AB however, disagreed with the Panel’s reasoning. According to the AB any analysis on whether 
a measure results in ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ discrimination “should focus on the cause of the 
discrimination, or the rationale put forward to explain its existence.”761 In the AB’s view, “there is 
such an abuse, and, therefore, there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination when a measure 
provisionally justified under a paragraph of Article XX is applied in a discriminatory manner ‘between 
countries where the same conditions prevail’, and when the reasons given for this discrimination 
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bear no rational connection to the objective falling within the purview of a paragraph of Article XX, 
or would go against that objective.”762 
In US — Shrimp, for example, when the disputed measure implied that, in certain circumstances, 
shrimp caught abroad using methods identical to those employed in the US would be excluded from 
the US market it was ‘difficult to reconcile with the declared objective of protecting and conserving 
sea turtles’.763 Using the US – Shrimp judgement, the AB in Brazil – Re-treaded Tyres admitted that 
they had difficulty in “understanding how discrimination might be viewed as complying with the 
Chapeau of Article XX when the alleged rationale for discriminating does not relate to the pursuit of 
or would go against the objective that was provisionally found to justify a measure under a 
paragraph of Article XX.”764 
The AB therefore concluded that “the ruling issued by the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal [was] not an 
acceptable rationale for the discrimination, because it bears no relationship to the legitimate 
objective pursued by the Import Ban that falls within the purview of Article XX(b), and even goes 
against this objective, to however small a degree.”765 Therefore, according to the AB, the application 
of the MERCOSUR exemption on the import ban on re-treaded tyres constituted ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination’.766 
Another relevant issue with regards to ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination’ arose in the 
Panel’s interpretation in Brazil – Re-treaded Tyres, that although the MERCOSUR exemption was 
discriminatory between MERCOSUR countries and other WTO Members, it would be ‘unjustifiable’ 
only if imports of re-treaded tyres entering into Brazil ‘were to take place in such amounts that the 
achievement of the objective of the measure at issue would be significantly undermined’.767  
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The AB assessed that the Panel’s interpretation implied that “the determination of whether 
discrimination is unjustifiable depends on the quantitative impact of this discrimination on the 
achievement of the objective of the measure at issue”768. The AB disagreed with this interpretation 
of the Panel reiterating that an analysis of ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ would rather involve the 
cause or the rationale of the discrimination.769  
According to the AB, however, the effects of the discrimination may be a relevant factor for 
determining whether the cause or rationale of the discrimination is acceptable or defensible and, 
ultimately, whether the discrimination is justifiable because “the Chapeau of Article XX deals with 
the manner of application of the measure at issue”770. This was however “fundamentally different 
from the Panel’s approach, which focused exclusively on the relationship between the effects of the 
discrimination and its justifiable or unjustifiable character.”771  
4.6 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 defined the concept of standards in international environmental law. The analysis 
included a section on the WTO compatibility of environmental standards772. Articles I773, III.4774 and 
XI.1775 of the GATT are particularly problematic in terms of environmental standards as they are 
designed to eliminate discrimination between goods and therefore diametrically opposed to the 
inherent concept of environmental standards, which distinguish between otherwise like products 
through criteria set by them.  
Although Article XI does set an exception for standards, these standards are limited to ‘the 
classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade’776. Yet the AB decision of 
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Australia – Salmon777, and the Panel decision of EC – Sardines778, notes the prerogative given to 
member states, to determine their chosen level of environmental protection through policy 
objectives, in the SPS and TBT Agreement respectively779. Therefore, it stands to reason, that policy 
objectives which do not fall under the exceptions of Article XI.2(b) would need to be excepted 
elsewhere through a legislative mandate.  
The GATT provides for such an exception through its General Exceptions clause in Article XX. This 
chapter has looked at the provisions of Article XX and the interpretations of the clause through 
various WTO and GATT disputes. This chapter looked specifically at Article XX(b), (g) and the 
Chapeau. These three provisions780, when analysed in the various disputes, reveal several principles 
that determine the justifiability of a standard. As a concluding exercise, therefore, this section 
summarizes these various principles discussed in the previous sections. 
One of the important subjects addressed by the DSB is that of ‘extraterritoriality’. Standards 
condition access to a Member State’s market by imposing conditions on Member States wishing to 
access these markets. The AB in US – Shrimp decided that conditioning access to a Member’s 
domestic market may be a common aspect of measures invoking Article XX781. Therefore, imposing 
policies that set a certain level of standards for imported goods may be justified under Article XX of 
the GATT. 
However, justifying a measure under Article XX is a two-tiered procedure subject to the tests of a 
specific provision followed by justification under the Chapeau of Article XX782. The disputed measure 
must first be ‘provisionally justified under the particular exceptions of the provisions of Article XX 
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before being ‘further appraised’ by the Chapeau783. The two Article XX provisions that are 
environmentally relevant are Article XX(b) and (g). 
When invoking Article XX(b) the measure must fulfil three criteria. First the policy objective of the 
measures must be designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health. Secondly, must be 
necessary to fulfil the policy objective. Lastly, the measure must satisfy the conditions of the 
Chapeau of Article XX784.  
Determination of whether it is designed to protect human, animal or plant health is subject to each 
individual case and dependent on the reasoning of the court. For example in US-Gasoline the US 
measures to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption of gasoline was within the range of 
those concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life or health mentioned in Article 
XX(b)785. Other case-law has elaborated on certain aspects which require to be examined in terms of 
this criterion including the design, architecture and structure of the measure786 and the policy goal it 
purports to serve787. 
In terms of the criterion of necessity, the DSB makes it clear that it not the necessity of the policy 
goal that was to be examined but rather the necessity of the particular measure to achieve such 
policy goal788. 
The AB in Korea – Beef imagined a spectrum of ‘necessity’ ranging from the ‘indispensable’ to merely 
‘making a contribution to’. In terms of the Article XX(b) requirement of necessity, the AB felt the 
definition was closer to the ‘indispensability’ of the measure. The greater the contribution of the 
measure to its objectives, the more easily might it be considered to be ‘necessary’789. 
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The contribution of a measure is assessed through the nature of the risk, the objective pursued, and 
the level of protection sought. It also depends on the nature, quantity, and quality of evidence 
existing at the time the analysis is made790. Both, the risk791 as well as the contribution of the 
measure towards the objective792 is evaluated in either quantitative or qualitative terms. 
One factor determining the necessity of a measure is its effect on international trade. The AB in 
Brazil — Retreaded Tyres reasoned that it would be very difficult to find measures with severe 
restrictive effects on international trade, as ‘necessary’ unless they are satisfactorily shown to make 
a material contribution to the achievement of the objective793.  
If the contribution of a measure is not immediately observable, however, it does not mean that such 
a measure cannot be justified under Article XX(b)794. This is because measures aimed at 
environmental issues such as global warming and climate change, may have delayed results795.   
In such circumstances, evidence or data, pertaining to the past or the present could be used to 
demonstrate the material contribution of the measure. Importantly, ‘quantitative projections in the 
future’, or ‘qualitative reasoning based on a set of hypotheses that are tested and supported by 
sufficient evidence’ may also be used to demonstrate material contribution796. These quantitative 
projections or qualitative reasoning may represent a divergent, but qualified and respected, 
opinion797. A Member is not obliged to follow a majority scientific opinion798.  
Another factor determining the ‘necessity’ of a measure is the availability of alternative measures. A 
Member State does not have to show that a standard eliminates the risk inherent to its objective in 
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its entirety but rather to create a level of acceptable risk below which reasonably available 
alternatives may be acceptable799. 
A measure is ‘necessary’, if an alternative measure not ‘reasonably available’. However, if an 
alternative GATT consistent measure is not available, a Member State is obliged to use a measure 
which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions’800.  
On the other hand, a Member State cannot be expected to use an alternative measure if that 
measure would allow the continuation of the risk that the environmental objective seeks to 
address801. Such an alternative measure would prevent a Member State from achieving its chosen 
level of health protection802. 
The two questions asked of an analysis of Article XX(g) are the scope of the terms ‘exhaustible 
natural resources’ and ‘relating to’. In terms of exhaustible natural resources the AB in US – Shrimp 
included living resources within the ambit of Article XX(g)803. This increased the scope of the 
provision to include environmental standards related to conservation efforts and those ensuring the 
safety and sustainability of species. 
The term ‘relating to’ broadens the scope of Article XX(g) even further. By virtue of the term, not 
only are ‘necessary’ measures covered by the provision, but a much wider range of measures which 
are ‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource804. 
The Chapeau to Article XX(g) limits the measures that may be justified under the provisions. The 
purpose and object of the Chapeau is to prevent the abuse of the provisions805 by guarding against 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ and ‘disguised restriction on international trade’. 
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An important indicator of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination is the failure to cooperate with the 
governments of effected member States and to not consider the cost of a measure on parties 
affected by such measure806. 
Moreover, although the AB has allowed the extraterritorial effect of measures justified by Article XX, 
there are limits to such permission. It is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO 
Member to use an economic embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially the same 
comprehensive regulatory programme, to achieve a certain policy goal, without taking into 
consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of those other Members807. 
Another aspect in determining the conditions of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination was similar 
criteria applied to all effected Member states. Member States are required to provide objective 
criteria for any discrimination.808 Discrimination due obligations to an international body cannot be 
counted as ‘objective criteria and would be considered ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’809. 
Understanding these limitations placed on standards and measures implementing standards allow us 
to analyse standard setting instruments in international trade. Keeping such limitations in mind 
therefore, we look at unilateral and cooperated environmental standard setting instruments in the 
following chapters, assessing them against WTO compatibility and efficiency in addressing 
environmental issues. 
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5. UNILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION  
5.1 Introduction 
Having sought a definition of environmental standards and their relationship with the WTO, the 
thesis now turns its attention to the methods of implementation of environmental standards. 
Environmental standards in the international context can be imposed either unilaterally or in a 
cooperative negotiated fashion through bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral agreements. This 
chapter concentrates on unilateral action and its subset, Unilateral Environmental Action (UEA), and 
explores both the drawbacks as well as advantages associated with unilateral action in international 
policy making.  
Before setting out the definition of unilateral action, it is necessary to restrict the term to the 
context of the thesis. Previous chapters identify and limit the problem of trade related 
environmental issues in the context of international relations between nation states. A discussion on 
an international trade-environmental relationship and consequent policy-making is possible with 
already defined parameters in terms of the principle of mutual recognition810, as it lies in the domain 
of state legislation and is the prerogative of nation states to sanction.  A discussion on the 
environmental aspects of multilateral treaties also inherently holds similar limitations.  
However, unilateral action can often be found both as state sanctioned as well as a private 
instrument. For example, eco labels such as the EU Eco label is a legislated instrument governed by 
EC regulation811, while the Fairtrade labelling program is a private, not-for-profit, non-governmental 
international labelling program812.  
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As a result, comparing unilateral action with other implementing methods of environmental 
standards in inter-state relations requires limiting the discussion at the outset. Therefore, this 
chapter, discussing unilateral action, concentrates on the actions of states and their associated 
administrative and enforcement agencies rather than any form of individual or private act. 
Keeping the abovementioned limitation in mind, Section 5.2 defines unilateral action and 
categorizes UEAs as a subset of such action. The section then classifies UEAs into five variants 
according to where the recipient of such threat and, as a result, protection is situated and where the 
origin of the causation that led to such unilateral action is situated813. This helps determine whether 
the effects of such action are restricted within national borders or have an extraterritorial effect that 
may potentially lead to international disputes. 
The origin of causation may be either internal or external to the jurisdiction of the UEA 
implementing nation. Internal causation may either arise from environmental accidents or as a bi-
product of the exploitation of natural resources. Section 5.3.1 therefore explores the right of 
countries exploit their natural resources followed by Section 5.3.2 which discusses whether, in the 
case of an extraterritorial effect of such exploitation, the countries duty to prevent or mitigate 
resulting environmental damage to other countries. 
In case a country fails to prevent environmental damage through inaction or inadequate or 
ineffective action, the affected second country therefore experiences external causation. In such 
cases unilateral action leading to extraterritorial action is often scrutinized through factors of 
conformity and a test of necessity. The WTO jurisprudence surrounding the necessity test has been 
discussed in the previous chapter in Section 4.3.2 Article XX(b): Necessity. We look at ‘necessity’ 
again in this chapter in relation to UEAs and consider the provisions of ‘necessity found in the 
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International Law Commission Articles on the responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts814. Section 5.3.3 therefore discusses UEAs from extraterritorial causation. 
Section 5.4 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of UEAs especially in light of 
Multilateral/Plurilateral inadequacy and the international caution provided against arbitrary action. 
Section 5.5 concludes by analysing the characteristics of UEAs in light of the discussions on the 
relationship between international trade and environmental standards in previous chapters and the 
resulting requirements of negotiations and market access. 
5.2 Classifying Unilateral Environmental Action 
As mentioned in the Introduction above, the discussion on unilateral action is limited to the actions 
of states and their associated administrative and enforcement agencies. Considering these 
limitations, unilateral action is therefore defined to be the use by a nation of its administrative and 
enforcement agencies (or the threat of such use) to secure a policy goal as mandated by a domestic 
political process815. Such action is taken independent of any cooperative arrangement with any other 
state or international institution816.  
In terms of this thesis, Unilateral Environmental Action (UEA) is categorized as the subset of all 
unilateral action analysed within the trade-environment nexus and would have the purpose of 
either, protecting the environment, protecting the people against environmental, health and safety 
externalities or protecting the environmentally relevant national interests (natural or agricultural 
resources)817. Unilateral action has been defined by Builder to be, “any action which a state takes 
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solely on its own, independent of any express cooperative arrangement with any other state or 
international institution”818.  
Bilder has provided five methods in which UEAs may be classified. The classification of UEAs into the 
five variants mentioned below has been influenced by two of Bilder’s methods of classification – 
using the motive of the state taking environmental action and the location of the principal and 
immediate effect819. The other classification methods provided by Bilder are – duration and 
permanence of the action, nature of the environmental threat, the impact on the interest of other 
nations, and the consistency of the action to international law820.  
The use of the motive of the state and the location of the effect of the UEA, as a method of 
classification, has been particularly influential to this thesis as it provides the opportunity to 
deliberate two essential doctrinal principles – extraterritoriality and sovereignty, later in this 
chapter821. These two doctrinal principles are also discussed in the context of the other instrument 
implementing environmental standards – Mutual Recognition Agreements822.   
The other methods of classification mentioned by Bilder, has not been used in this thesis as methods 
of classification. Rather, they can be seen as themes and characteristics universal to any discussion 
on the trade-environment nexus. For example, the method of categorizing UEAs through the impact 
on the interest of other countries corresponds to the theme of international friction caused by 
environmental action is a central theme of this thesis and indeed of this chapter823. Similarly, the 
method of categorization using the consistency or inconsistency of UEAs to present or emerging 
international law corresponds to the discussions of WTO compatibility and international obligations 
with regards to the environmental standard setting instruments mentioned in the thesis824. 
                                                          
818
 Bilder (n 816) 53 
819
 Bilder (n 816) 59 
820
 Bilder (n 816) 61-62 
821
 See Section 5.3 The Legality of UEAs 
822
 See Chapter 7 Section 7.2 Mutual Recognition and the Transfer of Sovereignty 
823
 See Section 5.3 The Legality of UEAs,  
824
 See Chapter 4 Standards as General Exceptions to the GATT 
162 
 
Therefore, instead of using these methods of classification to categorize UEAs, they have been 
discussed as central themes to this thesis. 
Considering the methods of categorization of the motive of the state and the location of the effect 
of the UEA, this thesis builds on its own categorization of UEAs based on two factors: (1) the location 
of the causation of the environmental issue leading to the UEA and (2) the location of the 
threatened and subsequent beneficiary to the protection offered by the UEA.825  
Thus the five variants of UEA discussed below can be categorized into the following826: 
(1) UEA arising from Internal Causation, Internal Effect 
(2) UEA arising from Internal Causation, External Effect 
(3) UEA arising from Internal Causation, External Global Effect 
(4) UEA arising from External Causation, Internal Effect and 
(5) UEA arising from External Causation, External Global Effect 
These five variants are discussed next. 
5.2.1 UEA Arising from Internal Causation, Internal Effect 
The most obvious instance of a state’s duty to implement UEAs is when the action is intended to 
protect the environment and the people within the state’s own jurisdiction from a causation also 
arising from within. It is important to remember that in most cases, any form of environmental issue 
that is national in character i.e. both the causation as well as the effect (threat/protection) of the 
environmental issue arise within the borders of a country, will incur a unilateral national action 
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rather than an international multilateral effort827. There are two principles behind this reasoning – 
Domestic Sovereignty (including Permanent Sovereignty) and Decentralization.  
Domestic sovereignty refers to the organisation and control of domestic authority over internal 
affairs of state828. Permanent Sovereignty more specifically pertained to the right to utilize and 
exploit national resources.829 Decentralization postulates that the quality of implementation is at 
best at the lower levels of governance830.  
Instances of national implementations of Environmental Policy may be found throughout the global 
market ranging from national fishing quotas to emission controls. The Californian Air Pollution 
Control Laws are a stringent set of national standards in the US that provide a relevant example of 
this variant of UEAs and are also an illustration of the decentralization principle (federalism in the 
US)831.  The emission standards of the Californian legislations are often considered higher than even 
the US Federal standards (national standards), and have been implemented by fourteen other states 
within the US832.  A comparative study of Californian and Federal diesel fuel and diesel fuel emissions 
by Hajbabaei (et al) published in 2012, corroborates the effectiveness of implementing higher 
environmental standards and the principle of decentralization in addressing environmental issues833. 
The Californian Global Warming Solutions Act, 2006 mandates that that the CARB determine the 
emission levels of 1990 and set equivalent limits to be achieved by 2020834. 
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India’s National Solar Mission is another example of unilateral implementation of environmental 
standards835. It is an ambitious project aimed at enhancing India’s renewable energy capabilities and 
thereby reducing its dependency on carbon intensive fuels. The Mission Plan recognizes India’s 
energy security challenge and the contributory potential of the plan to the global necessity to the 
challenges of climate change836. The Solar Mission is a joint exercise between the Central 
government and several State governments, and thereby involving the principle of 
Decentralization837. The objective of decentralization is also clearly evident in India’s National Action 
Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), which is the precursor to the Solar Mission Plan. The NAPCC states 
that solar energy plan “has the advantage of permitting a decentralized distribution of energy, 
thereby empowering people at the grassroots level”.838 The Plan aims to deploy 20,000MW of Solar 
Energy by 2022839 thereby achieving Electric grid parity and further aims at achieving coal-based 
thermal power parity by 2030840. Clearly, the mission statement would indicate that the objective of 
meeting energy requirement through renewable energy sources (by reaching parity with 
conventional sources) is a clear effort to reduce India’s dependency on non-renewable energy and 
combat unsustainable energy usage. 
5.2.2 UEA Arising from Internal Causation, External Threat 
A second variant of UEAs occur when a State implements unilateral action to protect the interests of 
an outside jurisdiction from the adverse environmental, health or safety incidents arising within its 
own territory.   
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An example of national Legislation preventing transboundary harm can be found in the Canadian 
Federal Great Lakes Program841. The group of legislations are designed to protect the water quality 
and the aquatic eco systems in the North American Great Lakes which are shared between the US 
and Canada. This is reciprocated by the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Great Lakes 
National Program842.  Both sets of legislations (Canada and US) are a result of the commitments 
agreed upon in the bilateral Canada-US Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement843. The bilateral 
agreement provides that the national legislations are without extra-jurisdictional effects and pertain 
to the respective local governments and management agencies844. However, even with restrictions 
preventing transboundary authority, the legislations have transboundary effects that protect the 
interest of not only the country from where the legislation originates but also the neighbour. 
5.2.3 UEA Arising from Internal Causation, External Global Threat 
The third variant occurs when the action is intended to protect international environments and the 
global commons threatened by activities arising within its jurisdiction. Most national air pollution 
and emission laws may be categorized under this variant. Part IV of the UK’s Environment Act deals 
with air quality and emission regulations845. This regulation not only provides national standards but, 
through reporting obligations to the EU and the UN recognizes the cross border nature of air 
pollution. As a result, the UK government reports national emission totals each year for the main 
pollutants to the European Commission846 and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution847.848  
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Another example of a national regulation performing a UEA due to a causation arising within the 
originating country’s borders is found in EC ban on the sale of seal products within the European 
market849. The ban on seal products within is markets was implemented reduce animal cruelty 
torture and pain arising from the seal hunt of several external countries. The potential of increasing 
animal welfare through a ban in its own market is perhaps an implication and admission by EU that 
the common market is a significant causation of the original problem850. Therefore this UEA 
legislating within its borders is designed to impact an issue concerning the global seal population. 
The above three variants of UEAs had the common factor of domestic causation. The significant 
discussion stemming from these variants is whether countries that are home to such causation have 
a duty to prevent or mitigate the effects of such causation, especially if such causation has cross-
border effect851. The final two variations listed here see the causation of unilateral action arising 
from an external source outside the borders of the action implementing country. This is of 
significance due to the possibility of international friction as a result of the extraterritorial nature of 
such action852.    
5.2.4 UEA Arising from External Causation, Internal Threat 
The fourth variant of UEAs occurs when an extra-jurisdictional causation of an environmental issue 
prompts a state to implement unilateral action. This may be in the form of an act that affects other 
jurisdictions. An example in this case is the national marine pollution laws in East Asia. As a region 
where marine borders often overlap, many such borders are subject to disputes (see for example 
China’s recent South China Sea controversy with the Philippines853). Moreover, as an archipelagic 
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region, with several coastlines with a significant part of the population living in coastal areas, marine 
pollution through untreated sewage, industrial effluents, oils, pesticides, and hazardous wastes from 
land- and sea-based activities as well as overfishing, unsustainable and unplanned coastal 
development and the destruction of coastal habitat and ecosystems are a major environmental issue 
in the area854. However, regional cooperation is very weak in the area, especially with regards to 
implementation. The regional collaborative body, the Partnership in Environmental Management for 
the seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), formed under the UNEP, is merely a facilitating body855. As a result 
South Asian countries rely on national legislation to address these problems. For example, in 
Thailand the Committee on the Prevention and Combating of Oil Pollution has developed the Oil Spill 
Response Plan by virtue of the Regulation on the Prevention and Combating of Oil Pollution, 2004.856 
Japan, due to its obligations857 towards the London Convention and Protocol858, has implemented 
the Law Relating to the Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime Disaster859. 
A more common form of this variant is found in border control legislations controlling hazardous 
waste entering a state. An example of such legislation can be found in the UK’s The Hazardous 
Waste (England and Wales) Regulations, 2005. Schedule 7 of the Regulation, deals with cross border 
movements of hazardous waste internationally as well as within the United Kingdom. Within the UK 
the regulation specifies a mutual recognition of the standards of handling such waste. The entry of 
waste into England however, is strictly controlled by the regulation860.    
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5.2.5 UEA Arising from External Causation, External Global Threat 
Lastly, UEAs may be implemented to protect the international environments and the global 
commons threatened by activities arising from other jurisdictions. This may either be as part of a 
national policy or because it has been mandated by multilateral decision. Member states to 
multilateral organisations often have an obligation to legislate national policy that may affect trade 
dynamics with other members or even non-members to such organisations. In case of the latter, it is 
interesting to see whether such acts may be considered in violation of international law. One of the 
more famous examples of a UEA in the form of a unilateral environmental instrument was the 
dolphin safe eco-labelling requirements mandated by the US for Tuna fishing in the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific Ocean (ETP)861. Under the Marine Mammals Protection Act (MMPA), 1972 the US prohibited 
the use of ‘purse-seine’ nets for tuna fishing in the ETP as it led to a high dolphin mortality rate862. 
Subsequently, this was substantiated by the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, an 
amendment to the MMPA, requiring stringent labelling standards863. Therefore, the US implemented 
a UEA in order to safeguard dolphins extra-jurisdictionally864. 
5.3 The legality of UEAs 
The common feature of the above variants of UEAs is the aspect of independent action, 
disassociated from the actions or interests of other involved or concerned parties. This aspect of 
unilateral action does not, however, extend to consultations with other nation states, as was seen in 
the above example of the Canada-US Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, which influenced 
national and independent water quality and biodiversity programs in both the US and Canada865.  
However, the nature of unilateral action implies that States may consult and may even consider the 
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interests of these other nation states (extra jurisdictional interests) but this creates no obligations 
for the fulfilment of such considerations.  
This however, is purely in terms of the definition of unilateral action. Considering commercial reality 
in a globalized world, there may be an actual obligation in international law to consult with all 
interested parties before any policy implementation. This is certainly the case in WTO law where an 
obligation for consultation with effected/interested parties, stems from the test for necessity found 
in several WTO cases866.  
The exercise of analysing the legality of unilateral action is rendered more difficult than necessary if 
one is to consider the general bias against such action, which, as the following commentators have 
proposed, exists in matters of international relations. For example, Bodansky states that there is a 
general negative connotation attached to the term ‘unilateral’ in world politics867. Due to a 
globalized world, any action not taken with collective will is generally looked upon suspiciously. 
Accordingly, “If any action is unilateral, one need not even consider whether it is substantively right 
or wrong; the fact that it is undertaken by a single state rather than the ‘international community’ , 
in itself makes it illegitimate”868.  
Reisman’s definition of the subject further highlights the apparent illegitimacy of unilateral action. 
According to Reisman, unilateral action “is an act by a formally unauthorized participant which 
effectively pre-empts the official decision a legally designated official or agency was supposed to 
take”869.  
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Characterizing unilateral action in view of such negative connotations may even bring such action 
within the definition of an ‘internationally wrongful act’ as defined in ‘The Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts’870. The Articles provide that: 
“There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or 
omission: 
 (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and 
 (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state.”871 
However, Reisman also observes that such an action, even by an ‘unauthorized participant’ is often 
justified (or attempted to be justified) through a claim of legality consisting of three characteristics, 
that determine whether the action (even merely in its substance) conforms to the legal system 
under which it was taken. These three characteristics are that: 
“(1) The pertinent legal system allows such unilateral acts in certain circumstances or on 
condition that substantive tests of lawfulness are met; 
 (2) The circumstances for the particular unilateral act are claimed to be appropriate; and 
(3) The act, despite its procedural irregularities, has purportedly complied with the relevant 
substantive requirements of lawfulness”872 
The question of substance, Reisman admits, carries far more weight than the procedural aspect in 
the case of unilateral action873. This may be a convenient characteristic of standard implementing 
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instruments when one considers the global urgency to raise environmental standards. The factor of 
time necessitates quick action that may otherwise be hindered with procedural pedantry874.  
However, as mentioned earlier, commercial reality may suggest otherwise875. It is not certain 
whether such claims of legality, justifying unilateral action, would necessarily be upheld in disputes 
of international law. Consider these justifications in light of the US-Tuna/Dolphin cases. The GATT 
certainly allows unilateral action by member states to safeguard environmental interests (GATT 
Article XX). Therefore, in the US – Tuna/Dolphin I dispute, incompatibility of the US federal laws in 
question, to Articles III876 and Articles X.1877 of the GATT, led to interpretations under GATT Article 
XX(b) and XX(g)878. However, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) Panel decided that the provisions of 
XX(g) were violated by the measures due to the fact that the natural resources that the disputed 
measures addressed, were outside US jurisdiction879.  
Therefore, in the face of increasing Dolphin mortality rates, as a consequence of certain identified 
methods of Tuna fishing, the actions of the US government certainly cannot be said to be 
inappropriate, and clearly falls into Reisman’s justification of conformity. However, after the US 
government labelling requirements were instituted, it was procedural irregularities (extra-
jurisdictional regulation) that eventually led the DSB to strike down the disputed US federal laws.  
Furthermore, looking at environmental standards, in the backdrop of reducing restrictions to trade 
(as is the goal of most trade agreements/forums and the WTO itself) it is submitted here that there 
appears to be one other factor in excess of the factors of conformity suggested by Reisman – the 
necessity test. As mentioned above, the principle of necessity (of which the test of necessity is a part 
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thereof) also includes a discussion on the obligation of international consultation. A significant 
reasoning behind such an inclusion is to ascertain whether a less trade restrictive alternative is 
available to the parties. Therefore even if a specific unilateral action conforms substantially to the 
prevalent international law or norm, and is procedurally sound there is a possibility that the 
availability of a less trade restrictive alternative may render such action contravening of 
international trade regimes, especially the WTO. 
Another observation of note arises when categorizing UEAs according to the position of the 
causation. In the first three UEA variants therefore the environmental issue arises from within the 
borders of the implementing country and is therefore an internal causation. If there is an internal 
causation, that causation can come out of an environmental accident or out of the exploitation of 
natural resources or processes for such exploitation. In that case it needs to be seen whether 
countries have an absolute right to exploit their resources, and in case of an environmental issue 
arising from such exploitation, if there is an obligation to other states towards mitigating or reducing 
such issues. The question therefore arises whether States have an obligation towards other states in 
terms of environmental effects arising from within their jurisdiction or control880.  
The latter two variant of UEAs presumably arise when the State (where the causation has arisen), 
has been inadequate or perfunctory in their effort to mitigate or reduce such environmental issues. 
In the event of the non-performance of such obligation i.e. inaction, the affected State, will have a 
need to address such issues in an appropriate forum or perform a UEA of its own. It is in such 
circumstances, when the affected state performs a UEA that Reisman’s factors of the conformity of 
UEAs as well as the principle of necessity come into play.  
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Considering the discussions in this Chapter hitherto, it is necessary to discuss three related topics in 
this section. The following sub-sections therefore address the states right to permanent sovereignty 
over the unilateral exploitation of its own natural resources followed by a discussion on the 
international obligation to act unilaterally in case of an environmental causation arising from such 
activity. The section then discusses the principle of necessity. Only after the conclusion of such a 
discussion, can an attempt be made to debate the effectiveness of unilateral environmental 
action/instruments. Eventually, the goal of this exercise is to head towards a discussion on the 
comparative benefits of a more negotiated instrument to raise environmental standards881. 
5.3.1 Permanent Sovereignty 
There are several instances where states are in fact entitled to act unilaterally. It is a question of the 
sovereignty of a state for it to be able to self-determine its own policy path. Such entitlement is 
derived from the domestic sovereignty afforded to states through international norms. 
Domestic sovereignty refers to the organisation and control of domestic authority over internal 
affairs of state882. However, in the post war de-colonization era, an added aspect was attached to 
the concept of Domestic Sovereignty (historically as a means of justifying nationalization in 
developing countries)883. This was the principle of ‘Permanent Sovereignty’ that was specific to the 
use of natural resources. It was the right to utilize and exploit resources and such rights were owned 
in perpetuity by the state in which such natural resources are found884. 
One of the earlier instances of International acceptance of such sovereign rights can be found in the 
UN General Assembly resolution 626 (VII) which states that, “the right of people freely to use and 
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exploit their natural resources is inherent in their sovereignty.”885 The resolution further warns other 
states to “refrain from acts, direct or indirect, designed to impede the exercise of the sovereignty of 
any State over its natural resources.”886  
This principle was afforded a much stronger recognition by the UN General Assembly Resolution 
1803 (XVII) which was titled Permanent Sovereignty and Natural Resources. It states that “the right 
of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be 
exercised in the interest of their national development and of the wellbeing of the people of the 
State concerned.”887 The resolution therefore is one of the clear definitions of Permanent 
Sovereignty of Natural resources. It defines the limit of the right to permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, to extent that it is used for the benefit of the people of the state and for the 
purposes of national development. It is a pertinent question in this case, whether the principle can 
be argued against unilateral action by another state violating this right, if the original duty of using 
the principle for the national benefit remains unmet.  
Furthermore, the parameters of ‘national benefit’ are also ambiguous. The question does arise 
whether economic benefit at the cost of the environment is nationally beneficial. Would the 
arbitrary destruction or unsustainable use of natural resources by a state justify unilateral action 
against it without violating its permanent sovereignty, especially if such unsustainable action also 
affects the interest of the intervening state?  
The rights of third party states are addressed, to a certain extent, by Resolution 1803 (XVII), in the 
case of economic investment by such state, and the subsequent profit sharing. The resolution 
elaborates that the relationship of between natural resources and the right of “the exploration, 
development and disposition of such resources, as well as the import of the foreign capital required 
for these purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and 
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nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorisation, restriction or 
prohibition of such activities, […]”888. All profits derived from such activity and scheduled to be 
divided with a recipient country must be done so with “due care being taken to ensure that there is 
no impairment, for any reason, of that State’s sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources.”889 
Furthermore, the principle of ‘permanent sovereignty’ has been further encapsulated in UN General 
Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) (The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States) which states 
that, “every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use 
and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.”890 This does clarify the 
earlier question of the relationship between economic activities and natural resources to a certain 
extent, allowing the state to prioritize between the two by giving it ‘full permanent sovereignty’ over 
either. However the question of whether the state holds recourse to the principle in the face of 
violation of its duty of national benefit, still remains.  
In the ICJ ‘Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia)’ the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry addressed the subject of permanent sovereignty891 stating that, “the rights of self-
determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources are rights erga omnes belonging 
to the people […] and therefore generate a corresponding duty upon all States, […], to recognize and 
respect those rights.”892 
In the modern context, WTO principles such as Market Access, MFN and National Treatment do limit 
the principle of permanent sovereignty to a certain degree, at least in an economic perspective. 
With the advent of the WTO and an ever increasing inter connected world trade scenario there is a 
possibility that Sovereign rights have been diluted by these newer and more influential norms of 
international economics and trade policy. States are certainly restrained from showing overt 
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favouritism towards domestic producers and other select states through these WTO principles. 
However, in the absence of any economic misdemeanour, the restraints on a state towards causing 
extraterritorial environmental harm must be explored. The following subsection therefore looks at a 
state’s obligation towards extraterritorial harm arising from causation within its jurisdiction. 
5.3.2 Obligation towards other States for Internal Environmental 
Causations and UEAs arising out of Inaction  
An obligation of States with respect to the jurisdiction of other States was discussed by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion on the ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons’893 where: 
“The Court […] recognizes that the environment is not an abstraction but represents the 
living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations 
unborn. The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment.”894  
The ICJ, in the earlier ‘Corfu Channel Case’, ruled that it was, “every State’s obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”895. Using the above 
two obligations found in the Nuclear Weapons case and the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ, most 
recently in the ‘Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay’ points to the ‘due diligence 
required of a State in its territory’ and groups these obligations under the Principle of Prevention896. 
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The ICJ, in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), (an earlier 
judgement than Pulp Mills) recognizes this international obligation and further states that such 
obligation can only be ignored by invoking necessity897 in the face of ‘grave and imminent peril’ as 
laid down in Article 25 (Article 33 at the time) of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) draft 
articles on, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’.898  
The ILC’s draft articles on ‘Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities’ expresses 
this obligation towards other states in relation to transboundary environmental harm. The draft 
articles provide that ‘the state of origin’ shall be the one to take appropriate action to prevent 
transboundary harm899. The draft articles also provide guidance on implementation900, cooperation 
between states901, risk assessment902, and exchange of information903. 
Similarly, Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development904 and the identically 
worded Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)905 provide States, “the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”906 This principle was evident in 
the earlier mentioned bilateral Canada-US Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement907. This culminated 
in the independent and individual Canadian Federal Great Lakes Program908 and the Great Lakes 
National Program909.  
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States may also implement UEAs to mitigate environmental damage to an outside jurisdiction. Such 
unilateral action may be in the form of compensation for an environmental event that is detrimental 
to a State outside the jurisdiction of the ‘origin state’. This has been encapsulation in Principle 13 of 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development which states that, “[…] States shall also 
cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law 
regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage caused by 
activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.”910 
However, the very nature of international liability suggests the requirement for the determination of 
the extent of liability and the subsequent compensation. Therefore, unilateral action in the case of 
compensation for environmental damage has often been on the behest of international decisions by 
an adjudicating authority. An example of a post environmental damage compensation verdict is the 
famous Trail Smelter case between Canada and the US. The case revolved around trans-boundary 
pollution arising from a smelter in Trail, British Colombia, Canada. The smoke from the smelter 
caused distress and environmental damage to the surrounding areas including across the border in 
the US, leading to a compensation claim911. This case is an example of the earlier argument in this 
paragraph that in international trans-boundary environmental mitigation it is often the case that the 
determination of the extent of liability and the subsequent compensation is given the most 
importance and the reason for taking such disputes to international arbitral or adjudicating bodies. 
This is because, in the Trail Smelter case, Canada had already accepted an ‘international 
responsibility’ for the damage caused by the smelter912, and a bilateral commission, called the 
International Joint Commission had awarded a compensation of $ 350,000913, which was considered 
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inadequate. Thus the Convention forming the International Arbitral Tribunal was signed between 
Canada and the US, to determine adequate compensation and future mitigation914.  
The Tribunal, deliberated the method of determining compensation, especially in cases where the 
amount of damage cannot be determined with certainty. The Tribunal analysed the question of 
indemnity as considered by the US Supreme Court915 in Story Parchment Company v. Paterson 
Parchment Paper Company916 where the Supreme Court states: 
“Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of 
damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all 
relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his act. 
In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be 
enough if the evidence shows the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable 
interference, although the result may be only approximate.”917 
The Tribunal also noted the U.S. Supreme court judgment in Allison v. Chandler918 which stated: 
“But shall the injured party in an action of tort, which may happen to furnish no element of 
certainty, be allowed to recover damages (or merely nominal), because he cannot show the exact 
amount with certainty, though he is ready to show, to the satisfaction of the jury, that he has 
suffered large damages by the injury? Certainly, it is true, would thus be attained; but it would be 
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the certainty of injustice…. Juries are allowed to act upon probable and inferential, as well as direct 
and positive proof.”919 
The notions of liability, compensation and in general the right to act against eternal environmental 
hazard, notwithstanding, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development does caution against 
unilateral action unless unavoidable. In this regard Principle 12 reads,  
“Principle 12 
 
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system 
that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better 
address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental 
purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.  Unilateral actions to deal with environmental 
challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental 
measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as 
possible, be based on an international consensus.”920 
This leads to the deliberation on when an action is unavoidable, or even more appropriately when is 
it ‘necessary’. The following subsection therefore discusses the principle of necessity, especially as 
laid down by WTO jurisprudence. Moreover, the recommendation within Principle 12 for 
‘international consensus’ asks the further question of whether this creates an obligation to consult 
(a question asked previously in this chapter). Therefore the following subsection also looks at 
whether WTO jurisprudence provides for such an obligation. 
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5.3.3 The requirement of Necessity in WTO Jurisprudence 
It is worth noting again that in US – Tuna/Dolphin I the Panel stated that Article XX(b) allows each 
contracting party “to set its human, animal or plant life or health standards.”921 Similarly, in EC – 
Asbestos, the AB asserted the “undisputed” right of WTO members to determine the level of 
protection that they consider appropriate922.Therefore the level of an environmental standard, 
asserted by a WTO member is not in question. However, the unilateral implementation of a measure 
to assert such standards often leads to international friction and thereby a requirement to justify 
such a measure. Such a justification is dependent on the interpretation of the principle of Necessity. 
The discussion of ‘necessity’ in WTO law has primarily centred on jurisprudence regarding the 
General Exceptions clause of the GATT. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the event of a disputed 
measure (UEAs in light of this discussion) that is in derogation to other WTO law provisions, Article 
XX is usually the recourse taken by parties in justifying such environmental measures, under the 
WTO. In the US – Tuna/Dolphin I dispute, for example, the measures in question were considered to 
be incompatible to Articles III923 and Articles X.1924 of the GATT and therefore were considered for 
interpretation as exceptions under GATT Article XX(b) and (g)925.  
To understand the nature of ‘necessity’ in greater detail we briefly look beyond the discussion in 
Chapter 4 and towards the International Law Commission. The previously mentioned, ILC Articles on 
the Responsibility of states for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which is an international UN legislation, 
and outside the purview of the WTO, does provide a useful glimpse into the characterisation of 
‘necessity’ in international law. The ILC Articles state: 
“ Necessity 
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1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an 
act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act:  
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and 
imminent peril; and 
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.”926 
Admittedly, the need for raising environmental standards is not often a ‘grave and imminent peril’, 
and this is certainly reflected in the comparatively more relaxed provisions of the general exceptions 
in Article XX of the GATT. However, Article 25.1(a) of the ILC Articles does require the exhaustion of 
alternative measures in order to invoke ‘necessity’, which is also an essential requirement of Article 
XX of the GATT and discussed in detail below. Furthermore, the instructions of Article 25.1(b) of the 
ILC Articles to ‘not seriously impair an essential interest’ of other States is reflected in the ‘least 
trade restrictive’ requirement of Article XX, as laid down by WTO jurisprudence and also discussed in 
detail below.  
To establish necessity, the Appellate Body (AB) laid down a set of factors in their deliberations in 
Korea- Various measures on Beef927 and EC- Measures affecting Asbestos and Asbestos containing 
Products928, and their approval of the Panel decision in United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930929. Other characteristics are also found in various WTO case-laws that have been discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4. At this juncture it is however necessary to revisit these judgements in the 
context of unilateral action. 
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In attempting to clarify the meaning of ‘necessary’, the AB, in Korea – Beef, referred to the New 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, which defined it as “something ‘that cannot be dispensed with or 
done without, requisite, essential, needful’”930. However, the AB also noted that Black’s Law 
Dictionary cautioned that:  
“[The] word must be considered in the connection in which it is used, as it is a word 
susceptible of various meanings. It may import absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or 
it may import that which is only convenient, useful appropriate, suitable, proper or 
conducive to the end sought. It is an adjective addressing degree, and may express mere 
convenience or that which is indispensable or an absolute physical necessity.”931  
The AB then clarified that, in terms of Article XX, the ‘necessity’ of a certain measure would lean 
more towards the ‘indispensability’ of that measure rather than its role in obtaining a policy 
objective i.e. simply ‘making a contribution to’932. 
The ‘indispensable’ nature of such ‘necessity’ is enhanced by other contributing factors discussed by 
the AB. The extent to which such measure contributes to the end objective of such a policy is 
certainly a consideration towards its necessity. The greater its significance and potential contribution 
to the end objective the more ‘necessary’ it becomes933. 
The Panel in US – Tuna/Dolphin I, did however did provide the limitation that notwithstanding the 
end objective of a measure, the effect of the measure must be constrained geographically to the 
jurisdiction of the implementing party. According to the Panel, such measures must be “in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”934 In Canada – Measures 
Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, the Panel had determined that to be in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production, the measures had to be “primarily aimed at 
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rendering effective these restrictions.”935  Therefore, the Panel in US – Tuna/Dolphin I were of the 
opinion that countries could only effectively control production and consumption within its 
jurisdiction, and thus the measures it implemented would have to be limited to its own 
jurisdiction936. The Panel therefore decided that the disputed measures in US – Tuna/Dolphin I were 
in violation of Article XX(g), due to the fact that the natural resources being addressed by the 
measures were outside US jurisdiction937.  
It is of note that this severely limits the functioning of the fifth variant of UEAs, described above, 
which the reader will recall consists of UEAs arising from external causation and creating an external 
global threat938. The legitimacy of such unilateral action may therefore be determined by a 
multilateral mandate or there may be the necessity of an alternative instrument to address targeted 
environmental issues. Certainly, in a globalized world, this may be seen as a limitation of unilateral 
environmental action. 
Similar to the US – Tuna/Dolphin cases, in US – Shrimp/Turtle, the failure to meet the requirement of 
GATT Article XI.1 led the Panel, and subsequently the AB, to review them under Article XX939. 
However, in this case, the AB, unlike in US – Tuna/Dolphin I, did not deliberate on the jurisdiction of 
the measure. Rather, like in US – Gasoline940, the AB found that the measure is “not 
disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and 
conservation of sea turtle species”941. This case is important in the respect that the AB had agreed 
that certain UEAs (Process and Production Methods942 in this case) could fall under the general 
exception clause943. 
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A further factor for the determination of the ‘necessity’ of a measure, and one that is in addition to 
the provisions of Article XX is found in the Chapeau of Article XX. Although the chapeau does not 
specifically mention the term ‘necessity’, deliberations on the principle in the mentioned cases, do 
stress on its requirements. According to the AB in US – Gasoline, in order to prove that a measure 
falls under the general exception clause it is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the 
provisions of Article XX (a)-(j). The conditions mentioned within the Chapeau of Article XX must also 
be fulfilled944. Therefore beyond the provisions mentioned in Article XX (a)-(j) the measure must also 
“not [be] applied in a manner which would constitute a means of ARBITRARY or UNJUSTIFIABLE 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail945, or a DISGUISED 
RESTRICTION on international trade […]” (emphasis added)946. This was re-iterated in US – 
Shrimp/Turtle947.  
In US – Gasoline, for example, the AB felt that though US rules on gasoline imports were within the 
interpretation of Article XX(g) of GATT, they failed to meet the requirements of the Chapeau of 
Article XX and were deemed to be "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised restriction on 
international trade."948 Although the US measures being deliberated in US – Gasoline were technical 
regulations rather than environmental standards, in the context of General Exceptions it is quite 
likely that similar procedures would be applied. For example, in Thailand – Cigarettes, the Panel felt 
that Thailand's separate practice of banning foreign cigarettes while allowing domestic ones was an 
inconsistency with the General Agreement [and] not "necessary" within the meaning of Article 
XX”949. 
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Moreover, the TBT Agreement also provides for technical regulations to “not [be] prepared, adopted 
or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 
For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create”950. This reflects the 
requirements of proving the necessity of a trade restriction or that the measure is not trade 
restrictive, within the Chapeau of XX. 
In Korea – Beef the AB had surmised that to determine ‘necessity’ it was required that the restrictive 
effects of the measure in question on international commerce be considered951. In the China – Audio 
Visual Case952 the AB agreed with the Panel that in assessing necessity, the restrictive effect of the 
measures on not only the imports, but also those ‘wishing to engage in importing’ must be 
considered953. According to the AB, although the requirement of assessing the necessity of a 
measure and its trade restrictive effect on ‘imports’ and ‘importers’ or in other words ‘products or 
‘traders’ were not defined in Article XX(a), the Chapeau to Article XX refers to ‘restrictions on 
international trade’954.  
The AB in China – Audio Visual Case continued further in their analysis of what consists of a 
‘restriction to international trade’. The AB recalled that their analysis of ‘necessity’ in Korea – Beef 
was with regards to a measure found to be inconsistent with Article III.4 GATT which required that 
“no less favourable treatment be accorded not only in respect of laws, regulations and requirements 
directly regulating like products, but also in relation to measures affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.”955   This suggested to the AB that 
“effects on those who sell, purchase, transport, distribute, or use the products are not beyond 
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scrutiny under Article III:4.”956 The AB thus concluded that China's obligation to grant the right to 
trade to all enterprises with respect to goods957 is “not only concerned with the question of what can 
be traded, but more directly with the question of who is entitled to engage in trading”958.  
Furthermore, the AB stated that, “[i]n view of, on the one hand, China's measures, which impose a 
restriction on who can engage in importing the relevant products, and, on the other hand, the 
nature of the specific obligation in paragraph 5.1, which stipulates who China must permit to engage 
in importing, we see no error in the Panel's tailoring its assessment of the restrictive effect of the 
provisions of China's measures to take into account the restrictive effect on beneficiaries of the right 
to trade”959 [emphasis added]. 
The AB therefore gave the term ‘international trade’ a very broad scope to include those who sell, 
purchase, transport, distribute, or use the products and beneficiaries of the right to trade. 
Furthermore ‘no less favourable treatment’ was to be accorded not only in respect of laws, 
regulations and requirements directly regulating like products, but also in relation to measures 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. It is 
therefore interesting to question whether this conclusion drawn by the AB applies to exports and 
exporters as well (and perhaps by extension producers). This is extremely important for unilateral 
action with regards to technical regulations and standards. This is because the implication of such 
unilateral action on exporters and producers may then be considered in light of the China – 
Audiovisuals judgement. According to Korea – Beef, the less restrictive the effects of the measure, 
the more likely it is to be characterized as "necessary"960. Therefore if the standards created by such 
action are proven to be restrictive to exporters and producers it would logically appear that their 
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necessity is challenged in Article XX of GATT and by virtue of the its similarity to the Chapeau of 
Article XX, Article 2.2 of TBT961.  
A further factor in determining ‘necessity’ of a measure is the availability of an alternative, less trade 
disrupting measure. For example in Thailand – Cigarettes, the Panel decided that the measures 
prohibiting US cigarette imports were not necessary because Thailand had alternative measures 
reasonably available to them.”962 Similarly, in US – Section 337, the Panel had declared that a WTO 
member cannot justify a measure under Article XX, which is inconsistent with other GATT provisions, 
“if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not 
inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it.”963  
The reasonability of an alternative measure, however, is not arbitrarily determined. Rather, it is 
connected to the initial statement made in this subsection that the determination of the level of the 
environmental standard is a right afforded to the WTO member implementing the measure. 
Therefore, such a party cannot “reasonably be expected to employ any alternative measure if that 
measure would involve the continuation of the very risk that the Decree seeks to halt.”964 This is 
because such an alternative would prevent the member from achieving its chosen level of protection 
or standard.965  
However, the burden of providing evidence corroborating ‘necessity’ lies with the defending WTO 
member and if an alternative measure is suggested by the complainant then the defendant has a 
further burden to prove why the alternative is not as feasible as the measure in dispute966. Even in 
the deliberations of the Panel in US – Tuna/Dolphin I, it is clear that it is the responsibility of the 
implementing party to determine that there is no alternative measure to the disputed one, by 
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“exhausting all options reasonably available to it”. The Panel further determined that the exhaustion 
of options includes the “negotiation of international cooperative arrangements”967. Therefore, the 
Panel provides parties to the WTO, with an obligation to consult.  
However the obligation to ‘exhaust all options reasonably available’ was clarified later by the AB in 
China – Audio Visuals. The AB stated that, “[t]his burden does not imply that the responding party 
must take the initiative to demonstrate that there are no reasonably available alternatives that 
would achieve its objectives.  When, however, the complaining party identifies an alternative 
measure that, in its view, the responding party should have taken, the responding party will be 
required to demonstrate why its challenged measure nevertheless remains ‘necessary’ in the light of 
that alternative or, in other words, why the proposed alternative is not a genuine alternative or is 
not ‘reasonably available’.  If a responding party demonstrates that the alternative is not ‘reasonably 
available’, in the light of the interests or values being pursued and the party's desired level of 
protection, it follows that the challenged measure must be ‘necessary’.”968 
Multilateral deliberations and the consequent mandate to consult between nations is certainly a 
requirement in a globalized and interrelated world economy. However, there are conceivable and 
indeed existing situations where a multilateral or even more concentrated (plurilateral) and yet 
negotiated solutions are inadequate or absent. In such situations unilateral action often substitutes 
the prevalent legislative vacuum. The following section therefore discusses instances where such 
unilateral action may be necessary. 
5.4 UEAs in instances of Multilateral/Plurilateral Inadequacy 
Unilateral action may also be necessary where there is a lacuna in international law, or if an 
international agreement on a certain issue may not have pre-empted every situation969. In the above 
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mentioned example of national laws formulated to address oil spills and marine pollution in South-
East Asia970, a complex system of national and individual legislations are prevalent largely due to the 
inadequacies of international cooperation and agreement. South-East Asia is also subject to several 
instances of regional treaties and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and yet the nonexistence 
of accountability mechanisms within these systems necessitates a constant improvement of national 
laws971. 
Moreover, the inability to agree to international treaties renders several painstaking attempts at 
making such treaties redundant or at the very least feeble. Two very important examples of such 
international treaties were the Kyoto Protocol972 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). Both treaties were affected by the fact that the US government failed to ratify 
them. Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011973.  
The Kyoto Protocol commits its Parties to set internationally binding emission reduction targets974. 
The protocol through the principles set in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) follows the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and therefore 
imposes a heavier responsibility on developed countries975.  The Kyoto Protocol therefore only 
makes provisions for UNFCCC Annex I and Annex II countries (thereby not providing specific 
responsibilities to developing countries)976.  This has added enormously to the apparent lacklustre 
performance of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2006, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 
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sanctioned by the UK government (HM Treasury), close captioned the international friction arising 
from the differentiated standards of the Kyoto Protocol: 
“[T]he Kyoto Protocol has been heavily criticised in some quarters for creating quantitative 
obligations only for the rich countries, without placing any constraints on emissions from the 
fast growing emerging economies. The US and Australia have subsequently declined to ratify 
the Protocol, and a number of other countries are not taking strong steps to implement it. 
The developing countries did in fact take on obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, but these 
were un-quantified and allowed climate change to be addressed as part of wider national 
policies on sustainable development.”977 
Annex B of the Protocol provided quantified emission reduction commitments for specific 
countries978 with the implication throughout the protocol that second and subsequent commitment 
periods would be negotiated in the future979. However, the initial commitments requirements 
themselves were considered inadequate and thereby rendered the treaty ineffective980 and this 
reflected in the effect on potential future commitment periods. By 2012, Japan, Russia, New Zealand 
and Canada had indicated they would not sign up to a second Kyoto commitment period981, while 
the US continued to remain un-ratified. Developing nations through the G-77 (including 
emerging/transitional countries like Brazil, India, South Africa and China) reiterated the need for the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility982.983 The agreement was extended to 2020 but 
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this second period of commitments was largely dubbed as ineffectual by the international press and 
reflected the increasing divide and bitterness amongst the parties to the convention984.  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) too has a similar tale of diminishing 
importance in global environmental issues. The UNCLOS is an international treaty of a very wide 
ambit of subjects relating to international waters. Subject areas range include navigation rights, 
natural resources, maritime borders (exclusive economic zones), marine species (fisheries and 
mammals) etc985. The US is the most noticeable country missing from the signatory list986.  
A very recent undermining of the UNCLOS authority has been China’s rejection of its arbitration with 
the Philippines under Annex VII of UNCLOS, to settle territorial disputes over the South China Sea987. 
The Philippines, under UNCLOS Annex VII988, instigated arbitration proceedings against China, only to 
have the very jurisdiction of the UNCLOS in this case rejected because China had declared ‘under 
Article 298989 that [it did not] accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV990 of 
the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) 
of Article 298 of the Convention’. Moreover China also felt the correct forum for settlement of this 
dispute would be the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)991.992 
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Not only have the Kyoto Protocol and the UNCLOS witnessed a deficiency in multilateral 
decisiveness, but as precursors to other important international agreements, seen corresponding 
deficiencies in such other agreements as well. As an example of such related agreements, Article 65 
of UNCLOS993 is considered a vital endorsement of the International Whaling Commission (IWC)994. 
The IWC995 enforces a ban on whaling and trading in whale products996. However, by reserving 
exemptions with the IWC, Japan, Norway and Iceland have managed to circumvent the 
moratorium997 placed on whaling since 1985998 thereby creating international friction with anti-
whaling countries.  
All the above mentioned international instances have seen some form of unilateral action in 
response to the prevalent multilateral vacuum.  Although the Kyoto Protocol has not been ratified by 
the US, emission standards within the US (formulated by the Environmental Protection Agency999) 
are very high, while the state of California has even more stringent vehicular emission standards 
(formulated by the California Air resources Board1000).1001 The standards in Europe, Japan and the US 
are fairly similar as well1002. Emerging countries such as India1003 and China have emulated European 
standards through their own emission programs10041005. 
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The UNCLOS deficiencies have been reduced through several national legislations by contracting 
parties. One important example in the US is Section 8 of the Fishermen’s Protective Act1006. Known as 
the Pelly amendment1007, it allows extrajudicial action in international negotiations, against countries 
suspected of undermining sustainable fishing efforts.  The Pelly Amendment is also utilized in 
negotiating new species into the CITES Annexes.1008 The Japanese import reduction on Hawksbill 
turtle products in 1991 and the Soviet and Japanese revocation of their CITES exemption to whaling 
and reverting back to the much reduced CITES permitted quota in 1975, were both a result of US 
threats to use the Pelly Amendment1009. 
Whaling bans have found support in the national legislations of several countries. The US not only 
uses the Pelly Amendment against whaling but also has an added weapon in the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment1010 to the Fisherman's Protective Act. Through these amendments fish 
imports from offending countries could potentially be banned. Several countries including Japan and 
Norway are known to have joined the IWC and stopped commercial whaling due to the threat of 
such unilateral action from the US.1011 
These above examples serve to show that there does appear to be a purpose for UEAs, 
notwithstanding the legislative restrictions placed on such instruments i.e. necessity, the obligation 
to consult and the inclination towards international consensus. Furthermore, the duty of the state 
towards its people is certainly well established in terms of the principle of permanent sovereignty of 
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natural resources1012. The right of the state to permanent sovereignty deriving from its duty to the 
people also exacerbates a right to using unilateral action.  
However, such unilateral action may, and in most situations arising from an intermingled world 
economy, does, lead to extraterritorial ramifications1013. Domestic sovereignty allows a state to 
determine its domestic affairs. However such action, if it affects a state or a situation outside its 
jurisdiction then there may be a case against such action1014. Several instances of International law 
mandate caution against such action.  
UN Resolution 626 (VII) certainly considers international economic interconnectivity to be a 
significant factor to be considered when exploiting such sovereign rights. It recommends that States, 
in “the exercise of their rights freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources […] to 
have due regard, consistently with their sovereignty, to the need for maintaining the flow of capital 
in conditions of security, mutual confidence and economic cooperation among nations.”1015 This 
principle is further reflected in the identical wording of the Stockholm Declaration Principle 21 and 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Principle 2:  
“States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”1016 
It must be pointed out that there lies a difference between extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
extraterritorial effect. In a globalized and interconnected world of trade, any policy decision in one 
jurisdiction will have extraterritorial effects outside its borders. Such an effect is inevitable. Although 
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there have been several instances of international friction resulting from such cross border effects of 
trade or environmental policy, the characteristic of accidental influence rather than intended 
consequence have often been the difference between  such measures being deemed in violation of 
international policy or not. The globalized trade system and the borderless nature of environmental 
problems lead to this effect of extraterritorially beyond a nation’s border1017. 
The difficulty of course, also lies in distinguishing between whether extraterritorial effect through 
UEAs, has been accidental or whether such effect is an intentional barrier to trade. Developed 
countries use a plethora of standard increasing unilateral instruments, such as agricultural subsidies, 
ant-dumping rules and unilateral trade measures, which may have the unintentional or intentional 
effect of diluting developing country interests1018. The problem lies in distinguishing ‘true and 
pretended environmentalism’1019, and that environment protectionism can easily be justified as 
environmental protection. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the characteristics of Unilateral Environmental Action 
(UEA), and explore both the drawbacks as well as advantages associated with unilateral action in 
international policy making.  
As was discussed in previous chapters, for effective implementation of environmental standards in a 
globalized world economy two factors must be contemplated – (1) a more negotiated approach, 
thus reducing international friction and diplomatic mistrust and (2) continued and optimal market 
access, in order to fulfil international trade obligations (such as those of the WTO).  
It is observed in the above discussion that UEAs are bereft of negotiations in their entirety. UEAs are 
independent actions of individual states, disassociated from the actions or interests of other 
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involved or concerned parties. Although there may be an international obligation to consult, such 
obligation is often not executed, or at the very least disregarded. WTO jurisprudence and indeed 
international law cautions against arbitrary and unjustified unilateral action. Rather, even in 
instances when unilateral action is required, there remains an obligation to consult. However, the 
several examples provided in this chapter show WTO cases arising from unilateral action that have 
led to grievances to other member states.  
Furthermore, these cases also indicate the reduced market access as a result of unilateral action. 
They are a direct result of barriers to international trade. Such barriers result in the economic 
grievances of other Member states to the WTO. Market access, is a necessary factor, as firstly, 
barriers to such access exacerbates the problems of international friction. Secondly, trade 
obligations of WTO members and the presence of a strong trade dispute settlement mechanism, 
coupled with weak, confusing and segregated international environmental accountability 
mechanisms often results in a greater position of trade issues over environmental issues. Therefore, 
an instrument increasing environmental standards, which becomes a barrier to trade, will often be 
afforded a lesser priority over market access obligations and is liable to be struck down or 
weakened.  
Bearing these characteristics of UEAs in mind the following Chapter recommends a different 
environmental instrument – Mutual Recognition Agreements. It discusses the concept of mutual 
recognition and analyses MRAs in order to understand whether the drawbacks found in unilateral 




6. MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND MUTUAL 
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS  
6.1 Introduction 
As seen from the various WTO case-law in the previous chapter concerning unilateral instruments 
implementing national environmental policy, the implementation of environmental standards by 
nations, looking to assess environmental risk and pre-empt future environmental problems, can 
become the catalyst for politico-economic friction between countries. However, the concern for 
environmental standards and the constant effort to raise such standards for the welfare of its 
citizens is certainly a necessity of good governance and therefore must be a prerogative of individual 
nations who wish it so and have the economic ability to implement such standards. This is quite 
clearly reflected in several international treaties and by international forum, not least by the 
introduction of General Exception clauses where the predominant subject area of a particular treaty 
does not concern Health Safety and Environmental standards. A particularly fitting example, and one 
discussed in this thesis, is the General Exceptions clause (Article XX) found in the GATT1020. 
However other countries, especially countries exporting into those nations with higher 
environmental standards (increasingly, developing nations), may look towards such attempts at 
raising standards, as protectionist policies intending to distort trade through technical barriers. 
Wariness on the part of DCs/LDCs towards such policies may perhaps be justified given the history of 
international negotiations, policies and trade. Moreover, instruments of environmental standards 
that are in the form of unilateralist methods may distort trade even if the intention of the policy 
instrument implementing such standards is not to do so. Some, like voluntary eco labels, have 
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transnational effects and yet, being market driven cannot be challenged by the parties affected1021. 
Yet other regulations such as those invoking the Precautionary Principle1022 may be justified because 
they acquire a morally higher ground, for instance the welfare of citizens, even if they distort trade 
and were conceived with such intention. 
In light of this situation, this chapter intends to analyse Mutual Recognition (MR) and its potential 
ability to raise standards while reducing politico-economic friction between negotiating countries. 
MR is based on the principle of unencumbered sale of a product or service in one jurisdiction 
without having to comply with its regulations if such sale is lawfully permitted in another 
jurisdiction, subject to the existence of an agreement (this might be in a Mutual Recognition 
Agreement or an Agreement with elements of mutual recognition in it1023) establishing such mutual 
recognition of regulatory standards between the two jurisdictions1024. As Nicolaidis defines it, 
“Mutual Recognition establishes the general principle that if a product or service can be sold lawfully 
in one jurisdiction, it can be sold freely in any other participating jurisdiction.”1025 
MRAs being reciprocal, negotiated agreements that are voluntarily discussed by parties intending to 
form such an agreement, the potential for politico-economic friction may be considerably reduced 
as compared to unilateralist trade distorting international instruments. Nicolaidis & Shaffer 
conveniently word this potential for a considerably more harmonious relationship between 
negotiating nations: 
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“While mutual recognition is an expression of the broader category of ‘extraterritoriality’, it is 
not extraterritoriality of a ‘unilateralist’ (or ‘imperial’) bent, but rather extraterritoriality 
applied in a consensual or at least bi- or plurilateral ‘other-regarding’ manner.”1026 
Moreover, as will be analysed further, MRAs, and indeed MR in general, may have the potential of 
raising the environmental standards of parties to such agreements1027. Therefore, it is of academic 
interest to analyse whether MR may be considered as instruments with the potential to increase 
environmental standards, without raising suspicion of technical barriers or conflict between nations. 
This chapter seeks to first define MR and display its different aspects of as analysed by various 
academic thinkers, in Section 6.21028. The chapter analyses the characteristics of MR that may be 
conducive to international cooperation for raising standards with minimal trade distortion. Also, the 
chapter introduces the principle of Mutual Recognition and analyses Mutual Recognition 
Agreements and Agreements with elements of Mutual Recognition (Collectively MRAs).  
Mutual recognition can be of two kinds. It may be recognition of rules by the parties or of conformity 
assessment procedures. The mutual recognition of rules is accepted where national regulatory 
measures and objectives are considered to be of no such nature as to allow trade restrictions1029. 
Such recognition affects the export of the products directly. Thus goods of producers meeting the 
regulatory requirements of the exporting country are automatically allowed into the importing 
country. Secondly, the subject area of MRAs may be the recognition of conformity assessment 
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procedures. The involved parties mutually accept each other’s conformity assessment procedures as 
equivalent in order to ensure compliance with prevailing regulatory requirements.1030 
The definition of MRA can, in some organisations, have a broader meaning. For example, the Trans-
Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) considers mutual recognition agreements to be based on 
equivalence, harmonization or on the satisfaction of external criteria such as the external parties 
standards or international standards1031. As mentioned earlier, this thesis will not be considering the 
potential of harmonization, because such potential in the international trade context is difficult to 
achieve. Breaking down mutual recognition clauses reveals two essential characteristics – 
Equivalence and Reciprocity. The various issues of the transfer of sovereignty arising chiefly from this 
acceptance of the regulations of another State have been discussed in the next chapter1032. 
Following the definition, Section 6.2 looks at the two characteristics of MRAs that make it conducive 
to the objectives analysed by this thesis – an instrument of international trade that increases 
environmental standards while reducing friction between trading countries (especially in the North-
South context).  In this regard, the two characteristics highlighted are the reciprocity inherent in 
MRAs and the pre-agreement negotiations which lead to a lowest agreed level of standards (this is 
called the ‘lowest common standard’ in this thesis).  
Section 6.3 then looks at the various forms of MRAs1033. The discussion starts with the ‘original 
principle’ found in the ECJ case of Cassis de Dijon. The section then highlights the various forms of 
MR categorized by Pelkmans according to the differences between the home country and host 
country regulations and eventually the degree of strictness required in achieving equivalence 
between such differing regulations. Section 6.3.1 then specifically analyses one of these forms – the 
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New Approach – as it affords the highest degree of flexibility, in achieving equivalence of regulations 
pre-agreeing to an MRA1034. The thesis therefore puts forward the claim that the New Approach 
along with the concept of ‘managed MR’1035 may allow for a negotiated trade instrument with the 
flexibility of considering the objectives of both the home and host nations. 
Section 6.5 looks at two specific mutual recognition agreements. These examples given below 
illustrate the potential for mutual recognition to be based on equivalence and external criteria (such 
as national environmental standards) negotiated before the recognition of equivalence.  
The first agreement looked at is the US-Japan MRA on organic food products. This evolution of the 
agreement is analysed to show the degree of change in standards evolving into the Lowest Common 
Standard (LCS) but not necessarily creating an increase on the party with the higher standard.  
The next agreement looked at is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This chapter 
only looks at the Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary sections and the provisions of MR 
within them. It analyses the preconditions imposed on the parties on which the MRA provisions and 
the recognition of equivalence depends. 
6.2 Defining Mutual Recognition and Mutual Recognition Agreements 
Mutual Recognition (MR) is based on the principle of unencumbered sale of a product or service in 
one jurisdiction without having to comply with its regulations if such sale is lawfully permitted in 
another jurisdiction, subject to the existence of an agreement. In other words, there lies a 
contractual reciprocal obligation amongst jurisdictions, to transfer regulatory authority from the 
jurisdiction receiving the product (host nation) to the jurisdiction that produces and markets the 
product (home nation)1036.  
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According to Nicolaidis, “Mutual Recognition establishes the general principle that if a product or 
service can be sold lawfully in one jurisdiction, it can be sold freely in any other participating 
jurisdiction.”1037 This general principle was first established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
the “Cassis de Dijon” case1038. We look at this case in Section 6.31039.  
Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) are specific instances where the general principle has been 
applied, between specific parties, applying to specific goods and services and may include more or 
less restrictive constraints and caveats1040. For the purpose of this thesis MRAs will include both 
Agreements of Mutual Recognition and Agreements with elements or specific sections containing 
the principle of Mutual Recognition. 
Breaking down mutual recognition clauses found in MRAs reveals two essential characteristics: 
(1) Equivalence. The essence of MRAs is the recognition by each party of the equivalence of the 
activities of the other party1041. This characteristic also points at the predominance of home country 
regulations and standards over those of the host country. The various issues of the transfer of 
sovereignty arise chiefly from this characteristic and are discussed in Chapter 71042. 
The definition of MRAs can, in some organisations, have a broader meaning. For example, the Trans-
Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) considers MRAs to be based on equivalence, harmonization or 
on the satisfaction of external criteria such as the external parties standards or international 
standards1043. We include the concept of external criteria when discussing international MRAs as it 
encompasses the idea of ‘managed’ MR1044. We look at this concept in Section 6.3.21045.  
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(2) Reciprocity. While equivalence assessments are the practical task of achieving acceptance of 
regulatory diversity, mutual recognition is achieved when such equivalence assessments are put into 
a ‘broader co-operative framework’1046. It is “extraterritoriality applied in a consensual or at least bi- 
or plurilateral ‘other regarding’ manner”1047. Thus, recognition of equivalent standards is responded 
to with a corresponding recognition of equivalence of the recognizing party.  
However the degree and limitation of the recognition of equivalence may not necessarily be of the 
same level. The Parties may set different levels of accepted standards to the other. An example of 
this is the US-Japan MRA1048 where the pre-agreement negotiations established different levels of 
recognition of equivalence from either party. Such ‘constraints and caveats’ on the recognition of 
equivalence are dubbed as ‘external criteria’ by the TACD definition above, and as mentioned is 
what is termed as ‘managed MR’ by Nicolaidis and Schaffer1049. 
Considering the observations of the previous chapters and the potential for conflict between nations 
with different environmental standards, MRAs have two characteristics that may be conducive to 
reducing such potential for conflict while establishing higher environmental standards. We highlight 
these two characteristics here, and discuss it in further detail through the course of this and the 
following chapters. 
Firstly, MRAs are reciprocal, negotiated agreements that are voluntarily discussed by parties 
intending to form such an agreement. Therefore, the potential for politico-economic friction may be 
considerably reduced as compared to unilateralist trade distorting international instruments. 
Nicolaidis & Shaffer express this potential for a considerably more harmonious relationship between 
negotiating nations: 
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“While mutual recognition is an expression of the broader category of ‘extraterritoriality’, it 
is not extraterritoriality of a ‘unilateralist’ (or ‘imperial’) bent, but rather extraterritoriality 
applied in a consensual or at least bi- or plurilateral ‘other-regarding’ manner.”1050 
Secondly, MRAs, and indeed MR in general, may have the potential of raising the environmental 
standards of parties to such agreements. In terms of pre-agreement negotiations this chapter looks 
at whether the negotiations increase the lowest common standard (LCS) between the negotiating 
parties. As the formation of a MRA follows negotiations between parties, equivalence is recognized 
on the basis that the standards of the parties are at a similar level and the regulatory objectives 
those standards wish to achieve are the same. Before such recognition, however, if such standards 
are not equivalent then it is likely that the party with the lower standards are required to raise theirs 
and likewise the parties with the higher standards may seek to compromise on the standards to 
continue with a state of equivalence (See for example the US-Japan MRA below1051). 
However, the MRA does create a new level of LCS which is higher than standards achieved by the 
party with the lower standards, pre-negotiation. Therefore, negotiations for MRAs create an 
increase in standards at the point of the LCS, thereby increasing the minimum standards of the 
country grouping (See for example the NAFTA negotiations below1052). 
Various WTO agreements also provide the concept of LCS. Article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement 
discussing equivalence states: 
“Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as 
equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or from those used by other Members 
trading in the same product, if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the 
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importing Member that its measures achieve the importing Member's appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection. […]”1053 
The article therefore allows a lower limit of standards consistent with the ‘appropriate level of 
sanitary and phytosanitary protection’ desired by the importing nation. This concept of appropriate 
level of SPS protection is defined further in Annex A of the SPS Agreement as “[t]he level of 
protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.”1054 
Similarly, Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement also provides for considerations of the exporting Member 
State’s standards if such standards fulfil the objectives of the standards of the importing Member 
State. Article 2.7 States: 
“Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of 
other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that 
these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives of their own regulations.”1055 
This is, of course, consistent with the prerogative of the importing Members to set their own 
standards according to the Appellate Body, as has been discussed earlier1056. Furthermore, in the 
event that such a level of standard has not been adequately determined or has been done so with 
‘insufficient precision’ by the importing Member State, the AB in Australia – Salmon has stated that a 
WTO Panel may establish such a level1057.  
As Nicolaidis states, MRAs are a part of the effort to reconcile trade and regulatory goals by reducing 
the impact on trade due to the differences in such objectives, without ‘sacrificing legitimate 
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regulatory objectives’1058. The reader will recall that the legitimacy of regulatory objectives is an 
important aspect of the ‘necessity’ of measures propagating environmental standards1059. MRAs 
therefore may create the opportunity to maintain such regulatory objectives without having to 
resort to unilateral instruments thereby reducing the need to invoke the general exceptions in the 
GATT and subsequently reducing the potential for conflict.  
6.3 Forms of Mutual Recognition  
It is for these reasons that it is of academic interest to analyse whether MRAs may be considered as 
instruments with the potential to increase environmental standards, without raising suspicion of 
technical barriers or conflict between nations. Before analysing the characteristics of MRAs, 
however, we first look at the origins of the principle in the ECJ case of ‘Cassis de Dijon’.1060 This case 
concerns a central cooperative undertaking called Rewe-Zentral AG (Rewe), registered in Cologne, 
which imported goods from other Member States of the European Community into Germany. On 
requesting permission to import and sell certain potable spirits including the liqueur Cassis de Dijon 
(France) from the Federal Monopoly Administration for Spirits, Rewe was informed that the Cassis 
de Dijon could not be sold within Germany. This was because Article 100 (3) of the 
Branntweinmonopolgesetz provided that only potable spirits having a wine-spirit content of at least 
32% may be marketed in Germany while the Cassis de Dijon had a wine-spirit content of 15-20%.1061 
The Cassis de Dijon case also demonstrated the hidden power of quantitative restrictions in 
dissuading particular products or producers. Although no specific point of origin was specified within 
Article 100 (3) of the Branntweinmonopolgesetz, it predominantly targeted and thereby affected 
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competing French products, thus deterring French exporters and, protecting German producers and 
isolating the German market in the process1062. 
On the case being appealed to the ECJ, the court stated:  
“It […] appears that the unilateral requirement imposed by the rules of a Member State of a 
minimum alcohol content for the purposes of the sale of alcoholic beverages constitutes an 
obstacle to trade which is incompatible with the provisions of Article 30 of the Treaty. 
There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully produced and 
marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into any 
other Member State […]”1063 
Article 28 of the EEC Treaty1064 (which at the time of the Cassis de Dijon judgement was Article 30) 
reads: 
“Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States.”1065 
Known as the ‘Origin Principle’, the Cassis de Dijon case therefore was one of the first instances of 
mutual recognition whereby the ECJ surmised that a product lawfully produced and marketed in one 
Member State should be allowed into the market of all other EU Member States.1066  
Nicolaidis refers to such an agreement of Mutual recognition as a “contractual norm between 
governments whereby they agree to the transfer of regulatory authority from the host country (or 
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jurisdiction) where a transaction takes place, to the home country (or jurisdiction) from which a 
product, a person, a service or a firm originate”1067. 
Pelkmans identifies several forms of MR based on the degree of dissimilarity between the regulatory 
objectives of members to an MRA and the method to achieve approximation of the said objectives. 
We highlight Pelkmans’ classification of MRAs because one of the forms characterized by him – the 
New Approach – is most often found in international MRAs, and the flexibility this approach affords 
is most conducive to such international agreements and to the intention of reducing the impact of 
regulatory objectives, such as higher environmental standards, on trade. We notice from the MRAs 
that we analyse later in Section 6.51068 that Pelkmans’ New Approach is evident. We therefore look 
at Pelkmans’ categorization first. 
Pelkmans relates his identification of the types of mutual recognition to certain qualifications, most 
prominently found in Article 28 EEC Treaty, and provided for in Article 30 (ex Article 36)1069 of the 
EEC Treaty, which reads: 
“The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public 
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States.”1070  
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Fig 3 Diagram of Pelkmans’ Categorization of the forms of MR. From J. Pelkmans, 
“Mutual Recognition in Goods: On Promises and Disillusions”, 2007, pg 701 
It is of note here that the prohibitions and restrictions provided in Article 36 of the TFEU (ex-Article 
30 of the EEC Treaty) echo the provisions of Article XX GATT1071. In terms of the subject of this thesis, 
the relevant provisions would consist of environmental risk based regulations1072. Calling such 
prohibitions or restrictions as ‘derogations’, Pelkmans states that only through these derogations 
can a member state to an MRA, justify a deviation from the ‘Origin Principle’1073.  
On the occurrence of such 
deviations from the ‘Origin 
principle’, Pelkmans states 
that the next step is to see 
whether the concerning 
regulations of the Home 
country have ‘equivalent’ 
regulatory objectives as 
the Host country. In the 
presence of such 
equivalence the 
derogations can no longer 
be justified, as the Host 
country must appreciate 
that the Home country regulation does not increase any of the risks listed in Article 301074. 
Therefore, this is a form of MR with characteristics of both the ‘Origin Principle’ and ‘Equivalence’. 
Pelkmans names this form of Mutual Recognition ‘Judicial MR’1075. 
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If however, the regulatory objectives of the Home country are not ‘equivalent’ to the Host country, 
the derogations listed in Article 30 are justified. Restoring free market dynamics then necessitates an 
approximation approach of the Host country and Home country regulations. Pelkmans lists two 
separate approaches to this process of approximation.  He distinguishes between a pre- Cassis de 
Dijon form of mutual recognition (Old Approach) and a post- Cassis de Dijon form (New 
Approach)1076.  
Fundamentally, the difference lies in the method of achieving environmental objectives1077, by the 
parties to an MRA. The Old Approach consisted of an inflexible attempt at harmonizing the ‘technical 
aspects’ of the regulations addressing such issues1078. As Pelkmans, argues, the Old Approach 
“violates the respect for diversity”, a necessity when discussing MR at a global level1079, and is only 
justifiable when the Environmental risks are extremely high. As discussed previously, in such 
circumstances countries have recourse to Unilateral Environmental Instruments, and quite 
frequently use the precautionary approach1080 when formulating Environmental regulations. 
6.3.1 The New Approach 
The New Approach, conversely, concentrates more on end objectives rather than the format of the 
regulation itself and is dependent on negotiations. Therefore, on the occurrence of a deviation from 
the ‘Origin principle’, the Home country and the Host country must define the end objectives of their 
competing regulations1081. Pelkmans dubs this form of mutual recognition as ‘Regulatory MR’ as 
opposed to the Old Approach, which was characterized by its insistence of an equivalence of 
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regulatory form1082. Importantly Pelkmans recognizes that both forms of mutual recognition help 
prevent the use of such objectives as technical barriers to trade1083. 
However, the ‘Regulatory MR’ of the New Approach is of particular interest to this thesis, as the 
flexibility that this form of MR affords, may be most conducive to an International framework 
concerning free trade. This is because of two specific reasons. Firstly, and importantly, the New 
Approach is dependent on negotiations. As has been discussed, the objective of this thesis is to find 
a negotiated Policy and Trade Instrument capable of increasing Environmental Standards1084. 
Regulatory MR is highly suitable to this objective and this characteristic of negotiations being 
beneficial to International Trade Relations has been discussed in greater detail below1085. 
Secondly, as has been discussed before1086, Environmental indicators such as the EKC fail to account 
for certain variables. These variables are also often unaccounted for in International policy and law, 
and include environmental factors, economic factors etc. The significance Countries formulating 
National and Domestic Laws are naturally more adept at including such factors in their policy 
calculations. The broad ambit of negotiated objectives, arising from the New Approach of 
‘Regulatory MR’, would allow for such variance in national policy and regulations. 
The factual circumstances behind the previously discussed WTO case of US-Tuna/Dolphin I1087 serves 
the purpose of illustrating how a strict seeking of ‘Equivalence’, similar to the Old Approach, can be 
detrimental to International relations while at the same time demonstrating the potential of the  
New Approach, had it been used in this case. The regulatory objective of the US Marine Mammals 
Protection Act 1972 was the prevention of Dolphin mortality in Tuna fishing1088. Mexico, too, had 
certain regulatory safeguards in place that according to them were sufficient to prevent excessive 
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Dolphin mortality in Tuna catches1089. Notwithstanding the merits of the arguments on either side, 
historically this insistence on equivalence by the US had led to continuous international litigation 
and friction, between Mexico and the US. Although the incidents surrounding the Tuna embargo by 
the US eventually led to Mexico to refer the case to the WTO leading to the US-Tuna I Panel 
judgement, that itself was not the extent of the International friction surrounding the events.  
It must be noted firstly, that following the Panel judgement on US-Tuna I, neither the US nor Mexico 
challenged the judgement at the Appellate Body or implemented it. Instead they sought out bilateral 
consultations with each other, ‘aimed at reaching agreement outside the GATT’, thereby defusing 
the situation temporarily1090. This may be construed as an example of the potential for negotiations, 
an important ingredient of MR (admittedly the GATT Panel judgement prior to such consultations 
may have had a catalytic effect). Perhaps it is possible to conceive that continued and vigorous 
bilateral negotiations could have prevented further escalation of the Tuna/Dolphin situation.  
However, the awkwardly brokered negotiation was short lived and has since led to many 
international incidences and two further Tuna/Dolphin cases. A further example of the escalation 
arising from the Tuna/Dolphin situation can be seen in the situation that unfolded within the Inter 
American Tropical Tuna Convention (IATTC)1091, an international organisation whose membership 
includes the US, Mexico and the European Union1092 (parties to the three Tuna/Dolphin cases). On 
the US Senate blocking the legislation H.R.28231093, aimed at reversing Dolphin safeguard measures 
in existence in the US, Mexico immediately suspended its participation in the La Jolla Agreement 
under the IATTC, by withholding mandated information required for supervising Tuna catches in 
order to maintain Dolphin Safety. Moreover, the IATTC members further reprimanded the US 
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Dolphin safe program instead of addressing Mexico’s blatant refusal to adhere to its treaty 
obligations1094. Subsequent pressure on the Clinton Administration led to the passing of a lightly 
amended legislation1095, The International Dolphin Conservation Protection Act 1997 (IDCPA) (H.R. 
408)1096, thereby compromising and severely diluting previously established Dolphin Safety 
regulations. 
The primary purpose of the IDCPA was firstly, to give effect to the Declaration of Panama1097, and 
thereby ‘[eliminating] the ban on imports of tuna from those nations that are in compliance with the 
International Dolphin Conservation Program’1098. Coincidentally the signatories to the Declaration of 
Panama (other than Honduras) were also members of the IATTC. Importantly, in terms of 
Environmental standards, the IDCPA amended the definition of “dolphin safe” in the prevalent eco 
labelling program mandated by the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 19901099, to 
include Purse Seine fishing by countries that were members of the International Dolphin 
Conservation Program1100. Therefore, international political friction arising from a Unilateral 
Environmental Instruments (the ‘Dolphin safe’ Eco labelling mandate of the US), when seen in 
totality, led to the actual decrease of Environmental Standards. This further highlights the 
disadvantages of the non-negotiatory nature of unilateral Environmental Instruments as opposed to 
the inherent negotiations required in any form of mutual recognition in a MRA or any 
Bilateral/Plurilateral Regime. 
The Appellate Body, too, has commented on the need for equivalence in comparative regulations 
rather than a rigid approach. In US – Shrimp/Turtle it stated: 
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“In our view there is an important difference between conditioning market access on the 
adoption of essentially the same programme, and conditioning market access on the adoption 
of a programme comparable in effectiveness. Authorising an importing member to condition 
market access on exporting Members putting in place regulatory programmes comparable in 
effectiveness to that of the importing Member gives sufficient latitude to the exporting 
Member with respect to the programme it may adopt to achieve the level of effectiveness 
required.”1101 
6.3.2 Managed MRAs 
Having seen Pelkmans’ categorization of Mutual recognition into Judicial MR, the New Approach 
(Regulatory MR) and the Old Approach, we now look at another mode of categorization of mutual 
recognition as proposed by Nicolaidis – ‘pure MR’ and ‘managed MR’1102.1103 
According to Nicolaidis, “pure mutual recognition implies granting fully unconditional and open-
ended rights of access.”1104 Contrastingly, managed MR is a form of MR in which “home-country 
control is conditioned, partial and monitored”1105. Nicolaidis lists four “dimensions” which determine 
whether and the extent to which mutual recognition has been managed. These are: 
(1) prior conditions for equivalence;  
(2) automaticity;  
(3) scope; and  
(4) ex-post guarantees1106 
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According to Nicolaidis and Schmidt, managed MR consisted of some form of “prior harmonization 
or convergence of standards”1107. Managed MR also “[diminishes] the automaticity of access to host 
country markets by granting residual host-country control, reducing its scope in various ways and 
setting up mechanisms of ex-post guarantees and monitoring”1108. Nicolaidis and Shaffer, state that 
recognition by a host nation, and thereby a relinquishing of the host nation’s own rules governing 
standards, is always conditional to obligations placed on a home nation by the negotiated MR 
regime itself1109.  
An example of such managed MR may be seen in the Japan – US Mutual Recognition Agreement on 
Organic Products discussed below1110 where pre-agreement negotiations excluded substances from 
the ‘organic’ label and created notification, information and inspection obligations ex-post1111. 
6.4 The Advantage of MRAs in International Relations 
In order to discuss the importance of mutual recognition in the context of trade and the 
environment, it is first necessary to recognize the growing shift towards standards in regional trade.  
According to Chen and Mattoo this change has been brought about because of two specific 
reasons1112. Firstly, the gradual elimination of tariffs and quotas, in the multilateral trading system, 
has not been complemented with an equal reduction in non-tariff barriers. Walner refers to this as 
the ‘law of constant protection’ whereby, according to him, non-tariff barriers ‘fill the void’ created 
by a reduction in tariff barriers under the WTO1113.  
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Secondly, although multilateral trading platforms such as the WTO seek to reduce technical barriers 
to trade, agreements on standards are in fact encouraged1114. For example, Article 2 of the Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement concerns the preparation adoption and application of technical 
regulations by Member states1115. Although the article upholds the principles of national 
treatment1116 and discourages the use of technical regulations as barriers to trade1117, it does 
encourage recognizing the equivalence of standards between member states through Article 2.7. 
Article 2.7 states: 
“Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations 
of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, provided they are satisfied 
that these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives of their own regulations.”1118 
The wording of the Article is clearly reminiscent of Pelkman’s “New Approach” theory of mutual 
recognition (see above), where the importance is given to the end result of such regulations rather 
than the similarities and dissimilarities they have in their format. This is perhaps symbolic of the shift 
in recent times towards regional integration and harmonization of standards.  
It is of course obvious that standards when negotiated through the WTO will not be considered a 
TBT.  The point is when the standards are imposed unilaterally and not through negotiation. Then 
the curse of TBT arises. 
As mentioned earlier, Pelkmans is of the opinion that both regulatory and judicial MR help in 
preventing parties to use the environment, health, safety and consumer protection objectives as 
technical barriers to trade1119. This is because, even with a difference in equivalence levels between 
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regulatory and judicial MR, the eventual defining of regulatory objectives between parties to the 
MRA would render the use of technical barriers moot in light of equivalent standards. 
 This is an important aspect of mutual recognition in terms of involving developing countries to 
address environmental concerns. The characteristic mistrust between developing and developed 
nations stemming from a constant suspicion of technical barriers to trade1120 may be circumvented if 
standards are negotiated, compromised upon and mutually agreed to in the form of MRAs. This is 
more significant in the negotiation of international standards within the framework of bilateral 
agreements as parties are more understanding and can easily facilitate the development of trust 
towards the other party’s standards1121.  
Moreover, MR is also a more favourable approach in terms of standards because of a more 
negotiated approach to standards, unlike other environmental instruments (UEAs), as was seen in 
the US – Tuna and US – Shrimp Cases1122. As Chen and Mattoo argue, it is difficult to negotiate a 
decrease in standards, unlike tariffs, because the premise behind standards is increasing welfare1123. 
Therefore it is unlikely for host nations to compromise with a substantial decrease in standards1124.  
Economically, this translates to the fact that in order for home country products to be sold in the 
host nation, and for the host nation to recognize the home nation’s standards, such recognition 
must be preceded by an increase in standards in the home nation. An example of such initial 
increase in standards can be found in the NAFTA Side Agreements concerning labour and 
environmental standards, specifically the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
                                                          
1120
 Scott Vaughan, ‘Trade and Environment: Some North South Consideration, (1994) 27(3) Cornell International Law 
Journal 591, 593 
1121
 Nicolaidis and Shaffer (n 1026) 273 
1122
 See Chapter 5 Unilateral Environmental Action 
1123
 Chen and Mattoo (n 1112) 839 
1124
 David Vogel, ‘Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and Environmental Protection’ (1997) 4(4) 
Journal of European Public Policy 556, 558 
219 
 
(NAAEC). The NAAEC was customized to address the deficiencies in Mexico’s environmental 
standards1125. Article 3 of the NAAEC reads” 
“Article 3 Levels of Protection 
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection 
and environmental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its 
environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for 
high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and 
regulations.”1126 
NAFTA was only passed by the US Congress after Mexico agreed to uphold such environmental 
obligations (and similar labour standards)1127. Thus the NAAEC and through it NAFTA1128 became the 
first environmental agreement with trade sanctions1129. 
According to Vogel environmental standards are determined by domestic preferences and interests 
and are more prominent in ‘affluent nations’1130. He observes that there is no evidence of a lowering 
of environmental standards by such nations in order to compete with trading partners1131. This may 
be observed in intra-EU trade whereby, a prerequisite for membership to the EU for new applicant is 
the adoption of the EU’s safety, environment and labour standards1132. In fact, within the EU there is 
evidence of constant friction between the poorer member states trying to keep standards low in 
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order to invite investment while the richer and more affluent economies continuously trying to 
upgrade standards1133.  
Nevertheless, such friction should be relatively reduced as compared to other forms of standard 
implementation such as the use of eco labels and the precautionary principle. This is primarily 
because the difference in the strategies of implementation, again has to do with the degree of 
imposition of standards on the sovereignty of another state1134. 
6.5 Analysing MRAs 
Having analysed these characteristics of MRAs the chapter now analyses the claim that MRAs are 
conducive to the increase in standards (environmental or otherwise) between the contracting 
parties. In this regard, there are two identifiable areas where such standards may be determined. 
These are firstly in pre-agreement negotiations and thereafter in the actual agreement and the post 
agreement market effects. This may be true to agreements of recognition of conformity assessment 
procedures or the recognition of the actual goods or services themselves. 
In terms of pre-agreement negotiations the chapter looks at whether the negotiations increase the 
lowest common standard (LCS) between the negotiating parties. As discussed earlier, the formation 
of a mutual recognition agreement follows negotiations between parties. Equivalence is recognized 
on the basis that the standards of the parties are at a similar level and the objectives those 
standards wish to achieve are the same. Before such recognition, however, if such standards are not 
equivalent then it is likely that the party with the lower standards are required to raise theirs and 
likewise the parties with the higher standards may seek to compromise on the standards to continue 
with a state of equivalence1135. This is dependent on negotiating power and is often determined by 
the market incentive on joining such an agreement. However, the MRA does create a new level of 
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LCS which is higher than standards achieved by the party with the lower standards, pre-negotiation. 
Therefore, negotiations for MRAs create an increase in standards at the point of the LCS, thereby 
increasing the minimum standards of the country grouping1136. 
This section analyses these two areas in the context of MRAs. It looks at two examples of MRAs to 
see if they conform to their potential to increase environmental standards. Each subsection first 
identifies the element of mutual recognition within the agreement. Subsequently, it analyses the 
pre-agreement circumstances. It looks at the negotiation history and the conditions of recognition. 
Most agreements fall within the definition of ‘managed’ MR as described above1137. Recognition in 
these cases is subject to pre-conditions set by one or both parties to the agreement that reflect their 
national standards. This substantiates both earlier discussed theories of mutual recognition 
maintaining sovereign integrity and precluding a decrease in environmental standards. As Nicolaidis 
and Shaffer claim, the recognition by a host nation, and thereby a relinquishing of the host nation’s 
own rules governing standards, is always conditional to obligations placed on a home nation by the 
negotiated Mutual Recognition regime itself1138. These obligations will vary depending on 
‘compatibility thresholds’ between the parties1139. Compatibility thresholds are similar to the 
concept of LCS discussed above in Section 6.21140.  
The following subsections look at two mutual recognition agreements to analyse whether the 
preceding arguments are reflected in their provisions. They look at the market access achieved by 
the agreements and the increase in [environmental] standards.  
Moreover, MR is also a more favourable approach in terms of standards because of the relative lack 
of a blatant imposition of standards by one party on another, unlike other environmental 
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instruments (such as eco labels seen in the US-Tuna/Dolphin and US-Shrimp/Turtle Cases1141), yet 
with the potential for their qualitative increase. As Chen and Mattoo argue, it is difficult to negotiate 
a decrease in standards, unlike tariffs, because the premise behind standards is increasing welfare 
(or at the very least it is claimed to be)1142. Therefore it is unlikely for host nations to compromise 
with a substantial decrease in standards1143. Economically, this translates to the fact that in order for 
home country products to be sold in the host nation, and for the host nation to recognize the home 
nation’s standards, such recognition must be preceded by an increase in standards in the home 
nation.  
The first agreement looked at is the US-Japan MRA on organic food products. Unlike conventional 
agreements, this agreement was negotiated through a set of correspondences between the 
parties1144, firstly as recognition of equivalence in 2002 which later evolved into an MRA in 2013. This 
evolution of the agreement is analysed to show the degree of change in standards evolving into the 
LCS but not necessarily creating an increase on the party with the higher standard. It is reiterated 
again that MRAs serve to increase the standards of the party with the lower standards, thereby 
increasing the average standard of the country grouping. 
The next agreement looked at is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The NAFTA is 
essentially a broad ranging Free Trade Agreement that includes both host nation and home nation 
levels of control. The agreement contains a wide range of subject matter. This chapter only looks at 
the Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary sections and the provisions of MR within them. It 
analyses the preconditions imposed on the parties on which the MRA provisions and the recognition 
of equivalence depends. 
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6.5.1 The US-Japan Mutual Recognition Agreement on Organic Products 
This subsection looks at the provisions of the US-Japan MRA on Organic food products. The 
Agreement made was between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), Japan and 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), through inter-governmental 
correspondence1145.  
As noted earlier market incentive is an important factor in parties coming together for a trade 
agreement (including MRAs). The corresponding increase in environmental standards is a 
consequential phenomenon. In that respect, in the US-Japan agreement the parties are significant 
players in the organic market. According to the 2013 organic market survey carried out by the 
Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FiBL) and the International Federation of Organic 
Agricultural Movements (IFOAM), the US is the largest domestic market for organic food, with the 
largest distribution of revenues in a single market and the largest distribution of organic food sales 
(according to the most recent survey – 2011)1146. Japan is the ninth largest domestic market for 
organic food and the largest in Asia according to the same survey1147. It is therefore economically 
advantageous for the parties to form such an MRA. 
Another point to note before the analysis of the agreement is in terms of the LCS in the Agreement. 
This is set by the definition of organic food by the parties. The term ‘Organic’ is defined by national 
regulation of individual countries and is a standard in itself. In Japan it is set by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and is known as the JAS Standard1148. In the US similar 
standards are set by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) through its National 
Organic Program (NOP)1149. Although ‘organic’ standards may differ world-wide, they generally 
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pertain to a certain level of standards and are by virtue of their characteristic, higher than ordinary 
agriculture and agricultural products. The differences in organic standards have led to managed MR 
provisions in agreements as will be seen below. 
6.5.1.1 Analysis of the Agreements 
The first set of negotiations appeared in 2001 culminating in the 2002 Agreement notified to the 
WTO. This was an equivalence recognition agreement between the US and Japan and was notified to 
the WTO on April 20021150.  
The 2001 MAFF correspondence recognized the equivalence of US organic products by stating that 
“the grading system of organic agricultural products and organic agricultural products processed 
food in the US, which is stipulated in [the] National Organic Program, is equivalent to the grading 
system of organic products under the Japanese Agricultural Standards.”1151  
The 2001 letter of correspondence sent by the MAFF set certain conditions for the recognition of 
equivalence of the USDA organic food programme. These were the exclusion of the following 
substances in US organic food products that were to be exported to Japan: 
(1) Alkali Extracted Humic Acid 
(2) Lignin Sulfonate 
(3) Potassium Bicarbonate1152  
Furthermore, the correspondence mandated change notification, information and inspection 
obligations.1153 This qualification of the recognition of equivalence is similar to the aspect mentioned 
in ‘managed’ MRAs, although this agreement in 2002 was still a recognition of equivalence by Japan 
of US Organic food products.  
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Subsequently, the agreement was re-asserted in 2013 between the MAFF and the USDA through 
inter-governmental correspondence1154 converting the agreement to an MRA.  
The recognition element can be found in both sets on correspondences from either party in 2013. 
The MAFF concluded that “the grading system on organic products (organic agricultural products 
and organic agricultural product processed food) in the United States is equivalent to the system 
under the Law concerning Standardization and Proper Labelling of Agricultural and Forestry Products 
(the JAS law), after examining the equivalence in United States in March 13, 2002.”1155 
In reciprocity, the USDA determined that: 
“certain agricultural products produced and handled in accordance with Japan’s organic 
certification program that provides safeguards and guidelines governing the production and 
handling of such products that are at least equivalent to the requirements of the OFPA1156. 
[…] 
Accordingly […] certain agricultural products produced and handled in conformity with 
Japan’s organic certification program […] are deemed by the USDA to have been produced 
and handled in accordance with the OFPA and USDA’s organic regulations under the National 
Organic Program (NOP). […] These products may be sold, labelled, or represented in the 
United States as organically produced, including by display of the USDA organic seal as well 
as the JAS1157 organic logo […].”1158 
Thus, this listing of preconditions and the subsequent limitations to the recognition of equivalence 
meant that the US – Japan MRA was not a pure MR agreement but rather a managed one1159. 
Furthermore, the agreement was a not only a dual MRA recognizing product standard rules as well 
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as conformity assessment programs, but also a recognition agreement of each other’s labelling 
program.  
6.5.1.1.1 Changes between the 2002 Equivalence Recognition Agreement 
and the 2013 Mutual Recognition Agreement 
The 2013 post agreement conditions may be too recent to produce any significant development for 
analysis. However, the several changes between the 2002 Equivalence Agreement and the 2013 
MRA brings out very interesting differences, and hints at the role of MRAs in increasing 
environmental standards. This section looks at how this is so.  
The 2002 agreement was essentially an agreement of managed recognition of equivalence1160 that 
required all US Organic Products being exported to Japan not containing the substances Alkali 
Extracted Humic Acid, Lignin Sulfonate and Potassium Bicarbonate. Apart from this the Agreement 
also required notification, information and inspection obligations1161. The lack of reciprocity in the 
agreement limited its scope and precluded the agreement from being a true MRA. As discussed 
earlier, mutual recognition is the recognition by each party of the equivalent standards and 
conformity assessment of the other party. 
The 2013 Agreement on the other hand shows several developments to the original equivalence 
agreement. Firstly, the agreement is now a reciprocal agreement with both parties recognizing the 
equivalence of the other’s organic grading system (this has been discussed earlier in this section). 
The reader will recall this to be an essential characteristic of MRAs. 
The second change is in the actual terms of the agreement. From an agreement simply qualifying the 
exports from the US (2002 agreement), to the current complex agreement of mutual recognition, 
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the agreement terms now include rules governing product labelling requirements, standards and 
certification bodies.  
6.5.1.2 Labelling recognition 
The labelling requirements in the agreement are designed to keep either label (MAFF or USDA) 
functional and provide a choice for importers or exporters. Labelling requirements for Japanese 
products imported into the US are simpler than US products being exported into Japan. Japanese 
organic products for export to the US “are expected to be labelled according to USDA-NOP organic 
labelling requirements”1162 and accompanied by a NOP Import Certificate from either “a MAFF-
accredited or USDA accredited certification body based in Japan”1163. 
On the other hand for US products to be exported to Japan there are four scenarios:  
(1) A US product produced and handled by an operator certified by a USDA-NOP accredited certifier 
may display the USDA organic seal if compliant with the USDA organic labelling requirements1164. If 
such a product has a JAS seal then it is expected to be imported by a JAS-certified importer1165. 
(2) A US product produced and handled by an operator, who has a JAS-labelling contract with a JAS-
certified importer, and is certified by a USDA-NOP accredited certifier may display the JAS seal if 
compliant with the JAS organic labelling requirements1166 and/or the USDA seal in Japan. The 
operator is expected to be imported by a JAS-certified importer1167. 
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(3) A US product certified to the JAS standard by a MAFF-accredited certifier may display the USDA 
organic seal if compliant with USDA requirements1168 and/or the JAS organic seal if compliant with 
JAS requirements1169. 
(4) Lastly, for non-regulated organic products (with the exception of alcoholic beverages) for export 
to Japan, certified by a USDA-NOP accredited certifier may display the USDA organic seal1170 and the 
product may be labelled ‘organic’ in English or Japanese1171.  
The Labelling requirements of US products entering the Japanese market reflect the general 
conditions Japan had earlier imposed on the 2002 equivalence recognition agreement. This reflects 
the higher standards the domestically produced Japanese organic products pertain to, and the 
difference in such standards with the US market. As mentioned before, such differences lead to the 
imposition of conditions to mutual recognition and thereby a ‘managed’ agreement. 
6.5.1.3 Omission of substances 
The most glaring change between the two agreements, however, has been the omission of the 3 
substances earlier prohibited from organic product exports to Japan. The MAFF in its 
correspondence of acknowledgement of the agreement recognises its change of conditions. It states 
that, “with a view to ensuring the future equivalence in United States and to maintaining the public 
confidence to the graded organic product, MAFF will replace the previous conditions with the ones 
set forth in section II of Appendix 1 and the arrangement regarding the Organics Working Group 
described in Appendix 2.”1172 The Organics Working Group is a body consisting of representatives of 
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the USDA, USTR and the MAFF set up to monitor and review the operations of the arrangement in 
order to ‘enhance regulatory and standards cooperation’1173. 
Although the US general ban on the three substances were being considered in order to allow 
producers to conform to one set of rules1174, these substances continue to be in use in production 
and processing of organic products in the US 1175. 
Thus the fact that Japan chose to withdraw these conditions corroborates the argument that MRAs 
may not necessarily increase the standards of all parties to the agreement to the level of the party 
with the highest standards (this is rather a characteristic of harmonization than equivalence and 
mutual recognition).  Instead, MRAs seek to achieve the lowest common standard possible amongst 
the parties, thereby increase the standards of the party with the lower standards1176. In this case 
however, the lowest standard is pre-determined to the levels required for organic status. 
6.5.2 Certain features of the NAFTA concerning Trade between the US and 
Mexico 
The analysis of the NAFTA agreement seeks to substantiate the claim whether in order for home 
country products to be sold in the host nation, and for the host nation to recognize the home 
nation’s standards, such recognition must be preceded by an increase in standards in the home 
nation. In order to effectively analyse MR provisions within the agreement, this subsection looks at 
the related provisions within NAFTA concerning Agricultural products and Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
provisions1177. 
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The difference between National Treatment obligations under the GATT and mutual recognition lies 
in the fact that national treatment obligations consider host country regulations and standards, 
while MR considers home country standards and regulations1178. This difference can be found in the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation (NAAEC) side-agreement of the NAFTA. 
Although the NAFTA and the NAAEC side-agreement are strongly influenced by the WTO and other 
international agreements1179 there are specific provisions within the NAAEC that create WTO plus 
standards1180. This reveals the agreement's intention to raise the level of the LCS above those 
already mandated by the WTO and also to recognize the equivalence of the other parties.  
For example Article 710, NAFTA directs that “Articles 301 (National Treatment) and 309 (Import and 
Export Restrictions), and the provisions of Article XX(b) of the GATT as incorporated into Article 
2101(1) (General Exceptions)NAFTA, do not apply to any sanitary or phytosanitary measure.”1181 This 
paves the way for creating standards amongst the parties that are higher than those mandated by 
the WTO. The Agreement therefore continues with provisions for equivalence recognition1182, 
international standards1183, risk assessment1184, notification obligations1185, cooperation1186, etc., of 
its own creating a framework for standards (negotiated prior to the acceptance of the agreement) 
that is higher than the general GATT initiated standards available to parties to the Agreement.  
An example of such a pre-agreement negotiated increase in standards can be found in the NAFTA 
side agreements concerning labour and environmental standards, including the previously 
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mentioned NAAEC. The NAAEC was customized to address the deficiencies in Mexico’s 
environmental standards1187. Article 3 of the NAAEC reads” 
“Article 3 Levels of Protection 
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic 
environmental protection and environmental development policies and priorities, and 
to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall 
ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental protection 
and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations.”1188 
The NAAEC and through it NAFTA became the first environmental agreement with trade 
sanctions1189. A precondition of NAFTA being passed by the US Congress was Mexico agreeing to 
uphold such environmental standards (and similar labour standards)1190 obligated under the NAAEC.  
Provisions within the NAAEC side-agreement serve to illustrate two specific points mentioned in this 
thesis1191. Firstly, pre-agreement negotiations serve to raise the lowest common standards of the 
parties, thereby increasing the lower level of standards. This is clear from the negotiated provisions 
of the NAAEC mentioned above, and the importance that the Clinton administration in the US, laid 
on the acceptance of the NAAEC provisions by Mexico, in order to agree to the NAFTA1192. 
Secondly, once such an LCS has been achieved, the regulatory provisions for standards need not 
necessarily be stringent in its interpretation but rather look towards the substantive objectives of 
the parties. This may be done through recognition of equivalence. In the following section we 
analyse the NAAEC side-agreement to see whether it provides opportunities for such equivalence.  
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6.5.2.1 Analysis of the Agreement 
The treatment of imported goods, especially in terms of discrimination, is governed by the National 
Treatment principle of the GATT. This is mirrored in the NAFTA as well (despite Article 710 
mentioned above) through Annex 703.2 which states that, “where a Party adopts or maintains a 
measure respecting the classification, grading or marketing of a domestic agricultural good, it shall 
accord treatment to a like qualifying good destined for processing no less favourable than it accords 
under the measure to the domestic good destined for processing.”1193 This is problematic in terms of 
defining the agreement as an MRA as clearly the standards set are according to the host country 
regulations, albeit taking cognizance of home country like-products.  
Furthermore, Article 712 states that, “notwithstanding any other provision of this Section, each 
Party may, in protecting human, animal or plant life or health, establish its appropriate levels of 
protection in accordance with Article”1194. Through this provision the host country is allowed to set 
its preferred level of standards.  
Therefore the NAFTA agreement sections concerning Agricultural Products cannot be considered an 
MRA in the strictest sense. It is essentially a broad ranging Free Trade Agreement that includes both 
host nation and home nation levels of control. However, elements of mutual recognition are found 
in the NAFTA in its provisions concerning Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary provisions 
(discussed in Section 6.5.2.2) and on its provisions on General Standard related measures (discussed 
in Section 6.5.2.3).  
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6.5.2.2 Mutual Recognition Provisions Concerning Agriculture Products 
Standards and Related Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards 
In Chapter 7 NAFTA on Agriculture, the provision most relevant to this discussion is Article 714 which 
deals with Equivalence. The Article seeks to balance the level of standards the host country wishes 
to achieve, with recognition of the home country standards. It does so by requiring that, “[w]ithout 
reducing the level of protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the Parties shall, to the 
greatest extent practicable and in accordance with this Section, pursue equivalence of their 
respective sanitary and phytosanitary measures.”1195 
A point of note here is that equivalence (and indeed mutual recognition, as these provisions are 
applicable to all parties to the Agreement and thus reciprocal) is with regard to individual measures 
governing sanitary and phytosanitary standards in agricultural products and not regulation creating a 
single lowest common standard for goods for export1196. Article 714 further provides the procedure 
involved in achieving such equivalence. According to the Article the recognition of equivalence of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures by the host country (importing Party) is achieved when the 
home country (exporting Party) “provides to the importing Party scientific evidence or other 
information, in accordance with risk assessment methodologies agreed on by those Parties, to 
demonstrate objectively, […] that the exporting Party's measure achieves the importing Party's 
appropriate level of protection.”1197 
Therefore, the appropriate level is determined for each individual measure and at the level of the 
host country standards. Thus in this scenario the LCS is either increased or left at the level of either 
contracting party.  The reciprocity and the consequent open market (along with the presumption 
that producers and regulators would find it economically beneficial to have a single sanitary and 
phytosanitary standard for their products) would determine an increase in standards. Once a similar 
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level of standards is achieved, equivalence may be recognized thereby leading to mutual 
recognition. However, when determining such standards and in the development of such sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures, the parties are required to “consider relevant actual or proposed sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures of the other Parties”1198. Therefore equivalence of levels of sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards must be determined in a substantive way, reminiscent of the ‘regulatory 
MR’ category defined by Nicolaidis and Schaffer1199. 
To maintain the level of standards or at the very least a status quo of recognition of equivalence, the 
Agreement provides for “inspection, testing and other relevant procedures” within its territory1200. In 
the event that the home country measures do not achieve the appropriate level of measurements of 
the host country, the agreement allows the host country to determine so (on a scientific basis)1201 
and provide the home country such reasons for determining so1202. This acts as a deterrent to the 
decreasing of standards of either party. 
Such equivalence of sanitary and phytosanitary measures must also be determined taking into 
consideration regional circumstances such as the existence of eradication or control programs in 
that area1203 and any relevant international standard, guideline or recommendation1204. The host 
country must also base its determination geography, ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance and 
the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls of the home country1205. This therefore 
substantiates the possibility of equivalence recognition in ‘managed’ conditions. This is in strong 
contrast to requirements of unilateral measures and strict determination of potentially equivalent 
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laws. As seen in earlier chapters Mexico and the US, have in fact had disputes due to such strict 
interpretation and unilateral requirements1206. 
Furthermore, the host country will have to ‘pursue an agreement’ with the home country on specific 
requirements, which when fulfilled will achieve the host country level of protection and thus allow 
goods produced in an area of low pest or disease prevalence in the territory of the home country to 
be imported into the territory of the host country1207. Thus a ‘managed’1208 form of recognition is 
created where, in each such minor agreement for the determination of a sanitary or phytosanitary 
standard, a pre-agreement level of standard is first created. Given that the requirements are 
determined by the nation with the higher standards, an increase of the LCS may be assumed again. 
6.5.2.3 Mutual Recognition Provisions Concerning Standards Related 
Measures 
Another section of the NAFTA where elements of mutual recognition may be observed is the more 
general Chapter 9 on standard related measures1209. As mentioned above, the objectives of the 
Parties, in relation to standards, is to create a WTO plus agreement. The Parties therefore assert in 
this section of NAFTA, their obligations relating to standard-related measures under the TBT 
Agreement and other international agreements, including environmental and conservation 
agreements1210. 
Similar to the above discussed section on agricultural products standards, Chapter 9 also give rights 
to the host country in determining levels of General standards, “including any such measure relating 
to safety, the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers, 
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and any measure to ensure its enforcement or implementation. Such measures include those to 
prohibit the importation of a good of another Party […]”1211.  
However, such measure may not be arbitrary and unjustifiable1212, a disguised restriction on 
trade1213 and one that discriminates between ‘similar goods or services for the same use under the 
same conditions that pose the same level of risk and provide similar benefits’1214. Furthermore 
National Treatment and ‘like-product’ principles similar to the GATT must be observed as well1215. 
The measures must therefore be able to demonstrate that its purpose is to achieve a ‘legitimate 
objective’1216 and that it does not exclude goods from another Party that achieve the same 
objective1217. 
As stated before, host country standard determinations, though legitimate, preclude defining an 
agreement as an MRA (unless just determinations are from pre-agreement negotiations which 
create a ‘managed’ MRA). The argument that the NAFTA is predominantly a FTA, rather than an 
actual MRA, is substantiated by these provisions. However, Chapter 9 (similar to the more specific 
Chapter 7) also has specific provisions that contain elements of MR.  
The relevant Article embodying principles of mutual recognition is Article 906: Compatibility and 
Equivalence. According to Article 906, the Parties to the NAFTA require to work jointly to enhance 
the level of safety and of protection of human, animal and plant life and health, the environment 
and consumers1218. However, as long as it is not detrimental to the objectives of raising these 
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standards, the Parties are required to ‘make compatible’1219 their respective standards-related 
measures, in order to facilitate trade1220. This recognition of equivalency includes standards as well 
as conformity assessment procedures1221. 
Importantly Article 915 states that, “[e]ach importing Party shall treat a technical regulation adopted 
or maintained by an exporting Party as equivalent to its own where the exporting Party, in 
cooperation with the importing Party, demonstrates to the satisfaction of the importing Party that 
its technical regulation adequately fulfils the importing Party's legitimate objectives”1222 or give 
reasons for not doing so1223. 
Similar provisions can be found with regards to conformity assessment procedures in Article 908. 
These include an obligation on Parties to the agreement to make conformity assessment procedures 
in their respective territories compatible1224 and on terms no less favourable than those accorded to 
conformity assessment bodies in its territory1225. These procedures are not to be stricter, nor applied 
more strictly, than necessary1226. If a home nation so requests, then a ‘sympathetic consideration’ 
must be given by the host nation, to an agreement of mutual recognition of the results emerging 
from a home nation’s conformity assessment procedure1227. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to define Mutual Recognition in the context of this thesis and to 
analyse its potential as an instrument to raise Environmental standards. This exercise was a 
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necessary progression to the analysis of the Trade-Environment relationship1228 and Unilateral 
Environmental Instruments1229 in the preceding two chapters. As witnessed in Chapter 3, the Trade-
Environment analysis has predominantly shaped up to be a Developing/transitional country – 
developed country issue, and a question of Environmental standards. Developed countries in a 
partially post-materialistic society – largely because of already having gone through the 
industrialization process – can afford to look beyond material concerns, towards abstract societal 
benefits such as standards of living. Developed country markets therefore have a demand for high 
environmental standards.  
Developing countries on the other hand cannot afford such high standards for their domestic 
industries, if such industries are to compete with international firms. Furthermore, developing 
countries tend to bring up the argument that developed countries have reaped the benefits of 
industrialized pollution and now wish to hinder developing countries’ economic progress1230. 
Now although there are merits to this argument, one important drawback is the time factor. 
Although there might be a case of a relatively recent increase in Environmentalism due to developed 
countries reaching the post-materialist stage of their societal evolution, this increase in 
Environmentalism may be – given the finite nature of natural resources – because of an increased 
need for it. In such circumstances, notwithstanding the past benefits reaped by developed countries, 
they may have a very strong case for Environmental development and increased Environmental 
standards. 
Countries wishing to advocate environmental change do so in the International extra-territorial 
context through two diverging processes – unilaterally, where national laws are made and 
implemented without sufficient consultation of the Nations being affected, or bilaterally or pluri-
laterally through negotiations.  
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The examination of WTO case law in Chapters 4 and 5 revealed that a significant problem with 
Unilateral Environmental instruments is that they invariable lead to political and economic friction 
between countries. Therefore, the thesis searched for a trade instrument which would propagate 
environmental standards while reducing international friction by allowing nations the flexibility to 
achieve equivalent environmental objectives while keeping domestic conditions in mind. The thesis 
therefore suggests looking at the concept of MR and thereby the MRAs forming out of negotiations 
considering the concept. 
In order to look at mutual recognition in the international context this chapter looked most closely 
at the categorization set by Pelkmans. He divides mutual recognition into what he calls “Judicial MR” 
as well as the Old Approach and the New Approach which he calls ‘Regulatory MR’. 
In the Old Approach, MR is achieved by a strict harmonization of the regulations of the participating 
countries. It is inflexible and impractical in the International sense given the myriad of variables and 
permutations to be considered. The New Approach, alternatively, considers the equivalence of the 
regulatory objectives of the participating countries rather than the actual regulatory instruments. If 
the instruments to be compared have the same regulatory objective then mutual recognition can be 
achieved. It is this flexible form of mutual recognition that is important in the international context.  
The intention of this chapter was to observe the potential of MRAs in increasing environmental 
standards. The increase of standards through mutual recognition agreements may occur in two 
identifiable areas of the negotiated instrument. These are either in the pre-agreement negotiations 
or in the negotiated text of the agreement. Often, the text of the agreement will reflect the 
intention of the parties before agreement.  
This was observed in the NAFTA Agreement, for example where the apprehension of Mexico’s lower 
standards entering the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (the predecessor to the NAFTA), led to the 
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parties deciding on the NAFTA side agreements on labour and environmental standards (such as the 
NAAEC).  
Similarly, the 2002 equivalence recognition agreement between the US and Japan sought to ban the 
use of certain substances in organic in organic food products to be imported into Japan. Japan’s 
higher standards of organic food products not only influenced the agreement but forced the US to 
mull over a general ban on the substances in order to have one set of rules for their domestic 
producers1231. Although this did not materialize, it shows the potential a ‘managed’ recognition has 
in increasing environmental standards.  
Furthermore both sets of agreement show the potential for mutual recognition in the international 
context lies in designing ‘managed’ mutual recognition agreements. In the following chapter the 
thesis discusses the issue of sovereignty in mutual recognition agreements. By formulating managed 
agreements, the parties are allowed to withhold certain host country sovereignty by determining the 
minimal level of standards required for import. Not only does this allay fears of diluting sovereignty 
through extraterritorial home country rules, but also, the minimal standard determination increases 
the lowest common standards (LCS) between the parties.  
However, the potential of MRAs in raising standards is aided by a globalized interconnected market. 
Global market links and lucrative markets create incentives to join agreements that reduce market 
barriers to trade. MRAs are agreements that reduce trade barriers1232. As mentioned above1233, 
MRAs also have a consequential increase in lowest common environmental standards (the LCS). 
Therefore, a third party wishing to join such an agreement is obliged to increase their standards. As 
mentioned above, negotiation power may be a factor in the level of LCS, which may be significantly 
higher if the market that a country wants to join is already more advanced with environmental 
standards due to a pre-existing agreement. 
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This was the case with Mexico wanting to join the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. In order for 
NAFTA to be agreed to, Mexico was pressed into agreeing to the additional NAFTA side-agreements 
of labour and environmental standards.  
The Organic products chain also has the potential to create such dynamics. Consider the example of 
India in the Organic production chain. India has the largest number of organic producers in the 
world1234. Its organic regulations are formulated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry through 
the National Programme for Organic Production (NPOP)1235. India and the US have an MRA on 
certifying agents of Organic food products thereby allowing easier access to each other’s 
markets1236. 
Therefore both Japanese and Indian organic products have a common market in the US. Indian 
organic products entering the US market through mutual recognition of standards would 
theoretically be of equivalent levels to Japanese standards or at the very least compatible to the US 
import requirements. However, India and Japan do not yet have such an agreement between 
themselves.  If the MRA between the US and Japan was a pure MRA similar to the characteristics of 
the Origin Principle found in the Cassis de Dijon definition1237, instead of the current ‘managed’ one, 
products entering one market would have to be allowed into the other.  
The barriers still prevalent in such international trade agreements do, however, serve to safeguard 
the legitimate environmental interests of parties to agreements. The diverse levels of environmental 
standards in international trade necessitate so. The barriers also serve the purpose of incentivising 
countries to raise their level of standards in order to enter markets with higher standards, thereby 
continuously increasing the LCS as more trade agreements are formulated amongst nations and 
country groupings.  
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In the following chapter we look at two final issues required in our analysis of MRAs. It first looks at 
the issue of sovereignty associated with MRAs as these agreements entail the acceptance of home 
country regulations and standards by the host country. The chapter finally looks at the WTO 
compatibility of MRAs. 
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7. MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
7.1 Introduction 
There are two major issues that require discussion when examining MR. Firstly, MRAs constitute a 
horizontal transfer of power to another jurisdiction and therefore questions regarding sovereignty 
come to light. Therefore, the issue of sovereignty must be analysed in the present discussion. 
Secondly, MRAs are in effect agreements of preferential treatment and therefore must be seen in 
light of and in comparison to the most favoured nation (MFN) principle of the WTO1238. This chapter 
therefore discusses two prominent issues regarding MR.  
Section 7.2 first looks at the issue of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the fact that there lies a mutual 
agreement to recognize standards prevalent within another jurisdiction, essentially, such recognition 
is an acceptance of the standards of another jurisdiction and therefore may imply a direct or indirect 
transfer of sovereignty. Detractors of MR may see this as an important drawback of such an 
instrument. To study the dynamics of MR and agreements based on a transfer of sovereignty, it is 
therefore pertinent to discuss the question of a transfer of sovereignty. This is the first important 
issue that this chapter attempts to addresses.  
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Secondly, within the context of the WTO, MRAs may be seen as agreements of preferential 
treatment. Section 7.3 discusses MRAs in the WTO context, especially regarding regional agreements 
viz-à-viz the Most Favoured Nation principle. It also analyses the potential of a conflict between a 
GATT provision allowing mutual agreements and other WTO provisions within the GATT, SPS and 
TBT agreements preventing discrimination within Member States. 
7.2 Mutual Recognition and the Transfer of Sovereignty  
It is important to assess whether MR can be considered an instrument of governance or merely a 
facilitator of one. Trachtman argues, that given the inherent deregulatory nature of mutual 
recognition, and its characteristic of negotiating a choice of Home country regulations and thereby 
allocating regulatory jurisdiction makes mutual recognition, “not so much a rule of governance in the 
normal sense, but a rule of choice of governance”1239. In such a situation, the sovereignty of a nation 
is scarcely affected as firstly, national regulations are not superimposed by a separate set of 
regulations. Secondly, the power allowing for the choice of governance is derived from the 
sovereignty of the nation, as was asserted by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Germany in 
the below discussed Maastricht case1240. 
However, Maduro contradicts this by pointing to the processes generated by MR and the social 
outcomes arising from MR regimes1241. Schmidt, differentiates this form of international governance 
from the national scenario by calling MR a form of ‘governance without government’. According to 
her, this form of governance, “exposes the need for non-hierarchical solutions to co-ordination and 
co-operation”, unlike in the case of national governments1242.  
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Nicolaidis and Schaffer tend to agree with this view of MR being a form of governance and conclude 
that it is a necessary manifestation of the chaotic and globalized nature of Word Trade1243. In such 
circumstances, the issue of whether there is a transfer of sovereignty through MR becomes 
particularly important. This is because; beyond the mutually agreed lowest common Environmental 
Standard negotiated prior to recognition of a product, a host country is obligated to accept the 
standards of the home country1244.  
However unlike harmonization, MR does not entail a high degree of vertical transfer of sovereignty 
to the ‘supernational level’. In other words, responsibility for the regulation of the chosen sectors is 
transferred to the home state1245. According to Maduro1246 and Nicolaidis1247 this exchange of 
horizontal transfer of sovereignty through mutual negotiation, instead of a complete transfer of 
sovereign powers to a supernational institution is often a preferred instrument of economic 
integration. 
Sovereignty as a legal concept has several varying definitions and usages. Therefore, in discussing 
sovereignty, it is essential to clarify and segregate the particularities of the connotations of the term 
as required within the discussion. This however, is easier said than done considering the abstract 
nature of the legal concept of sovereignty.  
The United Nations Charter mentions sovereignty as one of its core principles of international 
relations. Article 2.1 of the Charter reads: 
“The Organisation and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in 
accordance with the following Principles. 
1. Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” 
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Yet defining sovereignty is considerably difficult, not only given its abstract nature, but also given the 
fact that the context of the usage of the term is equally important. The plethora of contingencies 
occurring under the vast subject of sovereignty makes it necessary to first restrict the definition to 
the desired context and define the parameters of the definition. This difficulty has led academics 
such as Hoffman to consider sovereignty to be a ‘bothersome’ concept and one that is insoluble in 
essence1248. 
Sarooshi suggests that the concept of sovereignty is an ‘essentially contested concept’1249. An 
essentially contested concept, according to Samantha Besson, is one that: 
“not only expresses a normative standard and whose conceptions differ from one person to the 
other, but whose correct application is to create disagreement over its correct application or, in 
other words, what the concept is itself. To claim that a concept is contestable is to make the 
analytical claim that debates about the criteria of correct application of a concept are 
inconclusive”1250. 
This is obvious from the various viewpoints that one is able to analyse the concept of sovereignty. 
Several academics such as Sarooshi1251, Hoffman1252, etc. have generally identified sovereignty under 
the categories of political, legal, economic, external and internal sovereignty. However, such 
differentiation can be further expanded according to the degree of its application, i.e. domestic, 
national or international deliberations on sovereignty or the interplay of one or more of such levels. 
Krasner therefore, lists four separate forms of sovereignty independent of institutional necessity, 
and more closely related to the degree of application. According to him, sovereignty could be 
divided into domestic, interdependent, international legal and Westphalian sovereignty1253. This 
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categorization of sovereignty is convenient for this discussion as it best highlights the interplay of 
politico-legal and economic policies in a domestic or international standpoint instead of a division 
dependant on the subject matter (political, economic etc.). This concentrates the discussion towards 
the governance hierarchies prevalent – from domestic vote banks all the way to international 
organisations – thereby aiding discussion on international relationships between various countries 
with regards to environmental standards, and further MRAs as an instrument to increase such 
environmental standards. Given this present part of the chapter considers the loss or transfer of 
sovereignty within the ambit of MRAs and not sovereignty itself, it would perhaps be easier to 
identify such a transfer or loss when considering sovereignty in terms of the Krasner model in order 
to see at which level such loss or transfer might occur (if at all). 
Domestic sovereignty refers to the organisation and control of domestic authority over internal 
affairs of state. In terms of historical discussions on sovereignty, domestic sovereignty most closely 
resembles the subject matter under consideration. The English school of thought on sovereignty 
(historically) was associated with this form1254.  
International legal sovereignty, on the other hand, is the recognition of the governmental authority 
or the state (the two are not necessarily the same) by the international community. Discussions on 
international legal sovereignty mirror the relationship of actors at the domestic level i.e. the citizens 
and the state. The equivalent actor to the citizens in domestic sovereignty is the state when 
discussing international legal sovereignty1255.  
Westphalian sovereignty is the ability of a domestic authority to function without the influence of 
external factors. It is different from international legal sovereignty because in the case of 
Westphalian sovereignty whether the act influencing the sovereignty of a nation is voluntary or 
coerced is immaterial. Any form of international transaction (not just economic) may be said to have 
influential repercussions on the decision making process of a state. Whether these decisions are 
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taken in good faith or coerced would determine the international legal sovereignty of a nation. 
However, the nature of the decision making process is not a factor in determining Westphalian 
sovereignty as any transnational intercourse could be said to be an influential external factor and 
thereby a transgression of sovereignty 1256. 
7.2.1 Mutual Recognition and Interdependent Sovereignty 
Interdependent sovereignty concerns the ability of a national authority to control transborder 
movement within their jurisdiction. Krasner reveals this form of sovereignty as the primary factor 
behind the diversion of discussions on sovereignty in general from topics of domestic sovereignty to 
a more international colour. He places globalisation as the cardinal antecedent for this shift in the 
academic discussion of sovereignty1257. Rosenou, in the same light, identifies a change in 
international systems and a consequent requirement for states to become interdependent and 
move away from the dogmas associated with a strict notion of domestic sovereignty. International 
issues, such as environmental problems, which do not recognize political and national borders, are 
increasingly requiring multilateral or at least bilateral co-operation amongst states. According to 
Rosenou, it is impossible for states to provide solutions to such issues individually1258. 
This is why, in terms of MRAs, the concept of Interdependent sovereignty is perhaps the most 
applicable. The inherent mutual negotiation, for the formation of MRAs between states is, in itself, a 
reassertion of Interdependent Sovereignty. However, it is prudent to note that all four variations of 
sovereignty mentioned by Krasner (or at least more than one), is inevitably affected by extraneous 
changes on each other. This is best illustrated by the simultaneous dilution of domestic and 
Westphalian sovereignty because of a change in the interdependent sovereignty of nation states 
joining international organisations such as the EU, NAFTA or the WTO. It is perhaps this concurrent 
                                                          
1256
 Krasner (n 1253) 20. The detailed analysis of all four types of sovereignty is beyond the scope of this piece as it 
discusses the effect of MRAs on sovereignty and not sovereignty itself. For further reading on Krasner’s analysis of 
sovereignty see “Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy” 
1257
 Krasner (n 1253) 12 
1258




change in different aspects of sovereignty that may be perceived as a transfer and the relinquishing 
of sovereign powers.  
The distinctive feature of the loss of interdependent sovereignty, as compared to the other forms of 
sovereignty would be a characteristic erosion of control rather than actual authority1259. As 
mentioned before, interdependent sovereignty is concerned with the authority to regulate 
transborder movement of goods, persons, pollutants, diseases and ideas1260. With the advent of 
globalisation, an increase in online internet transactions and because of the redundancy of national 
borders with regards to natural systems (for example, adverse effects on species, pollutants etc, 
originating in one state will not be limited within its borders), control over a state’s borders has 
systematically decreased. Moreover globalized trade and contemporary international politico-
economic phenomenon have led to states wilfully relinquishing such control in exchange for mutual 
benefit. This, however, does not in any way imply a loss of authority as well.  
Therefore, in terms of MR, and indeed MRAs, it is essential to consider whether sovereignty is seen 
as a dilution of authority or a dilution of control. If sovereignty is considered in terms of the 
authority that governments and states possess then MR cannot be considered an instrument for the 
weakening of sovereign powers as in MR there is no transfer or dilution of authority. An example of 
such refusal to dilute the authority of the state may be found in views of the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Germany, in the Maastricht case, where the court states that the community 
authority of the EU is derived from its Member states and that the Member states retain their 
sovereignty (and thereby authority) because of such derived authority of the EU1261. However, if 
sovereignty is considered as a measure of control then relinquishing interdependent sovereignty 
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also affects domestic sovereignty considerably. As put forward by Krasner, “if a state cannot regulate 
what passes across its borders, it will not be able to control what happens within them.”1262  
The most obvious example of such relinquishing of control would be the formation of the European 
Union and its common market. The domestic sovereignty of member states vis-à-vis transborder 
movement has, in a way been relinquished to the higher collective authority of the European Union. 
However, academics such as Hoffman argue that joining the EU is in effect an increase in sovereignty 
rather than the contrary. The essence of the argument is looking at European sovereignty as a whole 
and thereby to strengthen the EU’s sovereignty would be to strengthen the sovereignty of individual 
states1263.  
7.2.2 The Delegation and Transfer of Sovereign Powers 
A measure of the degree of conferral of sovereign powers due to MRAs, and their effect on the 
sovereignty of a nation is whether such an agreement results in the delegation of sovereign power 
or the transfer of it. The distinguishing factor between the two lies in the degree of revocability of 
the sovereign powers conferred by the state, in lieu of the agreement. In the case of the delegation 
of power, the state continues to have the power to revoke conferred rights at its own discretion1264.  
In reality the most obvious instance when such power may be invoked occurs when a party to an 
agreement (a state) wishes to withdraw unilaterally from the agreement. The degree of revocability 
allowed by the treaty may then depend on the availability of an express withdrawal clause1265. If a 
treaty contains an express withdrawal clause stipulating the time frame of withdrawal then it is quite 
clear that the sovereignty of the party in question has been temporarily delegated and is by no 
means absolute and irreversible1266.  
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On the other hand, if there is no withdrawal clause, then parties to an agreement are governed by 
Article 56(1) of the Vienna convention which states1267: 
“A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for 
denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) it is established 
that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) a right of 
denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.”1268 
Therefore, in the circumstances, parties to the agreement are required to rebut the presumption 
within the chapeau of Article 56, considering the intention behind the constitution of the 
agreement, and if they are able to do so, then accordingly the conferral of power by the state may 
continue to be considered a delegation rather than a transfer of sovereign power.1269 
Moreover, simultaneous sovereign powers further dilute the criticism regarding a conferral of 
sovereign powers. The usual instance of such an occurrence is when states confer some of their 
powers to international organisations. If a state confers some of its powers in light of an agreement 
but concurrently continues to hold the same powers without any limitations then such conferral 
cannot be considered a transfer. UN Member states confer treaty making powers to the UN without 
restricting their individual right to do the same. Ascension to the Organisation has in no way affected 
the sovereign powers of member states to continue seeking treaty relations outside the purview of 
the UN.1270  
A transfer of sovereign power, however, is more debatable in terms of the criticisms levelled at the 
dilution of interdependent sovereignty in international agreements. Unless specifically mentioned as 
part of a withdrawal clause, a transfer of sovereign power, as mentioned above is subject to Article 
56 of the Vienna convention. As before, unless an express provision is provided for the unilateral 
                                                          
1267
 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M Blokker, International Institutional Law, (Kluwer Law, 3
rd
 edition 1997) 1132 
1268
 The Vienna Convention 1969 Article 56(1) Denunciation of or withdrawal from a treaty containing no provision 
regarding termination, denunciation or withdrawal 
1269
 Sarooshi, (n 1249) 57 
1270
 Sarooshi, (n 1249) 59 
252 
 
withdrawal of a state, a presumption of irrevocability is existent. This was highlighted in the 
European Court of Justice case of Costa v ENEL where the ECJ stated: 
“By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its 
own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, 
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the 
Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves. [...] The transfer 
by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and 
obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, 
against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot 
prevail.”1271 
This view of the ECJ, however was severely challenged by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG) (The 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Germany) which in its decision of the Maastricht case stated:  
“[The Federal Republic of Germany] remains, even after the entry into force of the Union Treaty, a 
member of a union of States whose Community authority derives from the Member States and can 
have a binding effect on German sovereign territory only by virtue of the German implementing 
order. Germany is one of the ‘masters of the Treaties’, who have based their commitment to be 
bound by the Union Treaty, which is concluded ‘for an unlimited period’, on their intention to 
remain in long-term membership, but who could equally, in the final analysis, revoke that 
membership by adopting an act with the opposite effect. The validity and application of European 
law in Germany depend on the implementing order contained in the Law Approving the Treaty. 
Germany thus retains the quality of a sovereign State within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the 
Charter of the United Nations”1272 
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Not only was this a direct assertion of sovereignty by Germany, it was also revealing of the fact that 
international agreements, treaties and charters between states, essentially derived their sovereign 
powers not only from member states but also at their behest. Thus, the actual possession of 
sovereignty continues to lie with States, should they wish it so.  
This view reflects the view of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the earlier landmark 
judgement of the Lotus case1273. The court in its judgement states:  
“International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding 
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate 
the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore 
be presumed.”1274 
The disallowing of the presumption of restrictions on a nation is known as the Lotus case 
principle1275.  
Such friction between States and inter-governmental authority is familiar to the largely discussed 
academic argument of internal vs. external sovereignty. Besson, argues that the concept of 
sovereignty has traditionally operated in these two directions. According to her, within a state, 
external sovereignty is the prerogative of the executive while the legislature is sovereign in internal 
affairs. However, one cannot exist without the other as she states:  
“Without external sovereignty, indeed, the internal sovereign cannot define the latter and without 
internal sovereignty in the constitutional determination of competences, there cannot be an 
external sovereign and no human rights limitations in particular.”1276 
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7.2.3 Kantian Middle Path: Cosmopolitan Law 
As mentioned in the previous section, although MR and MRAs, as international instruments of co-
operation, continue to be a strong subject of debate in the sovereignty-globalisation context, their 
characteristics prevent any sharp distinction between the degrees of sovereignty and level of 
enforcement of sovereign powers. Nicolaidis and Shaffer, argue that mutual recognition must 
instead be seen as a intermingling of “domestic laws to constitute the global”.1277 In terms of MRAs 
therefore, it is perhaps less a question of coexistence of either internal and external sovereignty or 
interdependent and domestic sovereignty, and more an intermingling of domestic and international 
laws. 
Nicolaidis and Shaffer’s ‘middle-way’ concept is based on a similar concept of ‘cosmopolitan law’ by 
Kant (as acknowledged by them). The essential element which stands out in Kant’s legal construction 
is his negation of the subdivision of public law into state and international law. In To Perpetual Peace 
Kant mentions the tripartite division of public law: 
“We now come to the essential question regarding the prospect of perpetual peace. What does 
nature do in relation to the end which man’s own reason prescribes to him as duty i.e. how does 
nature help to promote his moral purpose? And how does nature guarantee that what man ought to 
do by the law of his freedom (but does not do) will in fact be done through nature’s compulsion, 
without prejudice to the free agency of man? This question arises, moreover, in all three areas of 
public right – in public, international and cosmopolitan right.”1278 
According to Archibugi, current public law is based on the recognition of the dogma of sovereignty 
while simultaneously acknowledging the principle of non-intervention. In his opinion Kantian legal 
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construction would help preserve the international principle of non-intervention without submitting 
to the dogmas associated with sovereignty1279.  
The Kantian philosophy of cosmopolitan law discusses heavily the obligation of states regarding the 
citizens of other states. According to Kleingeld, Kant felt this ‘emphasis on the status of the 
individual’ to be essential towards the creation of a global legal order1280. Cosmopolitan law, thus, 
concerns less with the functioning of the state itself and more on the repercussions of the said 
functioning on the citizens of a polity outside the state’s jurisdiction1281. This is extremely important 
with regards to MR given the repercussion of globalisation viz-a-viz movement of goods and persons 
through international borders, and the already mentioned interdependent effects of national 
sovereignty.   
Kantian philosophy on the deliberations of cosmopolitan law is based on Kant’s idea of a right to 
‘hospitality’1282, and is, as such, beyond the relevance of this discussion1283. However the underlying 
idea of a states right to enter into relationships with another state and its citizens and the concern 
and recognition of the effect of decision making outside a state’s jurisdiction are inherent facets of 
the framework of MRAs. The reciprocal concepts of extraterritoriality and comity intrinsic to the 
concept of cosmopolitan law are crucial to the understanding and justification of MR in a globalized 
world. 
The exclusivity of national and international public law is diluted with a somewhat reciprocal 
governance of one polity with regards to another1284. MR essentially falls within a separate category 
of transnational governance. According to Nicolaidis and Schaffer (2005), “While [MR] is an 
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expression of the broader category of ‘extraterritoriality’ it is not extraterritoriality of a ‘unilateralist’ 
(or ‘imperialist’) bent, but rather extraterritoriality applied in a consensual or at least bi- or 
plurilateral, ‘other regarding’ manner.”1285 
Therefore, although MR, like harmonization and standardization entails some degree of transfer of 
sovereignty (as do most supernational transactions) what must be realized is the degree to which 
such transfer is carried out and the resulting degree of trust required between the states involved. 
What remains to be seen is whether there is a direct correlation between a requirement for pre-
negotiation trust in a politico-economic instrument of standards (especially environmental 
standards), and the potential for post-implementation political friction. Logically, the less cross-
national trust required to implement an environmental instrument (assuming the lack of a 
requirement for trust derives from it being rendered unnecessary due to comprehensive 
negotiations or agreements), the less chances there are for dispute, post implementation1286. 
Instruments that do not require negotiations or agreements (e.g. Unilateralist instruments such as 
eco labels) may, using the same logical assumptions, have a greater potential for dispute. 
One very good example to illustrate the above may be the unilateralist imposition of eco labels by 
the United States of America (US) in cases that have been subject to WTO dispute settlement, such 
as the US – Shrimp1287 and the US – Tuna/Dolphin1288 cases. The unilateralist imposition of 
environmental standards through environmental legislation, not only led India, Malaysia, Pakistan 
and Thailand (in US – Shrimp) and Mexico and the EEC (in the three US – Tuna cases) to request the 
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO to establish a panel to settle these disputes, but also despite 
the prohibition of imports into the US being lifted afterwards, the post judgement use of eco labels 
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to achieve their regulatory objectives, have greatly contributed to the already existent mistrust 
between developed and developing countries concerning environmental objectives1289. 
In contrast, MRAs are mutually negotiated, with an inherent element of reciprocity, and are 
institutionalized1290. Therefore, in terms of environmental standards, parties to the agreement are in 
constant knowledge of the extent to which they may be affected (raising of standards) and the 
reciprocal benefits they may hope to receive in exchange (market access), and yet in a controlled 
environment of negotiations. In this light, MR appears to be less of a transfer of sovereignty and 
more of a political and economic barter to achieve objectives desired by all parties. In the classic 
North-south divide in international trade, this may well be the method that finally bridges the gap 
between the desire of developed nations to raise standards, and the suspicion of protectionism such 
desires evoke in developing countries. 
However, to declare MR to be a mere negotiation and compromise to achieve economic interests 
would be to over simplify a far more complex legal debate. In reality, MR entails the recognition of 
the rules of another state within its jurisdiction and that is clearly a horizontal transfer of 
sovereignty1291. Moreover, according to Maduro, MR may even entail a vertical transfer of 
sovereignty in certain aspects. This may occur either through the eventual harmonization of a 
negotiated and mutually recognized standard, or if such recognition is of an international standard. 
In such cases sovereignty is then transferred to technocratic international organisations beyond a 
state’s sovereign control1292. 
Pelkmans, however, delivers an interesting view with regard to the doubts concerning a transfer of 
sovereignty. According to him, if the regulatory objectives of the parties involved are similar i.e. risk 
management (in case of this thesis environmental risk), then recognition of each other’s standards is 
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hardly tantamount to a transfer of sovereignty1293. In fact, to not reciprocally recognize standards in 
this case, would be a strong instance of regulatory failure1294. 
According to Maduro, Pelkmans refers to only those instances where MR is equated to 
equivalence1295. However, in light of the earlier discussion of MR leading to an increase in standards, 
and the role MRAs play in convincing parties to come to the negotiating table after an ex- ante 
increase in standards driven by their desire for market access, it is suggested here that although the 
intention may not have been that of equivalence there is always a tendency to move towards it. This 
is similar to the ex- post tendency to harmonize. Therefore, not only does MR prove to be beneficial 
in terms of raising standards (environmental and otherwise) but also, it does so with minimal 
transfer of sovereignty. 
Moreover the issue with the transfer of sovereignty is further diluted by the realization of mutual 
benefit through co-operation. For an MR regime to function effectively, both, the home nation as 
well as the host nation is subject to certain responsibilities towards the other. Home nations must 
consider the protection of consumers outside their jurisdiction, while host nations have to take into 
account the effect their decisions may have on home country producers and service providers1296. As 
mentioned earlier, this entails a substantial element of trust between parties when negotiating an 
MR regime. It is, of course, the prerogative of the individual sovereign nation to decide, however, 
whether a minimal transfer of sovereignty is comparatively acceptable in light of the already existent 
mutual trust and the economic benefits of such an agreement. 
Nicolaidis and Schaffer further the reasoning for mutual trust through the principle of ‘comity’1297. 
The principle communicates ‘the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty 
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and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws”1298. The essence of MR is most definitively propagated through this principle. 
7.3 MRAs: The WTO perspective 
One of the primary principles of the WTO is that of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle1299. 
Accordingly, Article I GATT states, “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of 
all other contracting parties.” 
However, MR regimes are essentially an agreement of preferential treatment. Through a negotiatory 
process, parties to the agreement exclusively recognize the standard of the other for products and 
services that then may be marketed within their jurisdiction. Clearly, there is an element of 
preference meted out to one party with whom there is such a relationship, over another. This could 
have possibly been construed as an advantage as defined under Article I of GATT and thereby, to not 
forward the same advantage is potentially an infringement of the same. 
This, however, cannot be the case by virtue of Article XXIV.5 of the GATT. The Chapeau of Article 
XXIV.5 states: 
“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of 
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of 
an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade 
area;[...]”1300 
Therefore, MRAs have been covered by the GATT through this provision. In terms of third parties, 
there is however a condition provided that must be met by contracting parties. Article XXIV.4 
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recognizes that although the intention behind such an agreement is to “facilitate trade” between 
contracting parties, this should “[not] raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with 
such territories” 1301. 
The EU however, is of the opinion that satisfying the provisions of GATT Article XXIV.5-9 would 
automatically satisfy the requirements of Article XXIV.4. To not increase a level in protection as 
provided for in Article XXIV.5(a) would therefore not lead to any barriers to trade as envisaged in 
Article XXIV.4, thereby eliminating the any cause for action under Article XXIV.41302. 
The contradictory argument to this opinion is that the formation of a custom union or free-trade 
area leading to a new trade measure is invariably an increase in trade barriers and therefore a cause 
for action under Article XXIV.4. The satisfaction of the provisions of Article XXIV.5-9 is immaterial in 
terms of a cause of action through Article XXIV.41303. 
The GATS is more explicit in its acknowledgement of MR. Article VII.1 reads: 
“For the purposes of the fulfilment, in whole or in part, of its standards or criteria for the 
authorisation, licensing or certification of services suppliers, [...] a Member may recognize the 
education or experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certifications granted in a 
particular country. Such recognition, which may be achieved through harmonization or otherwise, 
may be based upon an agreement or arrangement with the country concerned or may be accorded 
autonomously.”1304 
Similar to the Article XXIV of the GATT, GATS Article VII also safeguards the interests of third parties, 
in this case by providing an openness clause, which dictates that such MRAs should provide 
adequate opportunity for third party accession to the agreement1305. Cantore identifies this as a 
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‘multilateral approach to mutual recognition’ that keeps bi- and multilateral MRAs open to new 
members1306. Article VII.3 GATS further safeguards parties outside such agreement by stating:  
“A member shall not accord recognition in a manner which would constitute a means of 
discrimination between countries in the application of its standards or criteria for the 
authorisation, licensing or certification of service suppliers, or a disguised restriction on trade 
in services.”1307 
A secondary problem arises when Article XXIV GATT allows the mutual recognition between 
exclusive parties while other WTO documents forbid it. Trachtman (2002) has extensively 
deliberated on this subject especially regarding the interplay between Article XXIV and the SPS and 
TBT Agreements1308. An example of such conflict arises with Article 2.3 of SPS. Article 2.3 reads: 
“Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, 
including between their own territory and that of other Members.  Sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade.”1309 
Trachtman asks the question whether, if two members have similar SPS standards and one of them 
has an agreement under Article XXIV of GATT with a third member, it would be possible for the third 
member to discriminate against the member which is not part of the agreement1310.  
Article 4 SPS does provide recognition provisions for SPS measures, similar to GATS VII. It states that:  
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“[m]embers shall, upon request, enter into consultations with the aim of achieving bilateral 
and multilateral agreements on recognition of the equivalence of specified sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures.”1311 
Therefore the SPS itself reconciles the idea of mutual recognition. However it is not clear how far the 
right to forming MRAs extends, in order to prevail over the right provided to third party members by 
Article 2.3 SPS. If mutual recognition permits the dilution of the right to Article 2.3 SPS then there 
appears no possibility of further academic argument. However, if it does not, then the initial 
question regarding the conflict between the GATT and other WTO Agreements must be answered.  
The General Interpretive note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement provides that “[i]n the event of 
conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of 
another agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation [...], 
the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.”1312 
Trachtman however further questions whether an overlapping situation as the one envisaged here 
would be considered a ‘conflict’ under the Interpretive Note. He is of the opinion that a ‘conflict’ in 
terms of the Interpretive Note would occur if an agreement (WTO legal text) exclusively forbids 
another and that in this particular situation that is not the case1313. It is submitted here, however, 
that this merely a speculative interpretation and can possibly truly be answered only by further WTO 
jurisprudence. 
However, the Panel report in Turkey - Textiles did provide a glimpse into their interpretation of a 
possible conflict between WTO Agreements by insisting that interpretations of other provisions of 
the WTO does not render Article XXVI.5(a) a ‘nullity’1314. The Panel however, were deliberating on 
the conflict between provisions within the GATT and Article XXIV.5(a) GATT. Whether this 
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deliberation of the Panel extends to other WTO legislations such as the SPS and TBT, is open to 
Interpretation. In Trachtman’s opinion, the SPS and TBT may be seen as extensions of principles 
already prevalent within the GATT, and as such must be considered as part of the text identified 
within the chapeau of Article XXIV.5 stating, “NOTHING in this Agreement shall prevent […]” 
(emphasis added). Therefore according to him SPS and TBT obligations may not prevent the rights 
provided to Member States to form custom unions and free-trade agreements and – by extension of 
this logical interpretation – MRAs1315. Therefore, the WTO may be said to allow mutual recognition 
and thereby MRAs even in the face of a conflict with other WTO provisions. 
7.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this penultimate chapter is to clarify two prominent issues concerning mutual 
recognition and MRAs. Firstly, recognition may be seen an acceptance of the standards of another 
jurisdiction and therefore may imply a direct or indirect transfer of sovereignty. To study the 
dynamics of mutual recognition and agreements based on a transfer of sovereignty, it was necessary 
to address the question of a transfer of sovereignty.  
Secondly, within the context of the WTO, MRAs and agreements with elements of mutual 
recognition could be seen as agreements of preferential treatment. Therefore the potential for 
conflict between the core principle of Most Favoured Nation, and WTO provisions allowing mutual 
recognition had to be explored. This Chapter, therefore, was essential to address either concern in 
order to consider mutual recognition as a viable international environmental policy tool. 
MR may be considered not so much a rule of governance in the normal sense, but a rule of choice of 
governance1316. In such a situation, the sovereignty of a nation is scarcely affected as firstly, national 
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regulations are not superimposed by a separate set of regulations. Secondly, the power allowing for 
the choice of governance is derived from the sovereignty of the nation1317. 
However, this may not be entirely accurate given the processes generated by MR and the social 
outcomes arising from MR regimes1318. In the circumstances MR may rather be considered to be a 
form of ‘governance without government’1319. Nicolaidis and Schaffer tend to agree with this view of 
MR being a form of governance and conclude that it is a necessary manifestation of the chaotic and 
globalized nature of Word Trade1320. Unlike a vertical transfer of sovereignty to the ‘supernational 
level’ as in harmonization, in MR responsibility for the regulation of the chosen sectors is transferred 
to the home state1321 and thereby may be a preferred instrument of economic integration1322.  
It is interesting to note that the inherent mutual negotiation, for the formation of MRAs between 
states is reflective of Interdependent Sovereignty which is concerned with the authority to regulate 
transborder movement of goods, persons, pollutants, diseases and ideas1323. Importantly, a loss of 
interdependent sovereignty reveals a characteristic erosion of control rather than actual 
authority1324. With the advent of globalisation, an increase in online internet transactions and 
because of the redundancy of national borders with regards to natural systems and environmental 
issues, control over a state’s borders has systematically decreased. This, however, does not in any 
way imply a loss of authority as well.  
Thus the question arises whether sovereignty, is seen as a dilution of authority or a dilution of 
control. This is important in the context of MRAs. If sovereignty is considered in terms of the 
authority that governments and states possess then MR cannot be considered an instrument for the 
weakening of sovereign powers as in MR there is no transfer or dilution of authority. However, if 
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sovereignty is considered as a measure of control then relinquishing interdependent sovereignty 
also affects domestic sovereignty considerably. As put forward by Krasner, “if a state cannot regulate 
what passes across its borders, it will not be able to control what happens within them.”1325  
A parallel question that may be asked of MRAs is whether such an agreement results in the 
delegation of sovereign power or the transfer of it. The distinguishing factor between the two lies in 
the degree of revocability of the sovereign powers conferred by the state, in lieu of the 
agreement1326. In the case of the delegation of power, the state continues to have the power to 
revoke conferred rights at its own discretion1327. This is often highlighted in international agreements 
through the availability of a withdrawal clause. If a treaty contains an express withdrawal clause 
stipulating the time frame of withdrawal then it is quite clear that the sovereignty of the party in 
question has been temporarily delegated and is by no means absolute and irreversible1328. The 
Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the Lotus case that in international law the rules 
of law binding upon States are derive from their own free. Thus restrictions upon the independence 
of States ‘cannot therefore be presumed’.1329  
MR may rather be seen as a intermingling of ‘domestic laws to constitute the global’ consisting of an 
intermingling of domestic and international laws.1330 This is similar to the Kantian concept of 
‘cosmopolitan law’, which discusses the obligation of states regarding the citizens of other states1331.  
The underlying idea of a states right to enter into relationships with another state and its citizens 
and the concern and recognition of the effect of decision making outside a state’s jurisdiction are 
inherent facets of the framework of MRAs. The reciprocal concepts of extraterritoriality and comity 
intrinsic to the concept of cosmopolitan law are crucial to the understanding and justification of MR 
in a globalized world. 
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MRAs are mutually negotiated, with an inherent element of reciprocity, and are institutionalized1332. 
Therefore, in terms of environmental standards, parties to the agreement are in constant knowledge 
of the extent to which they may be affected (raising of standards) and the reciprocal benefits they 
may hope to receive in exchange (market access), and yet in a controlled environment of 
negotiations. The transfer of sovereignty is further diluted by the realization of mutual benefit 
through co-operation. For an MR regime to function effectively, both, the home nation as well as the 
host nation is subject to certain responsibilities towards the other. Home nations must consider the 
protection of consumers outside their jurisdiction, while host nations have to take into account the 
effect their decisions may have on home country producers and service providers1333. 
Thus, to see MRAs as a transfer and thus the loss of sovereignty may not be the most conducive way 
of looking at the concept of mutual recognition. Rather, MRAs as a tool of transnational governance 
provides for a convenient mode of governance with minimal dilution of sovereignty, and with 
mutual consideration given to extraterritoriality and comity. 
The next section looked at the compatibility of MRAs with the WTO. MR regimes are essentially an 
agreement of preferential treatment and as such in infringement of Article I of GATT. 
However, Article XXIV.5 of the GATT allows the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area 
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area1334 thereby including MRAs within its fold. 
Article XXIV.4 however, provides a condition to the formation of CUs and FTAs. Although such 
agreements facilitate trade between parties, contracting parties cannot raise barriers to the trade of 
other contracting parties with such territories1335. 
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The intention to safeguard the rights of other Members to the WTO may also be found in other WTO 
legislation. Similar to the Article XXIV of the GATT, GATS Article VII safeguards the interests of third 
parties, by providing that such MRAs should provide adequate opportunity for third party accession 
to the agreement1336. Cantore identifies this as a ‘multilateral approach to mutual recognition’, 
which keeps MRAs open to new members1337.  
It may be the case that other WTO documents are in conflict with Article XXIV.4 of the GATT. Such a 
conflict arises with Article 2.3 of SPS which disallows Members from using their sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures to arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against other Members1338. Thus if 
two members have similar SPS standards and one of them has an agreement under Article XXIV of 
GATT with a third member, it would be possible for the third member to discriminate against the 
member which is not part of the agreement1339.  
The General Interpretive note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement provides that “[i]n the event of 
conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of 
another agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation [...], 
the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.”1340  
The Panel report in Turkey - Textiles discusses the issue of a conflict between WTO Agreements by 
insisting that interpretations of other provisions of the WTO does not render Article XXVI.5(a) a 
‘nullity’1341. The Panel however, were deliberating on the conflict between provisions within the 
GATT and Article XXIV.5(a) GATT and the question remains whether the interpretation extends to 
other WTO legislation such as the SPS and TBT.  
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The SPS Agreement does provide recognition provisions for SPS measures in Article 4.21342, thereby 
reconciling to the idea of mutual recognition. However it is not clear how far the right to forming 
MRAs extends, in order to prevail over the right provided to third party members by Article 2.3 SPS.  
Trachtman is of the opinion that the fact that the chapeau of Article XXIV.5 states, “NOTHING in this 
Agreement shall prevent […]” implies that the SPS and TBT may be seen as extensions of principles 
already prevalent within the GATT. Therefore SPS and TBT obligations may not prevent the rights 
provided to Member States to form custom unions and free-trade agreements and – by extension of 
this logical interpretation – MRAs1343. Therefore, the WTO may be said to allow mutual recognition 
and thereby MRAs even in the face of a conflict with other WTO provisions. 
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This thesis sought to explore the trade related aspects of environmental standards1344, including the 
analysis of ‘environmental standard increasing’ instruments affecting trade (specifically Unilateral 
Environmental Action and Mutual Recognition Agreements). The thesis used a “Black Letter” 
methodology of doctrinal analysis, concentrating on doctrinal principles associated with the 
transnational governance of environmental standards. 
The thesis assessed the potential for trade related friction between developed and developing 
countries arising out of normative environmental processes implementing environmental standards 
such as Unilateral Environmental Action (UEA)1345. Considering this potential for friction and its 
effect on environmental standards, the thesis examined Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) as 
a trade instrument with the potential to reduce such friction while implementing environmental 
standards1346.  
In terms of the novel approach found in this thesis - the thesis constructed a definition of standard 
through the works of Dworkin1347, to create a broader scope of the analysis of standards in relation 
to MRAs, than may be found in existing literature.  
Furthermore, as stated in the introduction to the thesis, available literature analyses the 
characteristics of MRAs and some literature is available on the relationship between environmental 
standards and MRAs. Where this thesis is different is in attempting to understand how the 
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characteristics of MRAs may potentially be utilized to combine a reduction in friction in international 
trade with the implementation of standards.  
Environmental standards are a contentious issue in international trade. The very definition of 
environmental standards is ambiguous. Depending on the definition used for standards in general 
and environmental standards specifically, could lead to a varying scope as seen in Chapter 2 Section 
2.31348. Further, Section 2.3.11349 has shown that the difficulty in arriving at a consensual decision on 
international environmental standards is further complicated by environment and trade related 
political friction between sovereign states in trade. 
Chapter 3 Section 3.4.21350 has shown that once the reasons behind such friction are identified, it 
then becomes possible to analyse policy instruments which propagate or encourage consensus in 
defining environmental standards, and assess and compare such instruments to highlight the 
characteristics that may be more conducive to reducing international trade related disputes in 
environmental matters and thereby more efficient in increasing environmental standards. As we saw 
in Section 3.4.2 an important assumption made here, of course, is that, given that environmental 
objectives remain the same, if an instrument is hindered by international opposition, it is 
detrimental to the efficiency of the instrument. 
The two international environmental standards propagating instruments chosen for discussion in 
this thesis are UEAs, and MRAs1351. As we say in Chapter 5 Section 5.31352, UEAs being unilateral in 
nature, and thereby often an imposition of environmental standards of one jurisdiction/state on 
another, afford us the opportunity to identify certain characteristics that may create issues of 
sovereignty and compatibility with international law. The issue of sovereignty was looked at in 
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Section 5.3.11353. We saw that sovereignty has several elements which influence the discussion on 
unilateral action including the sovereign right of a country to act unilaterally and the consequences if 
such a right is invasive to the interests of another country. There are of course situations where such 
unilateral action is justified by a state exercising its sovereign powers as discussed in Section 5.3.1.  
Using examples of identified characteristics such as the lack of negotiations, and the suspicion of 
protectionism in multilateral agreements which lead to international friction or even disputes, the 
thesis then looked at the concept of mutual recognition (MR) and MRAs and analysed two specific 
agreements, Japan-US and the NAFTA1354. The intention of this part of the discussion in this thesis 
was to show how the MR provisions within each analysed agreement have been more beneficial in 
terms of agreeing environmental standards and balancing sovereignty than pure trade related DSB 
disputes (UEAs) such as US - Shrimp and US – Tuna.  
The thesis then argued in Chapter 7 Section 7.3 that MR could be agreed as a form of preferential 
trade agreement but allowed as an exception under the GATT1355. MR therefore could be considered 
as a form of an exception under WTO rules. By observing this exception, the thesis implies that 
friction in environmental disputes arising through the DSB could then be avoided due to its WTO 
compatibility. Allowing for the previous assumption that an environmental instrument hindered due 
to international friction is detrimental to its own efficiency, a negotiated instrument like MR which 
reduces friction may potentially lead to more efficient standards. 
In this concluding chapter we summarise the arguments made in the thesis assessing whether MRAs 
can indeed be substituted for UEAs in certain situations while maintaining the objectives of the 
environmental standard. Simultaneously, the thesis also assesses whether MRAs are able to avoid 
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the imposition of host country standards on another jurisdiction/state, because of their inherent 
characteristic of negotiations and ‘other-regarding’1356 manner. 
8.2 Standards as Defined in the Thesis 
In Chapter 2 the thesis attempts to create a definition of the term ‘standards’ from the broad range 
of definitions available for consideration1357. The thesis then looks at ‘environmental standards’ in 
detail1358. In the following paragraphs we summarise the discussion surrounding the definition of the 
terms ‘standards’ followed by ‘environmental standards’. 
In Chapter 2 Section 2.31359, we look at the definition of standards as proposed by Dworkin1360. 
Dworkin’s concept of ‘standards’ which includes principles, rules and policies allows a broad scope of 
the definition of standards. On the other hand the more functional definition provided by the ISO1361 
is excessively specific, and pertains to only certain forms of standards1362. Therefore certain 
provisions in International Law, such as Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration1363 or Article 4(b) of UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)1364 would fall within the Dworkinian definition of 
standards but not within the specific definition of the ISO.  
The thesis has discussed these various definitions concluding that standards in this thesis will be 
considered to be a general assortment of rules, principles and policies in the ‘Dworkinian’ sense. This 
broad definition of standards does not limit environmental standards to legally enforceable limits, 
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but rather extends the definition to certain principles found in environmental law, which due to the 
character of international environmental law, are often relegated to ‘soft law’1365. 
Having looked at various approaches to defining the concept of ‘standards’, the thesis then looked in 
Chapter 2 Section 2.3.11366, at the specific category of environmental standards and their 
classification. One categorization of environmental standards can be found in the 21st Report of the 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution1367. The Report defines environmental standards as 
“any judgement about the acceptability of environmental modifications resulting from human 
activities which fulfil both the following conditions: (1) It is formally stated after some consideration 
and intended to apply generally to a defined class of cases and; (2) because of its relationship to 
certain sanctions, rewards or values, it can be expected to assert an influence, direct or indirect, on 
activities that affect the environment”1368 
The use of the word ‘judgement’, rather than specifying a document (such as in the ISO definition of 
standards), illustrates a tendency, not dissimilar to this thesis, to broaden the scope of the definition 
of environmental standards in order to be inclusive of standards considered to be within the realm 
of ‘soft law’1369.   
The forms of environmental standards are divided into standards related to ‘pathway points’ of a 
substance and their effect on contact with an ‘entity susceptible to damage’ at that point1370, and 
standards indirectly related to environmental modification1371. Pathway point standards include 
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Environmental quality standards, emission standards and product standards, while examples of 
indirect standards would include process standards and life-cycle analysis standards1372.  
8.3 Standards in International Trade 
Having defined environmental standards in the context of the thesis, the next important issue in the 
trade related aspects of international environmental standards was to understand why the demand 
for higher environmental standards usually flows from developed to developing countries. It is 
important to note at this point that this thesis, for example as discussed in detail at Section 3.2, does 
not imply that developing countries do not demand high environmental standards themselves, but 
rather that the general trend is for a demand for higher standards from larger economies 
(States)1373. Thus through Section 3.2 we saw that to be able to correlate higher environmental 
standards with higher economic growth allows for an analysis of instruments propagating 
environmental standards while reducing North-South friction arising from this demand for higher 
standards1374. 
Chapter 3 started with the concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) which graphed a 
correlation between per capita income of a nation and environmental deterioration1375. The EKC 
includes a Turning Point Index (TPI) on the graph beyond which an increasing per capita income 
leads to a decrease in environmental degradation, thereby suggesting an increase in environmental 
standards. This implies that the demand for increased environmental standards is found more often 
in countries beyond the TPI (generally developed countries) with a higher economic growth scale 
(per capita income)1376. Section 3.2.11377 suggests an explanation to this phenomenon through 
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Inglehart’s theory of ‘post-materialism’1378. According to the theory, as society evolves with rising per 
capita income, ‘materialistic’ values of economic and physical security are substituted by ‘post-
materialistic’ values1379 or “quality of life issues”1380. 
Section 3.2.2 however, finds certain academics to be sceptical of such a simplistic correlation 
between environmental standards and economic growth1381. Krutilla, for example, is of the opinion 
that an increased demand for environmental standards does not necessarily result in a higher 
standard of living1382. Esty1383, Stern1384 and Martinez-Alier1385 argue that a more complex dynamic 
exists between trade and environmental standards which include the components of ‘technique, 
composition and scale’1386. This thesis therefore argues that the relationship between environmental 
standards and economic growth exists in a model similar to the EKC if we superimpose the argument 
of the three additional components on the EKC. In other words technique composition and scale 
must be taken into consideration when considering the relationship between trade and 
environment1387. 
A further consideration made in the trade – environment context is the ‘anthropocentric – 
ecocentric cleavage’1388. This cleavage relates to the basis of environmental concern from which 
arise environmental action and standards. Understanding these concepts allows an insight into the 
nature of environmental concern. An overtly anthropocentric outlook may lead to a prioritization of 
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trade over environmental concerns. It also provides an insight into the way trade related 
environmental issues may be addressed in international forums such as the WTO.  
8.4 The WTO and Environmental Standards 
It is important to illustrate first why the WTO is the primary international forum considered in this 
discussion of environmental standards and international instruments implementing such standards. 
The presence of the DSB provides the WTO with a strong dispute resolution mechanism, which 
makes it an important organisation in the trade – environment discussion. Compared to the UNEP, 
which also provides policy related to trade and environment, the WTO holds a distinct advantage 
because of its effective dispute settlement abilities. The relatively successful implementation of 
awards arising of DSB judgments provides the WTO an edge in effectiveness over other international 
dispute resolution bodies such as the ICJ1389.  
However, this thesis does highlight the drawbacks of considering the WTO as a forum to consider 
environmental policy1390. The most obvious drawback with the WTO is that is it primarily a trade 
organisation1391. The WTO prioritizes trade efficiency and therefore one may be cautious of their 
environmental inclinations. Due to the WTO’s trade inclinations, Section 3.4.1 discusses the WTO 
regulations relevant to this topic1392. Another drawback is that within the WTO there is the dual 
committee structure addressing environmental standards – the CTE and the TBT Committee. The 
UNEP, in its 2005 study on eco labels, commented on the inefficiency of this structure as the CTE has 
no authority to implement changes while the TBT Committee is uninterested in the development of 
environmentally inclined standards (the report spoke specifically of ecolabels)1393.  
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However, notwithstanding such drawbacks, the influence and importance of jurisprudence 
surrounding WTO regulation related to environmental standards affecting trade, is substantial. 
Therefore, the relevant WTO regulations have been considered in this thesis. 
Although the definition of standards has been considered earlier, given the importance of the WTO, 
a separate discussion analysis is made regarding the WTO definition of standards. As the WTO is not 
a standards setting body, but rather functions as a legal regime supervising their effects on trade, 
the WTO is dependent on listed international standardization bodies for its definition of 
‘international standards’. WTO case-law such as the US – Tuna II (Mexico) case acknowledges the 
standards of specific international standard setting bodies and organisations1394. Furthermore, the 
TBT and SPS Agreements of the WTO, also consider the standards formulated by the listed 
international standardization organisations as international standards1395.  
This necessitates an identification of relevant international standards organisations. The SPS 
Agreement endorses the use of international standards, guidelines or recommendations1396 to 
harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures. These international standards organisations are 
listed in Annex A paragraph 3 of the SPS Agreement1397 and as such are the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (food safety), International Office of Epizootics (animal health and zoonoses), the 
Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention in cooperation with regional 
organisations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention 
(plant health), and other relevant international organisations for matters not covered by the above 
organisations.1398 
                                                          
1394
 See for example the Panel’s acknowledgement of the ISO/IEC Guide 2 definition of international standards in United 
States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (Report of the Appellate 
Body) (16 May 2012) WTO WT/DS381/AB/R (US – Tuna II (Mexico)) Para 7.663 
1395
 See Chapter 3 Section 3.4.1 Drawbacks of the WTO. 
1396
 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/12 (SPS 
Agreement), Article 3.1 
1397
 European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (16 January 1998) (Appellate 
Body) WT/DS321/AB/R (EC – Hormones) (AB) Para 532. 
1398
 SPS Agreement Annex A.3. 
278 
 
The TBT Agreement defines standards in terms of mandatory and voluntary. However, the 
terminology used in the TBT Agreement is slightly different. A mandatory standard within the TBT 
Agreement is referred to as a ‘Technical regulation’ whilst a voluntary standard is referred to as a 
‘Standard’1399: This connection has later been highlighted by the AB in European Communities – 
Trade Description of Sardines1400. 
As we saw in Chapter 2 Section 2.4 the TBT Agreement does not specify any standards setting 
organisations1401. However, documents such as the ‘Proposed GATT Code of Conduct for Preventing 
Technical Barriers to Trade’1402, the ‘List of International Standardizing Bodies for purposes of 
Articles 10.4 and 13.3 of the Agreement’1403, the ‘Information provided by bodies involved in the 
preparation of international standards’1404 and the ‘Second TBT Triennial Review of the Operation 
and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade’1405 do provide for such 
organisations in relation to the TBT Agreement. Section 2.4 listed the organisations most relevant to 
a discussion on environmental standards to be – the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), ISO, 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the OECD, the World Organisation of Animal Health (OIE), the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE)1406. 
Another relevant issue addressed in the thesis was the compatibility of environmental standards 
with the WTO regime. This was discussed at Chapter 2 Section 2.3.3.11407. The compatibility issues 
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arise primarily due to GATT Article XI.1. A reading of various WTO jurisprudence revealed that 
standards may indeed be in violation of Article XI GATT, however, there is an exception for standards 
within Article XI.2(b). According to Article XI.2(b) the provisions of Article XI.1 do not extend to the 
“Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or 
regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade;”1408 
The subject matter of standards under the WTO regime, especially under the GATT may be deduced 
through the provisions of General Exceptions Article XX (GATT) as well.  
Importantly, the level of standard, of course, may be determined by the Member State itself1409. 
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement “affirm that it is up to the Members to decide which policy 
objectives they wish to pursue and the levels at which they wish to pursue them.”1410 This is in line 
with the hypothesis of Lowest Common Standard (LCS) suggested in this thesis, which is often 
determined by negotiation in agreement containing environmental standards1411.  
However once such a level has been determined, Article 4 of the SPS Agreement1412 and similarly 
Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement1413 encourage Members to acknowledge regulations of other 
Members as equivalent if the objectives of the regulations remain the same. This is indeed 
convenient for the dynamics of a MRA as equivalence in the face of similar objectives is the hallmark 
of mutual recognition and one that allows separate jurisdictions to consider domestic dynamics 
when formulating policy for similar objectives1414.  
Although Article XI does set an exception for standards, these standards are limited to ‘the 
classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade’1415. Yet the AB decision of 
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Australia – Salmon1416 and the Panel decision of EC – Sardines1417 note the prerogative given to 
member states, to determine their chosen level of environmental protection through policy 
objectives, in the SPS and TBT Agreement respectively. Therefore, it stands to reason, that policy 
objectives which do not fall under the exceptions of Article XI.2(b) would need to be excepted 
elsewhere through a legislative mandate.  
The GATT provides for such an exception through its General Exceptions clause in Article XX. The 
provisions relevant to environmental standards particularly are Article XX(b), (g) and the Chapeau. 
These three provisions1418, when analysed in the various disputes, reveal several principles that 
determine the justifiability of a standard. 
In the analysis of UEIs and MRAs one of the predominant discussions has been that of the question 
of sovereignty arising from extraterritorial application of a State’s environmental standards. 
Standards condition access to a Member State’s market by imposing conditions on Member States 
wishing to access these markets. The DSB does address the issue of ‘extraterritoriality’ in   United 
States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products stating that the conditioning of 
access to a Member’s domestic market may be a common aspect of measures invoking Article XX1419. 
In such circumstances imposing policies that set a certain level of standards for imported goods may 
be justified under Article XX of the GATT. In other words, extraterritorial application of 
environmental standards may not be an issue as long as the standard can be justified under the 
provisions of Article XX. 
Justifying a measure under Article XX is a two-tiered procedure subject to the tests of a specific 
provision followed by justification under the Chapeau of Article XX as stated by the AB in US - 
                                                          
1416
 Australia – Salmon (AB) Para 205 
1417
 EC – Sardines (AB) Para 7.120 
1418
 As mentioned earlier the term ‘provisions’ is used loosely here to include the Chapeau, which is not a provision of 
Article XX in the strictest sense, but an inherent part of its application. 
1419
 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Report of the Appellate Body) (12 October 
1998) WT/DS58/AB/R (US – Shrimp) (AB) 
281 
 
Shrimp1420 and United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Report of 
the Appellate Body) 1421.  
Other than a justification under the Chapeau, a measure invoking Article XX(b) must demonstrate 
that the policy objective of the measures is designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
and that it is necessary to fulfil the policy objective1422.  
Whether a measure is designed to protect human, animal or plant health is determined by the DSB 
according to the facts of each individual case and may include the design, architecture and structure 
of the measure1423 and the policy goal it purports to serve1424. 
In terms of necessity, it is not the necessity of the policy goal that is required to be examined but the 
necessity of the particular measure to achieve such policy goal1425. This ensures the earlier discussed 
point that the level of environmental protection is determined by the State while the instrument of 
protection is examined for validity under WTO provisions. 
Once the measure to be examined has been isolated, its necessity is determined, by three factors – 
its ‘indispensability’, its ‘restrictive effect on international trade’ and the availability of ‘alternative 
measures’. ‘Indispensability’ dictates that the greater the contribution of the measure to its 
objectives, the more easily might it be considered to be ‘necessary’1426.  
A severe ‘restrictive effects on international trade’ would make the justification of ‘necessity’ 
difficult, and it would have to be satisfactorily shown to make a material contribution to the 
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achievement of the objective1427. This illustrates the inclination of the WTO to prioritize trade over 
environmental issues as discussed under the drawbacks of considering WTO for environmental 
policy.  
In terms of the availability of ‘alternative measures’ a measure is ‘necessary’, if an alternative 
measure not ‘reasonably available’. However, if an alternative GATT consistent measure is not 
available, a Member State is obliged to use a measure which entails the least degree of 
inconsistency with other GATT provisions’1428. On the other hand, a Member State cannot be 
expected to use an alternative measure if that measure would allow the continuation of the risk that 
the environmental objective seeks to address1429. Such an alternative measure would prevent a 
Member State from achieving its chosen level of protection1430. 
The two questions asked of an analysis of Article XX(g) are the scope of the terms ‘exhaustible 
natural resources’ and ‘relating to’. The term ‘exhaustible natural resources’, includes living 
resources1431 which allows environmental standards related to conservation efforts and those 
ensuring the safety and sustainability of species, to be analysed under the provision1432.  
The term ‘relating to’ broadens the scope of Article XX(g) even further. By virtue of the term, not 
only are ‘necessary’ measures covered by the provision, but a much wider range of measures which 
are ‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource1433. 
The purpose and object of the Chapeau is to prevent the abuse of the provisions1434 by guarding 
against ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ and ‘disguised restriction on international trade’. 
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The analysis of what constitutes ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ and ‘disguised restriction’ 
also highlights certain important factors required in international trade important for the reduction 
of international friction. In the further analysis of instruments implementing environmental 
standards, UEIs and MRAs are scrutinized especially to observe the degree to which these factors are 
available.  
Negotiation is an important indicator of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination. The failure to 
cooperate with the governments of effected Member States and to not consider the cost of a 
measure on parties affected by such measure would indicate arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination1435. 
The consideration for the domestic conditions of third parties is another factor. Although it has been 
determined above that WTO provisions allow the extraterritorial effect of measures there are limits 
to such permission. As we saw in the discussion of Chapter 4 Section 4.5.11436 of this thesis, it is not 
acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to 
require other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory programme, to 
achieve a certain policy goal, without taking into consideration different conditions which may occur 
in the territories of those other Members1437. 
Lastly, another factor determining the conditions of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination is the 
similar criteria applied to all effected Member states. Member States are required to provide 
objective criteria for any discrimination.1438 Discrimination due to obligations to an international 
body cannot be counted as ‘objective criteria and would be considered ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination’1439. This is reminiscent of the MFN principle of the WTO, which calls for equal 
treatment of all its members. Keeping the above factors determining the compatibility of standards 
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with the WTO in mind, this thesis then looked at UEIs and MRAs; assessing them against WTO 
compatibility and efficiency in addressing environmental issues. 
8.5 Unilateral Environmental Action 
A common feature of UEAs is the aspect of independent action, disassociated from the actions or 
interests of other involved or concerned parties. The nature of unilateral action implies that States 
may consult and may even consider the interests of these other nation states but this creates no 
obligations for the fulfilment of such considerations.  
However, as seen above due to the requirement of ‘necessity’ in WTO law there is an actual 
obligation to consult with all interested parties before any policy implementation1440. Therefore, any 
action not taken with collective will is generally looked upon suspiciously1441. 
As we saw in Chapter 5 Section 5.31442, Reisman observed that, often such an action, is justified (or 
attempted to be justified) through a claim of legality whereby, the pertinent legal system allows 
such unilateral acts in certain circumstances or on condition that substantive tests of lawfulness are 
met, where the circumstances for the particular unilateral act are claimed to be appropriate and the 
act, despite its procedural irregularities, has purportedly complied with the relevant substantive 
requirements of lawfulness1443. 
The question of substance carries far more weight than the procedural aspect in the case of 
unilateral action1444. This may be a convenient characteristic of standard raising instruments when 
one considers the global urgency to raise environmental standards. The factor of time necessitates 
quick action that may otherwise be hindered with procedural pedantry. MRAs especially in the form 
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of the New Approach too, allow for flexibility regarding procedural differences, by considering the 
objective of a regulation1445. This allows for differences in national laws and regulations as long as 
their objectives are similar in substance. The difference of course is that MRAs do not impose 
standards unilaterally. However, this also means that the procedural delays that unilateral action 
avoids are unavoidable in MRAs due to the necessity of negotiations. 
Yet an attempt to justify unilateral action may not always be successful for the very existence of 
procedural irregularities. This thesis gave the example of the US – Tuna/Dolphin I dispute where in 
the face of increasing Dolphin mortality rates, as a consequence of certain identified methods of 
Tuna fishing, the actions of the US government certainly could not be said to be inappropriate. 
However, after the US government labelling requirements were instituted, it was procedural 
irregularities (extra-jurisdictional regulation) that eventually led the DSB to strike down the disputed 
US federal laws1446.   
There are of course, instances where states may be allowed unilateral action. The dictates of 
Permanent Sovereignty allow State’s the right to utilize and exploit resources and such rights are 
owned in perpetuity by the state in which such natural resources are found1447. However, such a 
right leads to certain issues involving the rights of other states. 
The ICJ, in the Corfu Channel Case, states that it is, “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly 
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”1448. The ICJ also recognizes this 
international obligation in the earlier Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) case, and 
states that such obligation can only be ignored by invoking ‘necessity’ in the face of ‘grave and 
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imminent peril’1449. ILC’s draft articles on ‘Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities’ provide that ‘the state of origin’ shall be the one to take appropriate action to prevent 
transboundary harm1450. Similar principles have also been expressed in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development1451 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)1452.  
The question of ‘necessity’ as stipulated by the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, of course leads us again 
to the principle of necessity found in WTO jurisprudence. The several WTO case-law provided in this 
thesis relate to the discussion of necessity arising from unilateral action which were forthwith 
disputed by other Member States and are indicative of the grievances arising from such unilateral 
imposition of standards1453. The lack of necessity in several of the cases analysed also indicate the 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ and a ‘disguised restriction on trade’ as stipulated by the 
Chapeau to Article XX. This implies a lack of negotiations or even consultation. This requirement for 
the judicial services of the Dispute Settlement Body also indicates international friction and 
therefore validates the previously discussed connection between negotiations and international 
friction1454.  
Furthermore, these cases also indicate the reduced market access as a result of unilateral action. 
They are a direct result of barriers to international trade. Such barriers result in the economic 
grievances of other Member states to the WTO. Market access, is a necessary factor, as firstly, 
barriers to such access exacerbates the problems of international friction. Secondly, trade 
obligations of WTO members and the presence of a strong trade dispute settlement mechanism, 
coupled with weak, confusing and segregated international environmental accountability 
mechanisms often results in a greater position of trade issues over environmental issues. Therefore, 
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an instrument increasing environmental standards, which becomes a barrier to trade, will often be 
afforded a lesser priority over market access obligations and may be struck down or weakened.  
This therefore requires an alternative measure that is less trade restrictive. In light of this 
requirement the thesis looks at MRAs as one such alternative which may contain the characteristics 
to both propagate environmental standards while allowing states to consider a flexible approach to 
environmental objectives which are less disruptive of domestic needs. This latter facet would in turn 
reduce environment related trade disputes. 
8.6 Mutual Recognition Agreements 
In order to look at mutual recognition in the international context the thesis in Section 6.31455, 
looked most closely at the categorization set by Pelkmans where he divides mutual recognition into 
what he calls “Judicial MR” as well as the Old Approach and the New Approach, which he calls 
‘Regulatory MR’1456. The thesis concentrates most on the concept of New Approach due to the 
flexibility it affords towards meeting environmental objective while keeping domestic conditions in 
mind – a facet convenient to international trade as it may reduce international disputes arising from 
an otherwise requirement of strict adherence to environmental standards. 
In the Old Approach, MR is achieved by a strict harmonization of the regulations of the participating 
countries1457. It is inflexible and impractical in the International sense given the myriad of variables 
and permutations to be considered. The New Approach, alternatively, considers the equivalence of 
the regulatory objectives of the participating countries rather than the actual regulatory 
instruments1458. If the comparative regulatory instruments have the same regulatory objective then 
mutual recognition can be achieved. It is this flexible form of mutual recognition that is important in 
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the international context primarily because of the previously mentioned four factors. The thesis then 
looked towards actual mutual recognition agreements in the backdrop of these factors to analyse 
whether it is the optimal instrument necessary to increase Environmental Standards1459.  
The increase of environmental standards through mutual recognition agreements may occur in two 
identifiable areas of the negotiated instrument. These are either in the pre-agreement negotiations 
or in the negotiated text of the agreement. Often, the text of the agreement will reflect the 
intention of the parties, pre-agreement. An example provided in the thesis of this above point is the 
pre-NAFTA negotiations, where the apprehension of Mexico’s lower standards entering the US-
Canada Free Trade Agreement (the predecessor to the NAFTA), led to the parties deciding on the 
NAFTA side agreements on labour and environmental standards (such as the NAAEC)1460. Similarly, 
the 2002 equivalence recognition agreement between the US and Japan sought to ban the use of 
certain substances in organic in organic food products to be imported into Japan due to Japan’s 
higher standards of organic food products1461. The US even considered a general ban on the 
substances in order to have one set of rules for their domestic producers1462.  
Furthermore both sets of agreement show the potential for mutual recognition in the international 
context lies in designing ‘managed’ MRAs – a concept propagated by Nicolaidis1463. We discuss 
‘managed’ MRAs in Section 6.3.21464. By formulating managed agreements, the parties are allowed 
to withhold certain host country sovereignty by determining the minimal level of standards required 
for import. Not only does this allay fears of diluting sovereignty through extraterritorial home 
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country rules, but also, the minimal standard determination increases the lowest common standards 
(LCS) between the parties.  
The thesis considers the issue of sovereignty and MRAs in Section 7.21465. It is important to assess 
whether MR may be considered not so much a rule of governance in the normal sense, but a rule of 
choice of governance. Trachtman is of the opinion that MR is more a choice of governance1466. In 
such a situation, the sovereignty of a nation is scarcely affected as firstly, national regulations are 
not superimposed by a separate set of regulations. Secondly, the power allowing for the choice of 
governance is derived from the sovereignty of the nation1467. 
Maduro1468 and Nicolaidis and Schaffer1469 however disagree given the processes generated by MR 
and the social outcomes arising from MR regimes. In the circumstances, MR may rather be 
considered to be a form of ‘governance without government’. Schmidt points out that unlike a 
vertical transfer of sovereignty to the ‘supernational level’, in MR responsibility for the regulation of 
the chosen sectors is transferred to the home state1470. 
However, if such a transfer of sovereignty is seen in the light of interdependent sovereignty, which is 
concerned with the authority to regulate transborder movement of goods, persons, pollutants, 
diseases and ideas1471, there appears to be an erosion of control rather than actual authority1472. The 
thesis therefore explored the question whether the transfer of sovereignty in the context of MRAs, is 
seen as a dilution of authority or a dilution of control1473.  
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If sovereignty is considered in terms of the authority that governments and states possess then MR 
cannot be considered an instrument for the weakening of sovereign powers as, in MR there is no 
transfer or dilution of authority. However, if sovereignty is considered as a measure of control then 
relinquishing interdependent sovereignty also affects domestic sovereignty considerably because to 
not be able to regulate what passes across borders may lead to a dilution of the control over what 
happens within borders1474.  
Another pertinent way of looking at the issue of the transfer of sovereignty in the context of MRAs is 
whether such an agreement results in the delegation of sovereign power or the transfer of it. The 
distinguishing factor between the two lies in the degree of revocability of the sovereign powers 
conferred by the state, in lieu of the agreement. In the case of the delegation of power, the state 
continues to have the power to revoke conferred rights at its own discretion1475. Thus restrictions 
upon the independence of States ‘cannot therefore be presumed’.1476  
MR may rather be seen in light of the Kantian concept of ‘cosmopolitan law’, which discusses the 
obligation of states regarding the citizens of other states1477. The framework of MRAs allows the idea 
of a state’s right to enter into relationships with another state and to consider the effect of decision 
making outside a state’s jurisdiction.  
The reciprocal concepts of extraterritoriality and comity intrinsic to the concept of cosmopolitan law 
are crucial to the understanding and justification of MR in a globalized world. MRAs are mutually 
negotiated, with an inherent element of reciprocity, and are institutionalized1478. Therefore, in terms 
of environmental standards, parties to the agreement are in constant knowledge of the extent to 
which they may be affected (raising of standards) and the reciprocal benefits they may hope to 
receive in exchange (market access), and yet in a controlled environment of negotiations.  
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The transfer of sovereignty is further diluted by the realization of mutual benefit through co-
operation. For an MR regime to function effectively, both, the home nation as well as the host 
nation is subject to certain responsibilities towards the other. Home nations must consider the 
protection of consumers outside their jurisdiction, while host nations have to take into account the 
effect their decisions may have on home country producers and service providers1479.  
The potential of MRAs in raising standards is therefore aided by a globalized interconnected market. 
Global market links and lucrative markets create incentives to join agreements that reduce market 
barriers to trade. MRAs are such agreements reducing trade barriers. As mentioned before, MRAs 
also have consequential increase in environmental standards. Therefore, a third party wishing to join 
such an agreement is obliged to increase their standards. As mentioned above, negotiation power 
may be a factor in the level of LCS, which may be significantly higher if the market that a country 
wants to join is already bigger due to a pre-existing agreement. 
This was the case with Mexico wanting to join the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. In order for 
NAFTA to be agreed to, Mexico was pressed into agree to the NAFTA side-agreements of labour and 
environmental standards as well. The barriers still prevalent in such international trade agreements 
do, however, serve to safeguard the legitimate environmental interests of parties to agreements. 
The diverse levels of environmental standards in international trade necessitate so. The barriers also 
serve the purpose of incentivising countries to raise their level of standards in order to enter 
markets with higher standards, thereby continuously increasing the LCS as more trade agreements 
are formulated amongst nations and country groupings.   
The thesis shows how the Organic products chain also has the potential to create such dynamics1480. 
Consider the example of India in the Organic production chain. India has the largest number of 
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organic producers in the world1481. Its organic regulations are formulated by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry through the National Programme for Organic Production (NPOP)1482. India 
and the US have an MRA on certifying agents of Organic food products thereby allowing easier 
access to each other’s markets1483. 
Therefore both Japanese and Indian organic products have a common market in the US. Indian 
organic products entering the US market through mutual recognition of standards would 
theoretically be of equivalent levels to Japanese standards or at the very least compatible to the US 
import requirements. However, India and Japan do not yet have such an agreement between 
themselves.  If the MRA between the US and Japan was a ‘pure’ MR1484, instead of the current 
‘managed’ one, products entering one market would have to be allowed into the other1485. The other 
alternative of course is also a ‘managed’ MR between India and Japan (similar to the US – Japan 
agreement).  
8.7 Recommendations 
As mentioned previously in this thesis, the objective was to find an ‘environmental standard 
implementing’ instrument which may help in reducing friction arising between trading nations, due 
to a difference in environmental standards. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a limitation to this thesis is 
that it does not seek a more efficient environmental standard but rather looks at the method of 
implementation and the consequences of the instruments used on the relationship between 
developed and developing countries1486. Although the thesis does address the reasons for friction 
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between countries, its primary aim is to analyse certain trade instruments that may alleviate such 
friction between developed and developing countries while propagating environmental standards. 
In that regard, the thesis has analysed both UEAs and MRAs to highlight the advantages and 
disadvantages of either instrument. The thesis now recommends a combination of ‘managed’ MR 
and ‘regulatory’ MR as such an instrument which is conducive to international trade related 
environmental standards and the dynamics surrounding such a relationship.  The ‘managed’ MR 
dimension allows for the host country to set its standards pre-negotiation. The ‘regulatory’ MR 
dimension allows for the flexibility in international standard setting agreements where the objective 
of the parties is given importance, thus providing regulatory space for domestic conditions of the 
standard implementing country1487. It is this combination of Pelkman’s ‘regulatory’ MR and 
Nicolaidis’ ‘managed MR’ which is hypothesised in this thesis to be most conducive to international 
MRAs. We highlight certain factors previously discussed within this chapter to illustrate the 
propensity of such a combined form of MRA to allow for certain conditions to prevail. 
The primary reason for MRAs causing less friction amongst countries is the negotiatory nature of 
MRAs. UEAs on the other hand are invasive and impose standards extra jurisdictionally. The nature 
of unilateral action implies that States may consult and may even consider the interests of these 
other nation states but this creates no obligations for the fulfilment of such considerations.  
However, there does exist a WTO obligation to negotiate between countries and this stems from the 
requirement of ‘necessity’ found in Article XX(b)1488. Furthermore, the failure to cooperate with the 
governments of effected Member States and to not consider the cost of a measure on parties 
affected by such measure would indicate arbitrary or unjustified discrimination. An MRA negotiated 
to be compatible with such WTO conditions would be ‘managed’ according to the definition of the 
term.  
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Pre-agreement negotiations allow host countries to set their own level of standards. This is also in 
line with WTO legislation and jurisprudence. Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement “affirm that it is up to 
the Members to decide which policy objectives they wish to pursue and the levels at which they 
wish to pursue them” and the AB confirms this in Australia – Salmon1489. The concept of Lowest 
Common Standard (LCS) suggested in this thesis, is determined by negotiation in agreement 
containing environmental standards.  
Another probable reason for a combined MRA to be successful is the ‘regulatory’ MR characteristic 
of giving importance to the objective of the standard rather than the procedural aspect. This allows 
for flexibility in international trade relations where an environmental objective may be achieved 
keeping home state conditions and circumstances in mind.  
Furthermore, Article 4 of the SPS Agreement and Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement encourage 
Members to acknowledge regulations of other Members as equivalent if the objectives of the 
regulations remain the same.  
Thus this penchant for the combined form of MRAs to consider the host nation level of standards 
and the home nation environmental circumstances when achieving them is reminiscent of the 
Kantian cosmopolitan law as suggested by Nicolaidis.  
Being instruments of trade and due to the constant vigilance towards WTO compatibility it is only 
natural for the thesis to further recommend that the ideal forum for introducing and negotiating 
such MRAs would be the WTO. As has been discussed in this thesis, the presence of the DSB 
provides the WTO with a strong dispute resolution mechanism. Furthermore, MRAs have been 
covered by the GATT through Article XXIV.51490. The thesis of course merely looks at the WTO 
compatibility of MRAs and does not discuss the WTO as the ideal forum under which to negotiate 
agreement. This is a greater research topic ideal for further research. 
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The thesis does, however, recommend the combined form of ‘managed’ and ‘regulatory’ MRAs as a 
policy instrument in international trade. It encourages a further review of this form of MRA which 
may help in propagating environmental standards while alleviating fears of protectionism (due to 
the negotiatory nature of the instrument) and thereby aiding in the reduction of developed and 
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U.S. Department of Agriculture
February 6, 2001
Dear Mr. Yates,
I appreciate your cooperation in examining equivalency of organic products grading system in
the U.S. to that in Japan.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in Japan (hereinafter referred to as
"MAFF" ) recognizes that the grading system of organic agricultural products and organic
agricultural products processed food (hereinafter referred to as "organic products") in the
U.S., which is stipulated in National Organic Program, is equivalent to the grading system of
organic products under the Japanese Agricultural Standard stipulated in Articles 15-7 and
19-6-4 of the Law Concerning Standardization and Proper Labeling of Agricultural and
Forestry Products.
In order to maintain equivalency and ensure consumers' confidence in organic products sold
in Japan, the MAFF would like to conftrm that the competent authorities of the U.S.
Government have the following intentions:
1 In case the U.S. side amends the above-mentioned Program, to notify the Japanese side of
the contents of the amendment in advance;
2 To provide the Japanese side, upon request, with as much information as practicable
including that related to whether the inspection and certification system on organic products is
properly implemented in the U.S.;
3 In case the Japanese side notifies in advance the U.S. side of its inspection plan on the
Registered Foreign Certification Organizations in the U.S., to cooperate in such inspection, as
much as practicable; and
4 To take necessary action to prevent the use of the following substances in organic
products which will be exported to Japan.





Director-General of General Food Policy Bureau,
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries
Tokyo, Japan














